The Eternal Flame: Politics of the Olympic Games

Alyssa Gunstrom

The purpose of this study is to analyze the International Olympic Committee's (IOC) host city site selection process. The recent Beijing Olympics brought to the surface the political implications of the host city selection. Have the past IOC site selections been politically influenced? What factors do the IOC members consider to make their decision? I use data provided by Paul Poast from the University of Michigan that includes data from every Olympic candidate city since the 1960 Roman Games. Some of the variables analyzed include: European and North American Bias, Bribes, GDP and GDP Growth. Using both quantitative and qualitative analysis, I find that political consideration is important in selecting a host city; however, there does not appear to be a systematic political cause to explain host city selection.

Introduction

Every four years, over 10,000 athletes from more than 200 countries compete in the Olympic Games. The modern Olympics that we partake in today began with Pierre de Coubertin, who believed that sport could be used to advance France's political role in Europe. Coubertin believed that England had become such a global power through their sport ethics taught in schools, but that France's losses were due to their excessive philosophical training. In 1892, during a speech at the Sorbonne, he proposed in Paris the revival of the Olympics. In June of 1894, he issued several invitations to countries around Europe to further discuss the possibility of a modern Olympics. Two years later, Coubertin saw his dream come true with the first modern Olympics, taking place in Athens, Greece (Toohey, 9).

While the revival of the modern Olympics was brought about for political advancement, the International Olympic Committee (IOC) has tried to distance itself from its political roots, but many are suspect as to how sincere this objective is. And as the IOC is trying to be more nonpolitical, it seems as if the host site selections have become increasingly political. The Beijing site selection brought to the forefront the political implications of choosing certain cities to host the Olympics. Recently, Chicago was passed over for the 2016 Olympics in favor for it Rio de Janeiro. Some suggest that Chicago suffered from the IOC's political partiality against the U.S. There has been little quantitative analysis to prove or dispel such accusations. The following literature review and large-N analysis will try to uncover the variables that influence the decisions of the International Olympic Committee's host city selections (a list of all Olympic host cities are provided in the Appendix).

Literature Review

Ideological Regimes and Olympic Politics

The greatest criticisms that the Olympics and the IOC has received towards its host city selection process is that states and cities that are chosen seem too captured by political and cultural forces connected with the history of the twentieth century, like fascism, totalitarian and communism. Various countries have viewed the Olympics as a forum to promote their perceived political state (Shoval, 586). Jarol Manheim suggests that the Olympics are inextricably linked to international politics, due to the level of nationalism the festivities create, with the visible nationalistic elements (such as flags and uniforms) and the opportunity for propaganda through competition and infrastructure, which gives the host the chance to show off and advocate their cause to the world (Manheim, 279). The Olympics incite nationalism and passion, not only in the hosts but all participants and spectators. Some suggest that the problem with the IOC and Olympic structure is that it pervades these ideals through pomp and circumstance; as a result this type of structure does not allow for the real activists of the host city to confer any kind of credible moral activism (Hoberman, 24). What is interesting about the Games is that they are awarded to a *city* not a *country;* the IOC does this as a means to try cutting the political and nationalist attitudes of the Games, however this precaution has never been proven to work.

The Olympic committee's goal is to embrace the entire "human family", but in doing so the IOC has awarded the Games to police states that are bent on staging spectacular festivals to reinforce their own authority (Hoberman, 22). The best example of this tendency would be the Berlin Olympics of 1936. The IOC gave Berlin the

Olympics in 1931, with the hopes that it would aid Germany in the restoration after its defeat in WWI. However, they could not predict the election of Hitler in 1933, which would change the direction of Germany's politics.

At first, Hitler did not approve of the Olympics, but after some time realized the significance that they had for propaganda of the new German state and to show the supremacy of the Aryan race. As a result, the 1936 Olympics got the moniker the "Nazi Olympics" (Toohey, 91). Hitler was not the only dictator to take advantage of the Olympics. In 1968, Mexico City obtained the Olympics and used it as a platform to legitimatize their questionably democratic government's rule, which lead to huge protesting and a massacre of about 300 students. Another twenty years later, Seoul, South Korea was able to claim the Games under a repressive military rule by General Chun Doo-hwan.

The Economic Costs and Benefits of Hosting the Games

Most cities who apply do so for more benign reasons. Finland, Australia, and Canada applied and received the Games for the main reason that they wished to generate worldwide attention to their achievements and agendas. The 1984 Olympics in Los Angeles marked a turning point; after that year, the Olympics became financially profitable. This gave rise to the number of cities applying to host the Games. It was no longer just about visibility and prestige anymore, but they began to after the potential for great national and city profit (Shoval, 589).

Since the 1960's increase in the popularity and widespread use of television, the IOC and Olympics have become exceedingly profitable. NBC paid $1.25 billion dollars to be the only provider of coverage for the 2000 and 2004 Olympics. The host country

keeps 49% of these profits and the IOC receives the other 51% (Poast, 77). In fact, the broadcasting rights are the number one money maker for the IOC at $2.23 billion for the 2002 and 2004 Olympics; the next largest profit was from domestic sponsorship at $796 million dollars. Even with the high revenue from these broadcasting rights, there still is a larger amount of funding that a host city must provide to create successful Games.

Many cities need to add public transportation along with other basic facilities and infrastructure to house the events, participants, and spectators. The cost for the Athens Games was $16 billion and the recent Beijing Olympics were $40 billion (Humphreys, 30). Even with extreme cost, cities apply because the Olympics attract tourists, push the completion of public works projects and gain international media for future visitors and prestige (Poast, 75). The Games are very important for cities who wish to revitalize their urban development. Cities who have applied for these reasons were Paris, London, New York, Chicago, and Barcelona (Shoval, 597).

In the 2004 Olympics, Athens was able to build up their appeal by increasing their public infrastructure and international appeal, although they had been a ‘world capital’ for countless years prior. Athens was able to build a new state of the art metro system for the city, which might not have been funded otherwise. The Games have not always been a profitable event. The Montreal Games of 1976 just finished paying off their billion dollar debt in 2006 (Humphreys, 30). The cost of the bidding process alone is in the tens of millions of dollars; causing cities to gamble millions on the hopes of obtaining the Games. The economic impact of the Olympics can be a huge economic risk that potential host cities are willing to take, whether that gamble will lead to economic success and rejuvenation like Los Angeles or decades of debt like that of Montreal.

The Olympics can not only transform the image of city through urban development, but also through international media attention. The mass media attention and focus on the hosting city starts during the bidding process and snowballs through the win and the building process of the Olympic stadiums, leading to the Olympic Games themselves. The Olympics can increase a city's attraction and appeal for tourists and future capital investors by the amount of media a city receives. Atlanta wanted the Olympics for this very reason. Atlanta wanted to broaden their appeal and be known as an international city and be on the same stage as other American cities like New York, Chicago and Los Angeles, rather than be seen only as a southern hub. The Olympics helped boost the Atlanta area economy and appeal through positive media coverage, but cities like New York and London might attract negative attention through hosting the Games. This theory implies that large established cities with a significant tourist and capital investment communities will be put off by the increased activities during the period of the Olympics (Shoval, 594). During the bid development stage, a city must weight the positive and the negative aspects of hosting the Olympics before submitting their bid, because of the significant economic impact a major event like the Olympics hold on their citizenry.

Political Considerations and the IOC

In the history of the IOC, there has been a significant outside political influence on the committee. From the very first meeting at the Sorbonne Conference, there were political considerations in who should be invited to the Games. A political decision was made regarding whether or not the Sorbonne would invite a German representative to the Games, because at the time France and Germany were not politically friendly (Toohey,

97). Throughout the years the external political pressure continued within the organization. In 1916, the Russian Empire put pressure on the organization to exclude Finland from the Games. Then Bohemia, a founding member of the IOC, was pushed out by the Austrian-Hungarian Empire. In 1976, twenty-two African and Middle Eastern countries protested the Montreal Games because of the inclusion of New Zealand, who had participated in tournaments in apartheid South Africa. Also, the participation of Taiwan has been under controversy because of the relations with China (Seppäen, 122).

One of the most important external political movements happened during the 1980 Olympics; President Jimmy Carter lead a boycott against the Moscow Games to protest the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan and its restrictions of political rights (Hoberman, 26). The boycott, however, did not do anything to change the situation in Afghanistan and rights of the Soviet people.

The Games have been used as a stage for "public diplomacy"; wherein one government tries to influence a second nation's government's actions through media and public opinion (Manheim, 279). The Olympics have been used to display displeasure with another state or political system through demonstrations; boycotts, withdrawal, protest, cancellation and pullouts. The IOC frequently denounces these actions, repeating their mission of being a nonpolitical organization. Seppäen argues that the problem with this position is that politics is inextricably part of the Games; however the IOC cannot control the independence of the participating countries has accepted and chosen to ignore the considerable amount of political influence within the IOC (Seppäen, 118-121). Some ideas have been to establish a permanent Olympic site or perhaps to break the Games into

smaller world championships; however, this would reduce the significance of the Games, a price which the IOC and the Olympic movement is unlikely to support (Toohey, 99).

In *The Olympic Games: A Social Science Perspective*, the writers suggest that the proposition of separating sports and politics would be leaving out an important level of politics; that politics on this level is no longer party politics, but reflects a society as a whole (99). At an IOC meeting, President Jacques Rogge said "Politics invited itself into sports. We didn't call for politics to come". But in the last 75 years there has been a significant manipulation and exploitation of the Olympic Games for the advancement of a political agenda, whether by the IOC or an external political force (Hoberman, 22).

The Olympic Games, according to some political analysts has actually been one of the most successful political movements because of the continuous claims of being specifically a sporting organization with a philosophy that places it above political agendas (Toohey, 58). The Seoul Olympics were portrayed by the government of South Korea as a source for economic benefit for their economy and as a symbolic welcome back into the family of nations (Manheim, 286). In fact, the government was successful in becoming a democratic state in part, because of the contributions of the Olympics (Black-Bezanson, 1246). The struggle between the idealistic ideals and principles of the Olympic movement has been in constant competition with the reality of the world in which we live (Seppäen, 124).

Looking for Systematic Politics in IOC Decisions

Paul Poast uses a Large-N study to statistically analyze factors that are perceived to influence the IOC's host city selection. According to Poast, there are six social science categories that most Olympic analysis fall into. These categories are: economic

considerations, American corporate dependence, European identity, corruption, presidential preference, and distributive. His variables all coincide with these categories, including GDP, European bias, bribe, and population totals.

In the first category, Poast's theory is that the IOC selects candidates with the economic means to host the games. The economic capacity to a host city and country are undoubtedly critical. To illustrate how important economics are in deciding a host city is take the Berlin candidacy of 1980. President Ronald Reagan wanted the Olympics to go to Berlin in order to bring a "peaceful development between East and West" because the two states might develop a stronger relationship through the shared event. Even after the reunification, the U.S. wanted to see the Olympics go to Germany as a symbol of ceased hostilities. However, the IOC found that the economic obligations were just too high for the rebounding German economy. Although Berlin would have been the perfect political choice for the Games, the IOC eliminated them as a candidate on economic grounds.

The second category Poast suggests that the IOC wants to appease the United States so it makes decisions that would not incite U.S. boycotts and displeasure. However, this would suggest that the Committee should not have chosen Moscow or Beijing to host the Olympics; as discussed previously, the choice of Moscow to host the Olympics caused then President Jimmy Carter to lead a boycott against the Olympics. The European identity category suggests that the IOC is a European creation and because of their strong presence, the Games are predominately awarded to European cities. This category seems to be predominately true by looking at the past hosts of the Olympics, considering that the first Asian country to host the Olympics was Tokyo in 1964 and it was only the second time that the modern Olympics were held outside of Europe. Since

that time only 6 out of 26 Summer Olympics have been held outside the European continent.

The fourth and fifth groups claim that bribes and the IOC's president's influence are great factors in the ultimate choice of the committee's decisions. The IOC has been accused of taking bribes from multiple organizations during the bidding process and during the planning stages of the Games. The 1996 Salt Lakes City Games had so many problems with bribes that Mitt Romney was brought on late in the process to get the National Olympic Committee organized. It has been alleged that the 1992 Olympics were given to Barcelona because it was the hometown of the then IOC president.

The last category suggests that in order to maintain a global balance and fairness, the Games should be distributed equally around the globe. As previously stated, only 6 of 26 Summer Olympics have been out of the European continent; however, since the 1964 Olympics, there has been the most dispersion with 5 of the 12 Olympics held since then being outside of Europe.

Poast's research created quantitative variables to measure the systematic impact of various forces on IOC decision making. They have been an influential part of my own research, using the six categories to develop my own hypothesis and analysis of host site selections process.

The reviving principal of the Olympic Games, according to Coubertin, was to be a political game as much as a show of physical aptitude. While the overall goal of the Olympics is to promote fair play, peace, and understanding some believe that it has not been able to live up to this grand goal. Politics pervades all aspects of the International Olympic Committee and their site decisions, but the committee has been unable to accept

or perhaps embrace the political influence that they have. With my study, I hope to obtain a better understanding of the decisions made by the IOC and uncover if global politics do have an effect on the Olympic host city selection process.

Methods and Analysis

In reviewing the previous Olympic literature and research, analysis has clearly been irregular, using both quantitative and qualitative research. My analysis focuses on quantitative research, using difference of mean analysis, and briefly touching on qualitative in the conclusion.

I use data provided by Paul Poast from the University of Michigan that includes data from every Olympic candidate city since the 1960 Rome Games. The variables in this data set include; *win bid, CIUS, European bias, one, five,* and *ten year GDP growth rates, bribes, continental bias, population, city population, real GDP,* and *a North American bias.*

The original data set that I received had 99 cases, but I updated the set to include more recent host city decisions, bringing the total case number to 109. I used SPSS to do a difference of means analysis on the data of *Continental, European,* and *North American bias*. I calculated these variables with the interval variables of *Win Bid, 1st round loser,* and *2nd Place loser*. The last table that I generated was an overall difference of means with the dependent variable *Win Bid*, looking at the difference between the Olympic site winner and *all* losing candidate bids. Below are further explanations of the variables.

Dependent Variables

1st round losers: a dichotomous variable, where 1st round losers receive a 1 and all others receive a 0. They are candidate cities who were voted out during the first round of selection voting.

2nd place losers: a dichotomous variable, where 2nd place losers receive a 1 and all others receive a 0. They are candidate cities who were voted out during the last round of selection voting.

Win bid: a dichotomous variable, which the winner of the host city received a 1 and *all* losers received a 0.

Independent Variables

CIUS: measures the political proximity of a candidate city's national government's closeness to the United States. It is measured using the voting history of the country in the United Nations General Assembly in relation to the U.S.'s voting habits. The higher the CIUS the closer a country's voting habits are to those of the United States.

One year growth: average growth rate of the real GDP per capita a year prior to selection

Five year growth: average growth rate of the real GDP per capita five years prior to selection

Ten year growth: average growth rate of the real GDP per capita ten years prior to selection

Bribe: measures the impact of bribes by NOC and local Olympic committees on the IOC's host city selection. The variable is created by using the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), it ranges from 0 to 10 with 0 representing the perceived government

corruption because most Olympic organizations are closely related to the local governments.

Population: population of candidate city's country

City population: population of a candidate city

Real GDP: the real GDP per capita the year of the selection

Continental bias: a dummy variable, where a candidate receives a 1 if the immediately preceding Olympic were held in the same continent as the candidate, and a 0 if not

European bias: a dummy variable, which a European country receives a 1, and otherwise a 0

North American bias: a dummy variable, which a North American country receives a 1, and otherwise 0

Results

The Difference of Means analysis did not show any clear pattern of IOC host city selection. However, the analysis did produce some significant difference measurement, showing some favorability by the IOC on the independent variables. The following conclusions reveal which independent variables contain the most significant information to determine the IOC's selection process.

Comparing Within and Across Continents

(Table 1.1 about here)

The most significant results produced was relating to the *Continental Bias*. Within that variable, I tried breaking the variables down farther and included only the Olympics located on the same continent as the previous Olympics. The only variable that was significant at any level above .058, which is noteworthy, because Poast did not find

any bribe significance. The data was significant with the *Win Bid* variable at a level of .05, and *1st Round Losers* at .01. The results of the *Bribe* variable on Table 1.1 are intriguing. It is theorized that a city with the highest bribe should win the overall bid process, and that is what the results on the table showed. The *Bribe* mean for the winner was 8.55, second place was 7.11 (though the mean difference was not significant at any level) and first round loser was 6.366. This patterns reveals that the higher the bribe of a city's nation the more likely to win the bidding process. I expected from the results of Poast that there would be considerable significance in the economic variables. The other Difference of Means variables were insignificant at all levels.

However, it is interesting to note the *Real GDP's* means showed the winners had a 10,861, second place losers had 8,137.33 and first round losers were 9,768.50. Although none of the means were significant, the means do not follow a reasonable pattern. If the IOC were looking for host cities that could support the Games financially, the second place loser should have been voted out before the first round loser due to its lower GDP score. This data suggests that perhaps bribes offered to the IOC do influence their voting in selection host cities.

It is also interesting to note that the CIUS of the 2nd Round Loser was negatively higher than that of the 1st Round Loser and the All Bid Winners vs. Losing Bids. This could possibly suggest that in the later stages of voting committee members do take in consideration the closeness of candidate cities' country's closeness with the United States, meaning in this case that the closer a country is aligned with the United States their bidding city has a lesser chance of winning.

(Table 1.2 about here)

Then, I reselected the cases to measure candidate cities from Different Continents. This revealed that the *Win Bid* and *1st Round loser* variables were significant with the *Growth Ten* variable at .01, backing the Poast research. The dismissal of the first round loser was expected, because it had the largest mean difference. The variable followed the expected pattern were the cities with the highest growth rate faired better in the selection process than the ones with a lower growth rate.

The *Bribe* variable is very curious on this table, because unlike table 1.1, where the city's nation with the highest bribe won, on table 1.2 the city with the highest bribe did not win like expected. In fact, the winner of the bid had the lowest bride of the three dependent variables. The highest bribe was the second place loser, which was the only significant variable in this table.

The *City Population* variable became significant at a .05 level, perhaps reflecting that the IOC has some bias towards a city with a larger populous when it comes down to the final two candidates. However, I expected the greatest differences in any of the variables should have been between the winner and the first round loser because, theoretically, these two should be farthest from each other. However, in the *City Population* variable the winner and the first round loser were closer in proximity than the second place loser who got further in the bidding process. The *Real GDP* variable reflects the results like those on Table 1.1. It should be expected that the winner would have the largest GDP; but in Table 1.2, the average winner has a lower GDP, two out of the three dependent variables, and had the largest mean difference is against the second place loser. While this is a significant trend, it is not statistically significant.

Comparing European and Non European Bids

(Table 2.1 about here)

The Difference of Means analysis of the European and non-European cities revealed little insight to the IOC host city decisions. The European candidate cities means of analysis did not uncover statistically significant data, and the non-European variable test's only significant data was the Ten Year Growth variable at a .05 level. The expected results on Table 2.1 of the European cities were that the winner of the bid and the second place losers should be furthest apart, if the IOC is trying to be more globally diverse and are not Eurocentric in their choices as they claim in their statements. In fact, the data reveals that the second place losers are furthest away from the winner of the bid and the first round winners are closest to the winner.

(Table 2.2 about here)

In Table 2.2 (non-European candidates cities) it was expected that, if it would have been significant, the winners would have the highest *CIUS*- if, in fact, there was an American bias in the selection process. The analysis showed the exact opposite. The winners seemed to have the lowest mean difference *CIUS.* Looking at the *Real GDP* on Table 2.2, it shows the expected outcome like on Table 1.1. The winner of the bid had a GDP of 11,341.29, second place loser had 10,381.62, and the first place loser had a GDP of 10,674.75, showing that the IOC does consider GDP in some cases; though the analysis unfortunately, was not significant. Although much of the European and non-European tables do not reveal statistically information significant at the moment with the data available, it could become significant with more candidate cities.

The last difference of means analysis, the *North American Bias*, was broken down into North American and non-North American candidates cities, like the previous variables. In the North American analysis, the only variable measurement significant was the *CIUS* under the *2nd Place loser* at a level of .05, which varies from the pattern of the only variables being significant in the difference of means analysis.

Comparing North America and Non North American Bids

(Table 3.1 about here)

The *CIUS* suggests that cities outside North America, who voted alongside the US in the General Assembly of the United Nations, were given a bit of an edge during the selection process. The results I expected to be significant were the means difference *CIUS*. This is because one of the theories of how the IOC selects its host cities is due to a city's connection with the United States, especially for those cities that are located on the same continent as the United States. However, the analysis revealed that the winner of the bid from the North American supported host cities had the lowest *CIUS* score and the first round and second place losers shared a score of 700.00, showing that perhaps the IOC is trying to distance itself from candidate's cities whose country voted similarly to the United States. Of course, like most of the analysis results the data was not statistically significant.

(Table 3.2 about here)

In the non-North American candidates, the ten year GDP growth rate (*Growth Ten*) was significant for the *Bid Winners* at a level of .05, showing that the IOC has, according to the pattern in the data, taken in account the ten year economic growth of a city when selecting a host. The next variable that received two significant levels was the

City Population for the *Bid Winners* at a level of .05 and the *2nd Place loser* at a .01 significance, showing the city population in non-North American candidates does have an affect during the selection process. The expected results, like the North American candidates, were for the *CIUS* to be significant. However, the resulting outcome showed it was not necessarily important for a country to vote in correspondingly to the United States, but to have a score that is smaller, indicating that a country does not vote parallel to the United States, which would demonstrate that the IOC was trying to pick a host cities that does not necessarily align with the United States.

Comparing All Bids

(Table 4 about here)

The final table contains the difference means of analysis of all the candidate cities separated into winners and losers. The variables that were significant were the ten year GDP growth rate (*Growth Ten*) at a .05 level, and the *City Population* and *Continental Difference* at a .01. The expected result of the analysis was for the *Continental*, *North American*, and *European Bias* to be significant. These independent variables are the most controversial topics discussed. That is in part due to most people assuming the IOC considers only three factors during selection: 1) if it's favorable to Europe 2) if it's favorable to the North American continent (specifically the United States) and 3) the IOC tries to have a global diversity in host sites, which seems counterproductive to the first two assumptions. In the analysis, the only variable that was significant on Table 4 was *Continental Difference*, exposing that continental difference is an important factor for the IOC when they vote on the future site of the Olympics.

The *Continental*, *North American*, and *European Bias* variables were not significant; nevertheless, their means are advantageous. The *European Bias* illustrated that there is no bias within the IOC for European candidate cities, because the winner had a lower score (.36) than the loser (.56).

In contrast, the *North American Bias* presented evidence that there maybe a North American bias, which goes against the analysis of the North American and non-North American Candidate Cities tables along with the results from the *CIUS*, which on Table 4 shows that the winner is closer in political proximity than the loser. The analysis confirms that the decision process of the International Olympic Committee is difficult to systematically study the political and economic factors that influence the host site selection.

The difference of means analysis revealed that the only significant data was from *City Population*, *Bribe*, and the ten year growth rate (*Growth Ten*); and only on Table 4, the only relevant data was the *Continental Difference* variables. The problem with any data set and analysis is the lack of cases to manipulate, which makes it difficult to acquire statistically significant data.

Expected Data Outcomes

While much of my data was not significant, there were trends I did expect to see in my data; some of which I was able to observe and others just the opposite occurred.

The first variable tested, the *CIUS*, there was an expectation that those countries that aligned themselves closer to the United States would prevail further in the bidding process due to the committee's wish to please United States corporations and media outlets. In a majority of the cases (Tables 1.1, 2.1, 2.2, 3.2), the winner had a higher

negative *CIUS*, while the loser of the bid had a lower one. However, those countries that had positive *CIUS* and lost the bid had higher Difference of Means values, suggesting that perhaps there could be greater U.S. disapproval than positive even though there are more instances of negative *CIUS* bid winners.

In the case of the variables of *Growth Five* and *Growth Ten*, the results were as expected. Those cities with the greatest amount of growth over the time period were more likely to move further on in the bidding process and ultimately win the bid. There were only few exception to this pattern and did not yield and significant changes to the suggested outcomes.

The next variable, which was discussed quite a bit, was *Bribe.* As stated under the analysis of Table 1.1, the winners' of the bids are expected to be those that had the higher bids, however this was not always the case. In fact, there were only six times that the winner had a higher bribe: three won in the 1st Round, two in the 2nd Round and one in the All Bid Winners vs. Losers. It is interesting to note that Table 1.1, *Difference Means of Analysis for Olympic Bid Winners and Losers by Same Continent Olympics* had the most instances of a bribe winning a bid. Again, the bribe variable is only a measurement of the *whole* countries bribe index and does not measure a particular candidate's actual recorded bribes, meaning that those that have higher bribes could perhaps have fewer instances of bribes during a bid than those that are counted as having lower because of the type of variable used. Also, it is difficult to accurately measure bribes, because they are not normally something a candidate city or a committee member would want to keep track of in case of being found out.

The next two variables, *Country* and *City Population*, one might believe the candidate with the higher population would win the bid, because it could indicate a candidate with better infrastructure, regional hubs and are more economically secure, which are three key components one might believe are important to hosting a mega event such as the Olympics. This holds to be true except for a few cases, as well. Again, the odd one out is Table 1.1; where *Country* and *City Population* for All Bid Winners and 1st Round Loss Means had the city and country with the lesser population winning. I do not have an indication based on the expected and received outcomes of the other tables to understand why this table happens to have the most bid winners the lowest population; although I suspect that it could have something to do with their high bribes, as mentioned previously.

The last widely used variable, *Real GDP*, did not have a sure negative pattern, indicating that those candidates with the higher GDP won the bid, like expected and was showing the *Growth Five* and *Growth Ten* variables. Tables 1.1, 2.2 and 3.1 all exhibited the winners having the highest *Real GDP* and the loser had the lowest; however the opposite is found in Tables 3.2 and 4 with the winners having the lowest *Real GDP*. Table 4's data results, for me, seem to be the most surprising, because this is the analysis of all the bid winners and losers without further breaking down the data and operizing it. Of all the tables, I would have expected Table 4 to show the *Real GDP* to be negative, like the growth rates.

Conclusion

With the lack of much significant statistical data, researchers have employed the qualitative or social perspective, as the favored form of methodology. The areas in which

commentators have concentrated on are human rights, and reintroducing WWII losers through hosting the Olympics.

Human rights have been an important factor for many people in regards to the Olympic spirit. The 2008 summer Olympics in Beijing revealed IOC's emphasis of their political autonomy. Beijing was kept from hosting the 2000 Olympics by political pressure from the West, because when the site was chosen it was only 3 years after the Tiananmen Square massacre (Poast, 76). The Beijing Games again came under protest, because of the Chinese brutality in Tibet, energy deals with Sudan and Burma, and the overall internal repression of their people (Black, 1255). Some of the leaders of the protest against Beijing holding the Olympics were Steven Spielberg, Mia Farrow and Olympian Joey Cheek, who was denied a visa for his outspoken disapproval of China's connection to Darfur. The IOC is inundated with politics and the concerns of outsiders. There have been frequent proposals to eliminate or reduce political interference; but as revealed in the literature review; boycotts have been used in prior Olympics as a form of political expression.

Since the end of WWII, almost every Olympic Games have been involved with politics in some manner; mostly in that cities in the defeated countries began holding the Games. Perhaps the IOC believed that if the defeated countries held the Games, it would symbolically mark their rehabilitation and emphasize their new set of values. Italy was the first Axis Power to obtain the Games; coincidently, Italy (Rome, 1960) obtained the least amount of negative stigma from the war then Japan (Tokyo, 1964). The selection of Munich in 1972, the IOC incorporated the last of the losers of WWII and the most responsible for the atrocities during the WWII (Shoval, 589). With the inclusion of a

Soviet Union city, Moscow in 1980, as a host the IOC signaled the inclusion of communist and socialist states as acceptable host cities, going against the political support of Western governments. The Moscow, Seoul, and Beijing Games were all controversial choices that integrated states into the greater international world. Despite their assertion of being a apolitical international organization the IOC has been influenced by international politics as Table 5 summarizes various potential political influence.

(Table 5 about here).

There have been accusations that the IOC is Western and Eurocentric, however quantitative research has dispelled this suggestion thus far. Yet, there is a trend of Western influence or American specifically, in the host city selection process. It can't be only a phenomenon of coincidences that WWII losers received the Olympics. While perhaps we can deduce that the host cities want to be accepted back into the international community, the IOC and the Western influences also wanted to use the Olympics as a way to reintroduce the defeated countries back in the international community.

It is unfortunate that there is a lack of data to do proper quantitative research; however, additional data in the future may create significant results. By adding more information to the data set, those variables that are insignificant but on the verge of being significant data could be revealed. While the data found in this Large-*N* study did not reveal much significant data or dispel major assumptions on the Olympic Host site decisions, there is a possibility that there is a variable or variables that better explain the Olympic trends but have not yet been discovered or have not been transformed/coded properly to reveal significant patterns.

Overall, further research on the Olympics should focus on adding to the data set and further scrutinize qualitatively and quantitatively the Olympic host site decisions made by the International Olympic Committee.

Table 1.1

Difference of Means Analysis for Olympic Bid Winners and Losers by Same Continent Olympics

	All Bid Winners vs. Losing Bid Means	Mean Difference	1st Round Loss Means	Mean Difference	2nd Round Loss Means	Mean Difference
CIUS Loser Winner	601.38 (N= 24) 675.00 (N= 2)	-73.625	597.56 (N=9) 675.00 (N=2)	-77.44	563.83 (N= 6) 675.00 (N= 2)	-111.17
Growth One Loser Winner	2.722 (N= 27) 2.519 (N= 2)	.2030	3.493 (N=10) 2.519 (N=2)	.9741	3.756 (N=6) 2.519 (N= 2)	1.24
Growth Five Loser Winner	3.5967 (N=27) 4.1900 (N= 2)	-.59331	4.0867 (N=10) 4.1900 (N=2)	-.10333	2.8327 (N= 6) 4.1900 (N= 2)	1.36
Growth Ten Loser Winner	2.646 (N=24) 3.735 (N= 2)	-1.0893	2.816 (N=9) 3.735(N=2)	-.9195	2.293 (N= 5) 3.735 (N= 2)	-1.44
Bribe Loser Winner	6.967 (N=27) 8.550 (N= 2)	-1.5830*	6.366 (N=10) 8.550 (N=2)	-2.1840**	7.110 (N= 6) 8.550 (N= 2)	1.44
Country Population Loser Winner	41.6 mil. v 26.3 mil. (N= 2)	15.3 mil.	41.6 mil.(N=10) 26.3 mil. (N=2)	15.3 mil.	30.3 mil. (N= 6) 26.3 mil. (N= 2)	-4 mil.
City Population Loser Winner	1 mil. (N= 26) 90,000 (N= 2)	910,000	500,000 (N=10) 90,000 (N=2)	410,000	900,000 (N=6) 90,000 (N= 2)	-8,10000
Real GDP Loser Winner	10,062.07 (N=27) 10,861.00 (N= 2)	-7988.926	9,768.50 (N=10) 10,861.00 (N=2)	-1092.500	10,861.00(N=6) 8,137.33(N= 2)	-2,723.67

*Significant at .05 **Significant at .01

Table 1.2

Difference of Means Analysis of Olympic Bid Winners and Losers,
Excluding Bids from Same Continent as Previous Olympics

	All Bid Winners vs. Losing Bid Means	Mean Difference	1st Round Loss Means	Mean Difference	2nd Round Loss Means	Mean Difference
CIUS Loser Winner	 616.95 (N= 41) 600.35 (N=20)	16.601	 592.00 (N= 13) 600.35 (N= 20)	-8.350	 624.69 (N= 13) 600.35 (N= 20)	24.342
Growth One Loser Winner	 3.165 (N=55) 3.643 (N=26)	-.4785	 2.472 (N=17) 3.643 (N=26)	-1.1713	 2.963 (N=21) 3.643 (N=26)	-.6803
Growth Five Loser Winner	 2.3257 (N= 55) 3.3748 (N=26)	-1.04911	 2.6748 (N=17) 3.3748 (N=26)	-.69984	 2.1507 (N=21) 3.3748 (N=26)	-1.22407
Growth Ten Loser Winner	 2.304 (N=50) 3.575 (N=24)	-1.2706**	 2.013 (N=16) 3.575 (N=24)	-1.5620**	 2.238 (N=20) 3.575 (N=24)	-1.3372
Bribe Loser Winner	 7.276 (N=55) 6.789 (N=26)	.4864	 7.086 (N=17) 6.789 (N=26)	.2972	 7.648 (N=21) 6.789 (N=26)	.859**
Country Population Loser Winner	 93 mil. (N=55) 138 mil. (N=26)	-45 mil.	 81 mil. (N=17) 138 mil. (N=26)	-57 mil.	 124 mil. (N=21) 138 mil. (N=26)	-14 mil.
City Population Loser Winner	 1.7 mil. (N=55) 2.2 mil. (N=26)	-500,000	 2.5 mil. (N=17) 2.2 mil. (N=26)	300,000	 1.3 mil. (N=21) 2.2 mil. (N=26)	-900,000**
Real GDP Loser Winner	 11,952.78 (N=55) 10,775.49 (N=26)	1177.289	 10,697.52 (N=17) 10,775.49 (N=26)	-77.968	 12,534.95 (N=21) 10,775.49 (N=26)	1759.46

**significant at .01

Table 2.1

Difference of Means Analysis of Olympic Bid Winners and Losers by European Candidate Cities

	All Bid Winners vs. Losing Bid Means	Mean Difference	1st Round Loss Means	Mean Difference	2nd Round Loss Means	Mean Difference
CIUS Loser Winner	 617.78 (N=40) 639.09 (N=11)	-21.316	 593.79 (N=14) 639.09 (N=11)	-45.305	 616.60 (N=10) 639.09 (N=11)	-22.491
Growth One Loser Winner	 3.214 (N=45) 3.285 (N=11)	-.0714	 3.447 (N=15) 3.285 (N=11)	.1618	 2.926 (N=14) 3.285 (N=11)	-.3595
Growth Five Loser Winner	 2.7576 (N=45) 3.2793 (N=11)	-.52163	 3.4304 (N=15) 3.2793 (N=11)	.15117	 1.9204 (N=114) 3.2793 (N=11)	-1.35892
Growth Ten Loser Winner	 2.478 (N=40) 3.086 (N=10)	-.6082	 2.385 (N=14) 3.086 (N=10)	-.0714	 1.880 (N=12) 3.086 (N=10)	-1.2058
Bribe Loser Winner	 7.255 (N=45) 6.782 (N=11)	.4728	 6.688 (N=15) 6.782 (N=11)	-.0938	 7.718 (N=14) 6.782 (N=11)	.9360
Country Population Loser Winner	 2.7 mil. (N=45) 37.2 mil. (N=11)	-34.5 mil.	 31.7 mil. (N=15) 37.2 mil. (N=11)	-5.5 mil.	 20.2 mil. (N=14) 37.2 mil. (N=11)	-17 mil.
City Population Loser Winner	 9.1 mil. (N=44) 1.3 mil. (N=11)	7.8 mil.	 1 mil.(N=15) 1.3 mil. (N=11)	-300,000	 800,000 (N=14) 1.3 mil. (N=11)	-500,000
Real GDP Loser Winner	 11,208.11 (N=45) 10,179.98 (N=11)	1028.131	 10,096.39 (N=15) 10,179.98 (N=11)	-83.585	 12,649.78 (N=14) 10,179.98 (N=11)	2469.800

Table 2.2

Difference of Means Analysis of Olympic Bid Winners and Losers by Non-European Candidate Cities

	All Bid Winners vs. Losing Bid Means	Mean Difference	1st Round Loss Means	Mean Difference	2nd Round Loss Means	Mean Difference
CIUS Loser Winner	 596.00 (N=24) 570.18 (N=11)	25.818	 595.12 (N=8) 507.18 (N=11)	24.943	 570.18 (N=9) 593.11 (N=11)	-22.929
Growth One Loser Winner	 2.804 (N=36) 3.398 (N=17)	-.5945	 2.104 (N=12) 3.398 (N=17)	-1.2942	 3.398 (N=13) 3.369 (N=17)	.0287
Growth Five Loser Winner	 2.7330 (N=36) 3.0383 (N=17)	-.30528	 2.9070 (N=12) 3.0383 (N=17)	-.13131	 3.0383 (N=13) 2.7135 (N=17)	.32478
Growth Ten Loser Winner	 2.336 (N=33) 3.414 (N=16)	-1.0780	 2.197 (N=11) 3.414 (N=16)	-1.2178*	 3.414 (N=13) 2.589 (N=16)	.8254
Bribe Loser Winner	 7.086 (N=36) 6.946 (N=17)	1.399	 6.984 (N=12) 6.946 (N=17)	.0377	 6.946 (N=13) 7.324 (N=17)	-.3774
Country Population Loser Winner	 138 mil. (N=36) 186 mil. (N=17)	-48 mil.	 110 mil. (N=12) 186 mil. (N=17)	-76 mil.	 186 mil. (N=13) 193 mil. (N=17)	-7 mil.
City Population Loser Winner	 2.2 mil. (N=36) 2.6 mil. (N=17)	-400,000	 2.7 mil. (N=12) 2.6 mil. (N=17)	100,000	 1.7 mil. (N=13) 2.6 mil. (N=17)	-900,000
Real GDP Loser Winner	 11,163.94 (N=36) 11,341.29 (N=17)	-177.350	 10,674.75 (N=12) 11,341.29 (N=17)	-666.544	 10,381.62 (N=13) 11,341.29 (N=17)	-959.679

*significant at .05

Table 3.1

Difference of Means Analysis of Olympic Bid Winners and Losers by North American Candidate Cities

	All Bid Winners vs. Losing Bid Means	Mean Difference	1st Round Loss Means	Mean Difference	2nd Round Loss Means	Mean Difference
CIUS Loser Winner	 668.56 (N=9) 628.25 (N=4)	 40.31	 700.00 (N=2) 629.25 (N=4)	 70.750	 700.00 (N=4) 629.25 (N=4)	 70.750*
Growth One Loser Winner	 2.552 (N=21) 2.227 (N=10)	 .3255	 1.507 (N=6) 2.227 (N=10)	 -.7199	 1.971 (N=8) 2.227 (N=10)	 -.2557
Growth Five Loser Winner	 2.1846 (N=21) 2.2039 (N=10)	 -.01935	 2.6183 (N=6) 2.2039 (N=10)	 .41441	 1.8569 (N=8) 2.2039 (N=9)	 -.34704
Growth Ten Loser Winner	 1.923 (N=19) 2.459 (N=9)	 -.5355	 2.340 (N=6) 2.459 (N=10)	 -.1189	 1.652 (N=8) 2.459 (N=10)	 -.8071
Bribe Loser Winner	 7.917 (N=21) 7.551 (N=10)	 .3661	 8.235 (N=6) 7.551 (N=10)	 .6840	 8.240 (N=8) 7.551 (N=10)	 .6890
Country Population Loser Winner	 133 mil. (N=21) 144 mil. (N=10)	 -11 mil.	 144 mil. (N=6) 144 mil. (N=10)	 0	 115 mil. (N=8) 144 mil. (N=10)	 -29 mil.
City Population Loser Winner	 1.4 mil. (N=21) 1.3 mil. (N=10)	 100,000	 1.35 mil. (N=6) 1.27 mil. (N=10)	 80,000	 1.2 mil. (N=8) 1.3 mil. (N=10)	 -100,000
Real GDP Loser Winner	 13,619.90 (N=21) 14,009.80 (N=10)	 -389.895	 13,109.00 (N=6) 14,009.80 (N=10)	 -900.800	 12,434.75 (N=8) 14,009.80 (N=10)	 -1575.050

*significant at .05

Table 3.2

Difference of Means Analysis of Olympic Bid Winners and Losers by Non-North American Candidate Cities

	All Bid Winners vs. Losing Bid Means	Mean Difference	1st Round Loss Means	Mean Difference	2nd Round Loss Means	Mean Difference
CIUS Loser Winner	 599.96 (N=55) 602.22 (N=18)	 -2.259	 583.70 (N=20) 602.22 (N=18)	 -18.522	 580.27 (N=15) 602.22 (N=18)	 -21.956
Growth One Loser Winner	 3.199 (N=60) 4.305 (N=18)	 -1.1062	 3.234 (N=21) 4.305 (N=18)	 -1.0715	 3.631 (N=19) 4.305 (N=18)	 -.6742
Growth Five Loser Winner	 2.9434 (N=60) 4.1158 (N=18)	 -1.17239	 3.3634 (N=21) 4.1158 (N=18)	 -.75247	 2.4898 (N=19) 4.1158 (N=18)	 -1.62605
Growth Ten Loser Winner	 2.586* (N=54) 4.185 (N=17)	 -1.5981	 2.290 (N=19) 4.185 (N=17)	 -1.8948	 2.530 (N=17) 4.185 (N=17)	 -1.6549
Bribe Loser Winner	 6.922 (N=60) 6.562 (N=18)	 .3602	 6.415 (N=21) 6.562 (N=18)	 -.1464	 7.228 (N=18) 6.562 (N=19)	 .6668
Country Population Loser Winner	 56.4 mil. (N=60) 122 mil. (N=18)	 -65.6 mil.	 44.1 mil. (N=21) 122 mil. (N=18)	 -77.9	 98.6 mil. (N=18) 122 mil. (N=19)	 -23.4
City Population Loser Winner	 1.5 mil.* (N=60) 2.5 mil. (N=18)	 -1 mil.	 1.9 mil. (N=21) 2.5 mil. (N=18)	 -600,000	 1.2 mil.** (N=18) 2.5 mil. (N=19)	 -1.3 mil.
Real GDP Loser Winner	 10,337.48 (N=60) 8,988.15 (N=18)	 1349.329	 9,566.14 (N=21) 8,988.15 (N=18)	 557.984	 11,188.41 (N=18) 8,988.15 (N=19)	 2200.262

*significant at .05 **significant at .01

Table 4

Difference of Means Analysis of Olympic Bid Winners and Losers

	All Bid Winners vs. Losing Bid Means	Mean Difference
CIUS Loser Winner	 607.59 (N=59) 6.89 (N=20)	600.7
Growth One Loser Winner	 2.56 (N=72) 3.36 (N=25)	-.8
Growth Five Loser Winner	 2.68 (N=72) 3.56 (N=25)	-.88
Growth Ten Loser Winner	 2.37 (N=72) 3.62 (N=25)	-1.25*
Bribe Loser Winner	 7.22 (N=72) 6.89 (N=25)	.33
Population Loser Winner	 73.7 mil. (N=72) 134 mil (N=25)	-60.3
City Population Loser Winner	 1.13 mil. (N=72) 1.94 mil. (N=25)	-.81**
Real GDP Loser Winner	 11117.77 (N=72) 10443.71 (N=25)	674.06
Continental Difference Loser Winner	 .33 (N=72) .08 (N=25)	.25**
European Bias Loser Winner	 .56 (N=72) .36 (N=25)	.2
North American Bias Loser Winner	 .25 (N=72) .36 (N=25)	-.11

**significant at .01 *significant at .05

Table 5

Previous Host City Selection and Their Potential Political Significance
in the selection and during the Games

City	Potential Political Selection Criteria	During the Games
Rome 1960	Loser in WWII	South Africa's involvement banned due to apartheid
Tokyo 1964	Loser in WWII, first Asian country to host the Olympics	
Mexico City 1968	Questionable democratic government seeking legitimacy, deadly student protests	Black Panther salute, Vietnam War, East Germany's first involvement
Munich 1972	Loser in WWII	terrorist attack on Israeli competitors
Montreal 1976		Boycott of 30 African and Arab countries for the participation of New Zealand, Taiwanese withdrawal through Chinese pressure
Moscow 1980	Soviet Union, communist controlled state	US lead 60 countries in boycott, because of USSR invasion of Afghanistan, restriction of political & personal liberties
Los Angeles 1984	Response to holding Olympics previously in the Soviet Union	Boycott by Soviet Union
Seoul 1988	Massacre only a year before	Dictatorship to democracy for South Korea
Barcelona 1992	Alleged corruption by the IOC President	First since end of Cold War, South Africa participation
Atlanta 1996	American city with major corporate hubs	Huge commercialism, Terrorist bomb
Sydney 2000		
Athens 2004	Return to home of the Olympics	
Beijing 2008	Communist controlled state, Questioned in human rights and trade connection with Sudan and Burma	

Table 6

Modern Olympic Host Cities

Host City	Year	Season	Continent
Athens	1896	Summer	Europe
Paris	1900	Summer	Europe
St. Louis	1904	Summer	North America
London	1908	Summer	Europe
Stockholm	1912	Summer	Europe
Berlin	1916	Summer	Europe
Antwerp	1920	Summer	Europe
Chamonix	1924	Winter	Europe
Paris	1924	Summer	Europe
St. Moritz	1928	Winter	Europe
Amsterdam	1928	Summer	Europe
Lake Placid	1932	Winter	North America
Los Angeles	1932	Summer	North America
Garmisch-Partenkirchen	1936	Winter	Europe
Berlin	1936	Summer	Europe
Sapporo*	1940	Winter	Asia
Tokyo*	1940	Summer	Asia
Cortina d'Ampezzo*	1944	Summer	Europe
London*	1944	Summer	Europe
St. Moritz	1948	Winter	Europe
London	1948	Summer	Europe
Oslo	1952	Winter	Europe
Helsinki	1952	Summer	Europe
Cortina d'Ampezzo	1956	Winter	Europe
Melbourne**	1956	Summer	Oceania
Squaw Valley	1960	Winter	North America
Rome	1960	Summer	Europe
Innsbruck	1964	Winter	Europe
Tokyo	1964	Summer	Asia
Grenoble	1968	Winter	Europe
Mexico City	1968	Summer	North America
Sapporo	1972	Winter	Asia
Munich	1972	Summer	Europe
Innsbruck	1976	Winter	Europe
Montreal	1976	Summer	North America
Lake Placid	1980	Winter	North America
Moscow	1980	Summer	Europe
Sarajevo	1984	Winter	Europe
Los Angeles	1984	Summer	North America
Calgary	1988	Winter	North America

Seoul	1988	Summer	Asia
Albertville	1988	Winter	Europe
Barcelona	1992	Summer	Europe
Lillehammer	1994	Winter	Europe
Atlanta	1996	Summer	North America
Nagano	1998	Winter	Asia
Sydney	2000	Summer	Oceania
Salt Lake City	2002	Winter	North America
Athens	2004	Summer	Europe
Torino	2006	Winter	Europe
Beijing	2008	Summer	Asia
Vancouver	2010	Winter	North America
London	2012	Summer	Europe
Sochi	2014	Winter	Europe
Rio de Janeiro	2016	Summer	South America

*Canceled due to WWII

**Equestrian events were held in Stockholm due to quarantine restrictions

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