

The Potential Return of Nationalism in Iraq

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Political Science Senior Thesis
Bemidji State University
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April 2010

Abstract

Over the past decade, Iraq has experienced a tremendous amount of change from once being a dictatorial regime to becoming a new and developing democracy. Iraq is dominantly composed of three main and distinct groups known as the Shiites, Sunnis, and Kurds. This paper attempts examine whether or not, Iraqi individuals see themselves first and foremost as Iraqis or as being Muslims first. There has been little research conducted that specifically examines the relationship between nationalism and ethnic identity in Iraq. However, some research suggests that most Iraqis see themselves as being Iraqi first instead of being Muslim first. This study addresses the relationship by examining data from the World Values Survey. Preliminary results confirm that many Sunni and Shiite Iraqi individuals view themselves as Iraqi first rather than Muslim first.

Introduction

Currently Iraq is struggling to become an emerging democracy in the Middle East. It is a country that has been plagued by insurgent violence since the US led invasion in 2003, but throughout its history there have been ethnic tensions, even under Saddam's rule. This state is dominantly made up of three distinct groups the Sunni Muslims, Shiite Muslims, and the Kurdish people. Tensions between these different groups have been present throughout Iraq's history as a state especially during the break up of the empires in 1920 and again in 1973. The current atmosphere in Iraq shows little hope for a unified Iraqi state.

Since 2003 Iraqis have participated in several elections. The 2003 and 2005 elections were seen as largely based on ethno-sectarian lines, which means that Iraqi voters voted for candidates that appealed to their specific ethnicity or religion. This would seem to indicate that Iraqi nationalism was not present during the first two elections. However, the 2008 and 2009 elections that took place in Iraq suggest that a large number of voters broke free from voting along the lines of identity and instead they voted according to the candidates politics. The March 7th 2010 parliamentary election was a very close race between Ayad Allawi's and Nouri al-Maliki. Allawi beat Al-Maliki by a narrow margin. Shortly after the election results were released Al-Maliki appeared on a televised news conference and announced that he would not accept the results. However, the UN and U.S. officials that over saw election process found the results to be credible and called on all sides to accept the results. Allawi won this election because he built a broad coalition that is drawn from both Islamic sects. The results from the 2010 election back up the idea that most Iraqi's have broken free from voting along the lines of

identity. This would seem to indicate a growth in Iraqi nationalism. So does the success of the two recent elections mean that Iraqi nationalism is on the rise or do other factors better explain why Iraqi nationalism is on the rise? Do Iraqis see themselves as Iraqi first or Muslim first? To answer these questions I have reviewed previous literature surrounding the concept nationalism and how it informs prospects for democracy in Iraq.

Literature Review

Nationalism

To get a better understanding of what is happening now in Iraq, I will investigate how nationalism has been commonly defined. Liberal nationalism and ethno-nationalism are the two major ways in which scholars have thought about national identity. Muller (2008) stated that liberal nationalists imply that national identity is solely based around “all people who live in a country’s borders are a part of the nation, regardless of their ethnic, racial, or religious origins” (p. 2). This view can be found by a lot of contemporary Americans, however not all Americans share this same view. Ethno-nationalism was a dominating force throughout European and American history. He also mentioned that, “the core of the ethno-nationalist idea is that nations are defined by a shared heritage, which usually includes a common language, a common faith, and a common ethnic ancestry” (Muller, 2008, p. 3). The way in which Iraqis identify themselves has an important impact for determining how much national pride they exhibit. Ahram (2008) argues that, “political activates and identities in Iraq revolve around this democracy and occupation axis” (p. 117). Ahram is not the only scholar who suggests that foreign occupation increases nationalism among natives. Inglehart would

also agree with Ahram's assessment. He argues that, "lacking the necessary linguistic, religious, and national credentials, an occupying force is not only perceived as having no right to rule, but is likely to become the target of nationalist agitation from the indigenous people" (Inglehart, 2006, p. 4). If these theories are true than I should expect to find high levels of nationalism among individuals who are in favor of the US withdraw from Iraq. Singapore is a perfect example of how British occupation fueled the growth of nationalism among the members of this small island.

Recent theory on identity suggests that it is not fixed but rather it's situational to the identity that will produce the highest pay off. Penn (2008) argues that, "this framework is compatible with the notion of situational selection, the idea that while ethnic groupings may be fixed, ethnic identification can depend in part on situational forces" (p. 2). It is important to note that not all scholars agree with notion of situational selection. For example, Razi (1990) suggests that in the Middle East nationalism and religion generate the widest bonds because they are seen as being commonly held values. He asserts that religion "has a wider and deeper domain than nationalism, particularly among the lower and lower middle strata, which constitute the overwhelming majority of the population" (Razi, 1990, p. 75). If Razi's theory is true than I would expect to find that most Iraqis see themselves first and foremost as Muslim, rather than Iraqi. The survey results from the work of the Independent Institute for Administrative and Civic Society Studies, an Iraqi research firm and they seem to indicate that Iraqi nationalism has been on the rise since 2004. Moaddel (2007) stated that, "these findings show that the feeling of national pride has increased as the percentages of Iraqis who expressed (very

proud to be Iraqis) went up from 77% in (Dec. 2004) to the low eighties in (April-Oct 2006)” (p. 2).

Scholars have used many different methods to measure nationalism in surveys. However, the single-item question has been most widely used for measuring nationalism. The single-item question only uses one question to measure national pride. Inglehart (2006) used the single item question for his study of nationalism and his results were statistically significant. He argues that “the single item measure of nationalism is considered very general and useful for cross-national comparison” (Inglehart, 2006, p. 9). Scholars such as Elkin (2006) and Sides (2006) argue “that many patriotism and nationalism survey items that refer to particular aspects of the nation-state (its government, its history, etc.) are inadequately specific” (p. 8). Their study showed that the single-item measure was correlated highly among the indicators of nationalism and patriotism. In addition, the scores on a multiple-item measure can be more sensitive to individual differences because the multiple item measures can produce a larger number of scores than compared to a single-item measure using a five point scale. For my purposes of investigating Iraqi nationalism I have used the data from World Values Survey. The WVS has used single-item questions that are very similar to the question of how proud are you in being a citizen of your country. With that being said the single-item measure of nationalism seems to be more appropriate than any other measures.

Iraq’s History of Nationalism

To get a better understanding of what is happening now in Iraq I have sought to investigate literature that surrounds Iraq’s history of nationalism. Sunnis and Shiites are both ethnically Arabic. So how are these two groups different? These groups became

distinctly different after Mohammed died in 632 due to disputes over who would be the rightful successor to the prophet. Cole (2006), argues that the “Shiites wanted the prophet to be succeeded by Ali idn Abi Talib, his son in law and cousin, and the Sunni branch was content to have Caliphs, the respected elders of the prophet’s tribe, succeed him” (p. 20). Modern Iraqi history shows that there have been three noticeable attempts to unify the Iraqi people under one government. The first and most evident case of an Iraqi nationalism movement was in the 1920’s. This is when Sunni’s and Shiites joined forces against British rule. Davis (2005) stated that, “Iraqi Muslims went to the houses of Christians and Jews- the largest single ethnic group in Baghdad at the time of the uprising-and insisted that they join protest marches and demonstrations because they were Iraqi citizens like everyone else” (p. 231). However, their Iraqi nationalist vision was crushed by the brutal force of the Hashemite monarchy that was installed by the British in 1921. The second example of Iraqi nationalism was after the British monarchy was overthrown in 1958. Shortly after the overthrowing of the monarchy, Qasim was elected as the prime minister of Iraq. Davis mentions that, “under Qasim sectarianism disappeared as a key element in recruiting for positions within the state bureaucracy, the military, and other official walks of life”(p. 233). This period of non sectarianism abruptly ended when Qasim was overthrown and assassinated by the Baath party in 1963. The Baath party assassinated Qasim because he was in the way of their path to power. After Qasim’s death the Baath party came to power and tried to quickly undo the many social reforms that were enacted by Qasim. Iraq was ruled by Saddam Hussein and the Baath party for a number of years until U.S. forces arrived in 2003.

Saddam quickly sided with the Sunni's, which in turn led to larger sectarianism between Sunni's, Shiite's, and Kurds. In the early 1990's Saddam's regime was running out of money from the cost of two wars and strict United Nations sanctions on its economy. The last attempt to unify Iraqi nationalism occurred during 1991 uprising against Saddam's Baath regime. During this time opposition groups formed and openly discussed sectarianism. According to Davis (2005), one result from this uprising was the "Charter 91, produced at a conference in liberated Kurdistan 1991, which called for a federated, democratic, and culturally pluralistic society" (p. 235). Saddam's reign as dictator was a disaster. Any sense of Iraqi unity was crushed by forced migrations of Shiite's to the south region of Iraq and the chemical weapons attacks against the Kurd's in the northern region of Iraq. Scholars such as, Julie Edwards and Stephan Edwards (2008) argue that "as institutions and apparatuses of the Iraqi state began to further collapse in the wake of the 2003 war, there seemed to be little left to salvage of either Britain's or the Baathists' conception of an Iraqi nation"(p. 335).

Iraq's New Democracy

The US the led invasion in 2003 brought about many changes in Iraq. A democracy was established and many Iraqi's were eager to take up power in this newly established government. So how does democracy and religion fit in with the case of Iraq? Remember Iraq is a state that is very diverse in religion and ethnicity. If Iraq is to succeed in bringing about nationalism and a successful democracy, than religion and democracy must be able to coexist. What emerges from this scenario is the secularist challenge. Recently there has been a rigorous academic debate in the West about secularism verses faith having serious consequences for the future of democracy. So what does the

secularist view entitle? Scholars such as Elshtain, describe a secularist as “someone who wants to go beyond the separation of church and state and to effect a thoroughgoing separation of religion and politics at every level of civil society” (2009, p. 8). The secularist view in the strictest stance seems to be very implausible for promoting democracy in Iraq because this nation is so deeply religious. Perhaps a more plausible way of using the secularist view to promote democracy and build unity would be to set religion apart from the state and to leave it in a private realm. Elshtain (2009) argues that “in much of the Muslim world, secularism is equated with atheism and, as such, is unacceptable to ordinary Muslims” (p. 12).

Since the 2003 invasion, scholars, politicians, and Iraqi citizens have argued in support for either the integration or accommodation approach, as being the best way to manage national and religious diversity in Iraq’s new democracy. According to McGarry (2007), “Integrationist states seek to construct a single overarching public identity” (p. 270). The integrationists are in favor of an executive branch of government and a federation that is not based on ethnic criteria. These researchers see the sectarianism and ethnocentrism that occurs in Iraq as being a recent phenomenon, rather than the possibility of it being established over long periods of time. The consociational approach focuses on accommodating all the different communities in Iraq. McGarry (2009) stated that, “accommodationist democratic states recognize dual or multiple public identities through consociation” (p. 671). Integrationists see accommodationists as being ethnocentric because their plans for Iraq do not include the idea of an ethnically impartial state but the supporters of accommodation see themselves as being pluralists. Both of these systems have flaws and are not perfect. Iraq’s 2005 constitution represents the

accommodationist's views on how the democracy should be designed and operated. So what does all this talk over integration and accommodation have to do with Iraqi nationalism? Well if the integrationist's criticisms of the accommodationists are correct, than I should expect to find low levels of nationalism among the Iraqi individuals.

Iraq's 2003 and 2005 elections were pretty successful in bringing about high numbers of voter turnout with the exception of low turnout among Sunni's in the first election. Most Sunni's boycotted the election because they feared that they would be misrepresented. The 2005 election was very different from the first election because the majority of the Sunni population participated and by doing so they reinstated themselves back into political relevance. In 2005 the UN was picked by the US and Iraq to help select an electoral system for Iraq. The system they picked for this election was proportional representation (PR) with a single state wide ballot. PR is seen as being useful for obtaining a more inclusive result and for dealing with ethnic conflict. However, scholars such as Diamond (2006) reject the use of a single nationwide ballot. He argues "that there is nothing that is more conducive to an election's becoming an identity referendum than a single national-list system in which voters hardly even know who the candidates are" (Diamond, 2006, p. 37). This means that Iraqis were just voting for a party rather than voting for a candidate who would intend to improve Iraqi life. To put it more simply it means party voting. This election was a disaster for secular parties that sought to remove religion from politics. It was an election filled with rigorous debate that suggested it would have a different impact on voter behavior than compared to the 2003 election. Dawisha (2006) stated that "when the voters finally went to the polls, they ended up turning to their primordial loyalties very much as they had in the January 30

elections”(p. 98). Xenophobia might best explain the outcomes of Iraq’s 2003 and 2005 elections. Xenophobia occurs when threats of survival dominate people’s lives. This impulse forces people to focus on the wellbeing of their group, while they distrust views of others. Inglehart (2006) argues that “at the same time, these conditions induce people to close ranks against dangerous outsiders, producing rejection of outsiders and in group solidarity” (p. 496).

The Possible Reemergence of Iraqi Nationalism

This section of my paper reviews literature relating to Iraqi nationalism from the time period of 2009 to 2010. By doing so this will give me a better understanding of what is happening now in Iraq. Since 2004 Iraqi nationalism seems to have been on the rise. Will Iraqi nationalism continue to grow? Well, the January 31, 2009 election results show an indication that there is a reemergence of secular nationalism in Iraq. For the first time, a large majority of Iraqis shifted away from voting for religious parties and Kurdish separatists. These results would seem to indicate that a new and different Iraq is trying to emerge. Raed Jarrar is the Iraq’ consultant to the American Friend Service Committee (AFSC). AFSC is an affiliated organization that provides humanitarian relief and works of social justice. He stated that, “the Iraqi political map has been redrawn and there’s been a significant shift from the sectarian-based politics of 2005 to an electoral map based on people’s politics and not their ethnic or religious identity” (Dreyfuss, 2009, p. 1). This article suggests that most Iraqis are getting fed up with voting for religious parties that fail to produce jobs and other basic services. This is by no means the only source that seems to indicate a rise in Iraqi nationalism. Arraf (2009) mentioned that, “an Iraqi government-funded opinion poll recently found that nearly one-third of voters

surveyed listed improving local services as their biggest priority and almost half preferred secular over religious candidates”(p. 1). If these sources are correct than I would expect to find relatively high amounts of nationalism among Iraqi individuals. However, the growing seeds of nationalism could be crushed by a fight over Kirkuk region.

Kirkuk is a very oil rich region located in northern Iraq that both the Kurds and Arabs want control over it. For many years tensions have increased over Kirkuk due to the enormous wealth that it possesses in oil reserves. The Kurds see Kirkuk as their province and thus they want to make it a part of their self ruled region. Since 2003, many Kurds that were displaced under Saddam’s rule have returned to live in this region. However, many Sunni’s and Shiite’s argue that the Kurds have packed more Kurds into this region than before. The Sunni’s and Shiite’s fear Kurdish control over Kirkuk because they believe that they will stand to loose government benefits and jobs. The associated press from in The New York Times (2010) stated that “the dispute has caused a deadlock over the country’s election law, threatening to delay Iraq’s nationwide elections set for mid-January” (p. 1). The battle over Kirkuk could have devastating impacts over Iraqi nationalism. If the Kurds and Arabs do not come to an agreement soon than national pride could be crushed once again.

Methods and Analysis

Data Source

The data that I used is from the World Values Survey (WVS). This survey was conducted throughout eighteen provinces in Iraq. WVS is a global network of social scientists who survey the basic beliefs and values of individuals from more than eighty

different societies around the world. For my purposes, I used their most recent data set that was produced in 2006 from a survey that was conducted throughout Iraq.

Method

In order to further my examination of nationalism in Iraq I imported the WVS data onto SPSS. This data set provided me with numerous variables that I used as my independent and dependent variables. Most of the independent variables that I used came from three different areas such as religious identity, ethnic identity, and demographic variables. For the religious identity category I created Shiite and Sunni dummy variables. The Shiite dummy variable is coded 0 or 1 (1=Shiite, 0=otherwise). In the ethnic identity category I created a Kurd dummy variable. This variable is also coded 0 or 1 (1=Kurd, 0=otherwise). The demographic variables are Gender, Age, Education, and Income. Gender is another dummy variable that I created and it is also coded 0 or 1 (1=female, 0=male). Region of Interview and War are some other independent variables that I tested with the dependent variable nationalism. The Region of the Interview is a nominal level variable that records the city in which the respondents participated in the survey. War is a nominal level variable that asked respondents to record yes or no if they would be willing to fight in a war for their country. My unit of analysis is Iraqi individuals. The dependent variables are nationalism and total-trust these are measured at the ordinal level. Nationalism scores range between two and seven. Lower scores represent those individuals who have lower feeling levels towards nationalism and higher scores represent those individuals who have a higher feeling towards nationalism (2= not proud, 7= very proud). A similar construction would also apply to my second dependent variable total-trust.

Findings

(Figure 1 about here)

Figure 1 shows the eighteen provinces in which the survey was conducted and the mean average for individuals level of nationalism. The dependent variable in this graph is Nationalism and the independent variable is Region of Interview. Most of the cities in this figure fall shortly below or right above a mean average of 1, for how proud they are of their nationality. However, Erbill and Sulamania are the two cities that stand out the most in this graph. This comes from the fact that both of them have a large number of Sunnis and Kurds that live there. Erbill and Sulamania are located in northern Iraq. These two cities have a relatively high mean average of nationalism compared to the rest of the cities that were used when this survey was conducted. The Chi-Square results show that there is a significant relationship between the dependent variable nationalism and the independent variable, Region of Interview. A significant but yet a weak relationship was present ($\lambda = .069$).

(Table 1 about here)

This table looks at the War variable, would you be willing to fight in a war for your country, and its relationship between the dependent variable Nationalism. ($\chi^2 = .221$) This indicates that there is no significant relationship between Nationalism and V75. Even though this cross tabulation failed to produce significant results it still holds value for my study. This table shows us that most Iraqis are proud of their nationality and that most of those individuals would not be willing to fight in a war for their country. The results seem to suggest that other variables like religion, ethnicity, and demographic ones might be better at explaining nationalism in Iraq.

(Table 2 about here)

Table 2 looks deeper into the relationship between how proud different ethnic groups are of their nationality and their combined trust in Shiites, Sunnis, and Kurds. The Central Arabic Muslims and the Kurds both produced significant results. For the Central Arabic Muslims a negative and weak relationship was present (Somers' $d = -.048$). When looking closer at the Kurds a negative and weak relationship was also found (Somers' $d = -.016$). This table shows that most Central Arabic Muslims responded by saying that they are very proud of their nationality and it also shows that they have high levels of trust in other Shiites, Sunni's, and Kurds. When looking at how proud Kurd respondents are of their nationality most of them fell into the very proud and quite proud category. However, this cross tabulation suggests that most Kurds have little trust in other ethnic groups particularly with Shiites and Sunnis.

(Table 3 about here)

Table 3 is a multivariate regression analysis of Iraqi nationalism by religious, ethnic, and demographic variables. The dependent variable in this table is the nationalism index and the independent variables being tested are the Shiite dummy, Sunni dummy, Kurd dummy, Gender dummy, Age, Education, and Income. This table shows that most of the independent variables being tested such as the Sunni, Gender, Age, Education, and Income all fail to produce any significant results. However, the Kurd and Shiite dummy variables both produced interesting and significant results. The Shiite dummy variable is significant at the .05 level and the Kurd dummy variable is significant at the .01 level. When looking closer at the Shiite dummy variable if an individual identifies as being Shiite they tend to be less nationalistic by $-.115$. There was no surprise upon my

examination of the Kurd variable when I found that if an individual identifies as being Kurd they are -.605 less nationalistic. The Adjusted R Squared for this table is .037. This means that only about 4% of dependent variable that I am testing explained by the independent variables in this model.

(Table 4 about here)

Table 4 is a multivariate regression analysis of Iraqi trust by religious, ethnic, and demographic variables. The dependent variable in this table is the trust index and the independent variables are the Shiite dummy, Sunni dummy, Kurd dummy, Gender dummy, Age, Education, and Income. This table produced a number of interesting results. The only variable that failed to produce any significant results was Income. All of the other variables are significant at the .01 level. Upon my examination of the Shiite dummy variable I found that if an individual identifies as being Shiite instead of Muslim they have a lower level of trust in other ethnic and religious groups by -.272. The results from the Sunni dummy variable suggests that if an individual identifies as being Sunni instead Muslim they have -.382 lower level of trust in other religious and ethnic groups. With no surprise if an individual identifies as being Kurdish they are the least likely to trust another ethnic or religious group by -4.52. The results from the Gender dummy are (Coefficient=.290). This indicates that women have more trust than men. The Age variable has a (Coefficient=.013). This means that when individuals get older they have more trust than compared to younger individuals. The last significant variable in this table is Education. It has a (Coefficient=.048). This suggests the more education an individual has the more likely they are to have higher levels of trust. The Adjusted R


Squared for this table is .037. This indicates that only about 4% of dependent variable that I am testing is explained the independent variables in this model.

Conclusion

After analyzing Iraqi nationalism and examining the results I found some interesting answers to the question of the possible return of nationalism in Iraq. This study found that most Iraqis are proud of their nationality and most of those individuals responded by saying that they would not be willing to fight in a war. This suggests that a high level of nationalism does not directly correlate with their willingness to fight in a war. Most Kurds have little trust in other ethnic groups particularly with the Shiite's and Sunni's. The nationalism index shows us that when an individual identifies as being either Shiite or Kurd they tend to be less nationalistic. The trust index results indicate that if an individual identifies as being Kurdish they are the least likely to trust another ethnic or religious group. More education and more age mean that an individual is more likely to have higher levels of trust. Women have more trust than men and the income variable was insignificant on both the nationalism and trust indexes.

So what can be done to continue the study of Iraqi nationalism? One way is to run this same analysis again when the new WVS data comes out to see if the results are similar. Another important way to further this study would be to watch the news for current events that affect the future of Iraq's democracy, such as the battle over Kirkuk. Finally we need to wait and see if this newly elected government can provide legitimate security to its people and be able to stop ethnic tensions that threaten their democracy.

Figure 1: Levels of Nationalism in Regions of Iraq



Chi-Square=.000*

Lamda=.069

Table 1: Cross Tabulation Analysis of Iraqi Nationalism and Willingness to Fight for Country

		Be willing to fight in war for your country		Total
		yes	no	
How proud of nationality	Very proud	651 80.7%	1131 83.8%	1782 82.6%
	Quite proud	132 16.4%	177 13.1%	309 14.3%
	Not very proud	15 1.9%	24 1.8%	39 1.8%
	Not at all proud	9 1.1%	18 1.3%	27 1.3%
Total		807 100.0%	1350 100.0%	2157 100.0%

Chi-Square=.221

Lamda=.000

Table 2: Cross Tabulation of Iraqi Nationalism and Combined Trust of Sunni, Shiite, and Kurd

Iraqi Ethnic Groups			Total Trust High to Low					Total	
			No Trust	Very Little Trust	Little Trust	Some Trust	Trust		Complete Trust
Central Arabic	How proud of nationality	Very proud	73	226	280	422	83	625	1709
			75.3%	85.9%	84.1%	88.3%	92.2%	91.0%	87.7%
		Quite proud	24	34	50	56	6	55	225
	Chi-Square=.001*		24.7%	12.9%	15.0%	11.7%	6.7%	8.0%	11.6%
	Somers'd=-.048	Not very proud	0	3	2	0	1	6	12
		.0%	1.1%	.6%	.0%	1.1%	.9%	.6%	
	Not at all proud	0	0	1	0	0	1	2	
		.0%	.0%	.3%	.0%	.0%	.1%	.1%	
	Total	97	263	333	478	90	687	1948	
		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	
Kurd	How proud of nationality	Very proud	2	21	60	48	10	24	165
			50.0%	55.3%	49.2%	61.5%	66.7%	46.2%	53.4%
		Quite proud	0	5	55	22	2	17	101
	Chi-Square=.000*		.0%	13.2%	45.1%	28.2%	13.3%	32.7%	32.7%
	Somers'd=-.016	Not very proud	1	6	5	3	3	5	23
		25.0%	15.8%	4.1%	3.8%	20.0%	9.6%	7.4%	
	Not at all proud	1	6	2	5	0	6	20	
		25.0%	15.8%	1.6%	6.4%	.0%	11.5%	6.5%	
	Total	4	38	122	78	15	52	309	
		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	

Table 3: Multivariate Regression Analysis of Iraqi Nationalism by Religious, Ethnic, and Demographic Variables

Religious Identity	Coefficient	t Score	Significance
Constant	5.630**	51.989	.000
Shiite Dummy	-.115*	-2.100	.036
Sunni Dummy	-.111	-1.278	.202
Ethnic Identity			
Kurd	-.605**	-8.264	.000
Demographic Variables			
Gender Dummy	.045	.940	.348
Age	.000	-.569	.569
Education	-.009	-.894	.371
Income	.022	1.537	.125

*= significance at .05

**= significance at .01

Adjusted R Square=.037

Dependent Variable = Nationalism index. The scores in this variable have a range between two and seven. Lower scores represent individuals who have lower feelings of nationalism and higher scores represent those individuals who have a higher feeling of nationalism.

Table 4: Multivariate Regression Analysis of Iraqi Trust by Religious, Ethnic, and Demographic Variables

Religious Identity	Coefficient	t Score	Significance
Constant	4.403**	28.683	.000
Shiite Dummy	-.272**	-3.424	.001
Sunni Dummy	-.382**	-3.182	.001
Ethnic Identity			
Kurd	-4.52**	-4.281	.000
Demographic Variables			
Gender Dummy	.290**	4.181	.000
Age	.013**	5.108	.000
Education	.048**	3.436	.001
Income	.004	.184	.854


*=significance at .05

**=significance at .01

Adjusted R Squared=.037

Dependent Variable = Trust index. The Scores in this variable have a range between two and seven. Higher scores represent those individuals with high levels of trust and lower scores represent individuals who have little trust.

Distribution of Ethnoreligious Groups and Major Tribes



Ethnic Group	Estimated Population	Also Found In	Religion	Language
Arabs	16 to 20 million	Throughout North Africa and the Middle East, Iran	65-80 percent Shia, 20-30 percent Sunni, less than 5 percent Christian	Arabic (Iraqi dialect)
Kurds	3.6 to 4.8 million	Turkey, Iran, Syria, Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan	Mostly Sunni, Shia, and Yazidi minority	Kurdish
Turkomans	300,000 to 800,000	Related to other Turkic peoples in Turkey, Azerbaijan, Iran, and Turkmenistan	Primarily Sunni	South Azeri Turkish
Others	As many as 1 million	Mostly Christians, Iranians, and other groups found in the Middle East	At least 50 percent Christian; Shias, Sunnis, and members of other religions account for the balance	Mostly Arabic, some Persian and other languages

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