

# **A Comparative Analysis of the Transitional Effect of Democratic Regime Change on Human Rights Development**

Alana McElhinney  
Bemidji State University

Political Science Senior Thesis  
Bemidji State University  
Dr. Patrick Donnay, Advisor  
April 2012

## Contents

Abstract.....	3
Introduction.....	4
Literature Review.....	15
Methodology.....	26
Data Analysis.....	29
Conclusion.....	33
Appendix A.....	35
Appendix B.....	41
Bibliography.....	52

## Abstract

*It has been a long-standing topic of discussion within the field of political science on the extent to which the establishment of democratic regime characteristics influences the development of human rights. While there is considerable research in the areas of democracy and human rights, what the literature lacks is research towards the growth of democratic regime characteristics being causal to the development of human rights practices. This analysis shows that a transition in democratic regime characteristics is directly linked to the development of human rights. After completing case-study analysis and developing causal theory I take data from the years 1981 and 2009 from both the Cingranelli and Richards Human Rights Data Project and the Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and combine them into one dataset. In the final analysis there is evidence of a strong causal link between the growth of certain democratic characteristics and the development of human rights.*

## Introduction

The concept of individual civil rights and freedoms represent a field of study within political science that is explicitly tied to the study of regime type. One regime type often studied is democracy. These important human rights characteristics are quite often globally recognized and encouraged and yet there are still reports of human rights abuses each and every year. It should be of the utmost importance that a government does not take repressive actions towards their citizens and strives to protect individual liberties. This explicit tie in between human rights and regime type has been researched extensively, and the goal of this research is to provide further support to show that the most effective way to improve human rights is to establish a democratic system of government.

While the examples of how the overarching principles of democracy improving human rights are prevalent in the literature, the gap lies in the degree to which the individual characteristics themselves can create an improvement on human rights. Analyzing the extent to which individual democratic characteristics affect individual liberties provides political scientists with more effective methods of promoting democracy. The difference of this research lies in that I will show through the data that in order to improve human rights, although it would be ideal, it is not necessary to have a whole and complete democratic system established.

For example, the freedom of elections, the openness of executive recruitment, the regulation of the executive, and the independence of the judiciary, are some of the democratic characteristics that should be established regardless whether the country could make these wholly and immediately accountable or legitimate. This is because even the

basic presence of these democratic building blocks will reduce repression and allow the respect for human rights to grow. The characteristics will show that at least if the concepts of a democracy are present it will encourage less repressive behavior by the government and remove potential hindrances in the transition to a democratic system.

The field of human rights and democracy is a complex and often frustrating area, but one of the purposes of a government should be to protect the rights and freedoms of the people that they govern, and I will show that this is best done through the establishment and transition to democratic systems. In order to fully understand this relationship the areas of both democracy and human rights will be further researched and elaborated upon. This will make the relationship between the two obvious, and the intertwining of the two fields impossible to ignore.

To better understand how democracy ties into the improvement of human rights, three countries are analyzed as case studies. The understanding of the history of their transitions towards or away from democracy will highlight the corresponding changes in human rights during the time frame used in analysis of 1981-2009.

## Case Studies

### *South Korea*

The Republic of South Korea is largely known for its relations with its northern counterpart, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. After the Korean War between North and South Korea during 1950-1953, the two tentatively agreed to work towards unification. This has been a long and politically tense struggle.

The focus on South Korea shows that economic improvements were made after the Korean War much through the assistance of foreign aid from the United States of America ("Korea," 2008). With the rebuilding of the economy and amendments being made to the constitution in 1987, a new governing set of guidelines was created for the nation.

The system of South Korea is currently set up so that the president is popularly elected for five-year terms and acts as the Head of State. The Prime Minister is then appointed by the President and acts as the Head of Government. The legislature is unicameral and this National Assembly consists of members who are also popularly elected. This nomination of Prime Minister has to be approved by the National Assembly, and there have been cases where nominees have been denied, such as during the year 2002 of Kim Dae Yung's term as President ("Korea," 2008).

The further establishment of democratic characteristics and the redevelopment of the economy lead towards a greater respect and sense of accountability that the government has for its citizens. The presence of a Constitutional Court allows the citizens another avenue to enforce this accountability of their government. The Constitutional

Court in South Korea has made important decisions that affect the executive branch of the government. In 2004 President Roh Moo Hyun was impeached over the violation of an election law, but the Constitutional Court reversed this decision and returned him to power a few months later ("Korea," 2008).

The Court again came into action in 2004 when President Roh Moo Hyun wanted to relocate sectors of the government to another city and this was met with opposition. The Constitutional Court declared that a referendum would be needed or a constitutional amendment must be made before the relocation could take place ("Korea," 2008). It is clear that the Constitutional Court is able to impose a system of checks and balances on the different levels of government and the independence of the judiciary is an important democratic factor. The concept of executive constraints acts as one of the independent variables and was shown to be one of the most important democratic characteristics.

The analysis will look at a period of time between 1981 and 2009, and the data begins a couple years after the assassination of President Park Chung Hee in 1979. In 1980 Chun Doo Hwan became President and worked towards shifting more power into the hands of the National Assembly as well as continuing to improve the economy of South Korea ("Korea," 2008). There was some dissatisfaction among the people in South Korea and a new constitution was created in 1987 that is currently the one the country is governed by now. It changed the term of the President from being a six-year term to a five-year term, and also called for popular election of the President ("Korea," 2008). These constitutional amendments exemplify a shift towards a fuller democracy and the successive leaders largely maintained these ideals.

In 1992, President Kim Young Sam became the first civilian to be elected as President since the Korean War that began in 1950 ("Korea," 2008). The openness of executive recruitment was an independent variable measured in the analysis and this election of a citizen goes to show that South Korea probably experienced an improvement in executive recruitment. This pertains to democracy's relationship with human rights because Kim Young Sam pioneered efforts against abuse and corruption within the government and tried to improve economic relations with North Korea ("Korea," 2008). He attempted to make the government less repressive and more accountable, which improves human rights.

During the years 2000 and onwards there have been issues of corruption trials of leaders such as Kim Dae Young, and Roh Moo Hyun's impeachment marked the beginning of a transitional phase within the South Korean government. The Uri Party lost power and the Grand National Party gained it, which led to the 2007 election of Lee Myung Bak as President. Tensions began to escalate again with North Korea, as President Lee Myung Bak took a stricter approach to relations with their counterpart and called for better human rights and a complete removal of nuclear weapons ("Korea," 2008).

The basic democratic foundations of South Korea have improved over the 28-year span of data, and all of these factors are important in retaining and promoting democratic ideals and values, which lead to an improvement in human rights. The history of South Korea's government and democratic characteristics leads to the idea that over the 28-year period of analysis in my research, there should be an increase in the establishment of the



democratic regime characteristics and a corresponding increase in the respect of individual human rights and liberties.

### *Venezuela*

Venezuela in the late 1950's was one of the most promising fledgling democracies in South America, especially with the signing of the Punto Fijo Pact in 1958. This pact formed an agreement between the competing political parties to allow the popular election of the President ("Venezuela," 2007). After the discovery of oil post World War I, the economy boomed and Venezuela became well known for their oil, and was also recognized as having one of the most expansive constitutions in Latin America ("Venezuela," 2007).

This constitution called for five branches of government in the legislative, electoral, judiciary, citizen's, and Presidential, branches. In 1999, President Hugo Chávez approved a new constitution calling for reforms to numerous areas of Venezuelan political and societal life, but the important part lays not so much in the reforms he was trying to make, but that he went about these reforms in a very democratic way- by calling for a public referendum. One of these reforms was establishing a Presidential system involving election by popular vote for 6 year, potentially consecutive terms. While these reforms may have been done by a democratic referendum, they were essentially allowing President Chávez to stay in power longer.

More power was placed into the hands of the President through this reform, and took away some influence and power from the citizens of Venezuela. This may also decrease political participation, as people would see the established permanence of their

President and be less likely to compete with the ruling party because of this. Political participation is another independent variable in this analysis and its effects on human rights in Venezuela will be measured.

Another issue also arose in the year 1999 in that the National Constitutional Assembly declared the judiciary to be in a state of emergency and a complete reform took place in order to eliminate corruption and improve efficiency (“Venezuela,” 2007). With this call for reform of the judiciary, the Organic Code of Criminal Procedures was also passed in the same year, and this led to a more open and accountable judiciary. It would seem that Venezuela has made some strides in establishing democratic factors during the 28-year time frame that will be analyzed, but an important factor that has not yet been taken into consideration is how the economy played into the stability and confidence of the democratic regime.

The aforementioned discovery of great oil reserves in Venezuela made it the country’s most important resource, and unfortunately, also made the country’s economy highly respondent to the effects of petroleum market conditions (“Venezuela,” 2007). It was inevitable that Venezuela would experience economic crisis if the oil market plummeted, and it did just that during the oil shocks of the 1980’s. Prior research will be discussed that shows the importance of the economy in the establishment and effectiveness of democracy, and if the economy experiences setbacks, so does democracy- especially if it’s a newer regime. Gross domestic product acts as a control variable in the analysis as the economy of the case study countries plays an important role in their development of democracy and human rights.

As the economy falters, people's standards of living and satisfaction with the government also falter, which leads to instability in a country. If there is instability in a country the government is more likely to use repressive behaviors and violence to maintain power and control over their citizens. This consequently leads to a decrease in respect for human rights and an increase in the abuses of these rights. Corresponding government coup attempts in 1992 also led to an increase of instability in the democratic government of Venezuela. An increase in the abuses of human rights, although mainly politically motivated, occurred during these times of economic and governmental unrest ("Venezuela," 2007).

Venezuela provides a case study that shows that even though a country made some movement towards a full democracy, setbacks in the economy and a lack of faith from citizens can lead to an increase in repressive behavior. A majority of the power was concentrated in the President and this allowed the government to be more repressive and less accountable to its citizens. It will be shown that over the 28-year period of analysis, Venezuela actually decreases in respect for human rights even though certain democratic characteristics had been previously established.

This leads to further research in that there are other factors that affect the establishment and success of a democracy and its corresponding effects on the human rights respect levels in a country. What the analysis and research will show is that there are ways this can be avoided. This is through the establishment and constant reinforcement of democratic ideals and values- whether it is through international treaties or citizen participation in non-governmental organizations (Anderson, Regan, & Ostergard, 2002; Hafner-Burton & Tsutsui, 2005).

Both the independence of the judiciary and a strong multi-party competitive system has been shown to be essential towards building a democracy. Where Venezuela failed is in the actual maintenance and accountability of these democratic characteristics (Corrales, 2001). Corruption and instability hinder the effectiveness of democratic characteristics, but at least establishing these characteristics initially builds the foundations necessary to rectify the issues a country may experience. This allows the return to the pursuance of democratic ideals and proficiency in the area of human rights.

### *Hungary*

Hungary provides the third case study in which the analysis shows that over the 28-year span of 1981-2009 Hungary experienced a positive growth in both democracy and human rights. The country was under communist rule from 1947-1989, and the first data was gathered from Hungary in 1981. The second set of data was collected in 2009, during which Hungary had a democratic parliamentary system in place. This provides an ideal case to study in regards to the theory that the presence of democratic characteristics will show a corresponding growth in the respect for the individual civil rights and liberties of the citizens in any given country.

The parliamentary republic was established in Hungary in 1989 and the first free elections in the country were held the following year. This reformation of the political system was brought about by 1988 revisions made to the previous constitution established in 1949 ("Hungary," 2007). These revisions involved mandates that ended the monopoly the Communist Party held over power and created a multi-party system, as well as creating an actual position of President to replace the previously used Presidential Council. The system is slightly different from the United States' Presidential system in

the sense that the Hungarian President, while he acts as the head of state, is elected by a majority vote in Parliament to a five-year term. The Prime Minister is then also elected by a majority vote in Parliament- whose members are popularly elected to four-year terms.

Along with the foundational changes that altered Hungary's government from a communist regime to a democratic one, other external factors also helped to assist in this transition and ensure the stability and longevity of the new regime type. Hungary officially joined NATO as a full member in July of 1997, as well as officially joining the European Union in 2004 ("Hungary," 2007). These two memberships encourage further progress towards maintaining this new regime and upholding the standards set by other international organizations.

Involvement in international organizations, treaties, and alliances proves to be of great value to democracy and human rights when done in a responsible and accountable way (Starr & Lindborg, 2003; Powell & Staton, 2009). Hungary shows improvements in both the areas of democracy and respect for individual liberties over the 28 years of the study.

### *Implications*

The countries of South Korea, Venezuela, and Hungary, all offer case studies through the historical analysis of their governmental history during the years 1981-2009. Democratic characteristics changed dramatically in these three countries. The corresponding directions of these changes in regards to human rights are dependent upon whether the democratic characteristics of the nation develop in a positive or negative direction. The research will agree with the hypothesis stating that as the individual

dimensions of the democratic characteristics of a country increase, so will the country's respect for individual liberties. The reasons that this theory holds true are further developed in the literature that follows.

## Literature Review

The previous case studies lay out real world examples of democratic transitions within 3 countries. It is unlikely that over the 28 year time frame of the analysis that the government of a country will have remained completely stagnant. It is commonly accepted in the world of political science that democratic regimes are less likely to suffer from high levels of human rights abuses. While this study is not refuting the overarching principles of democracy, many studies do say that a certain “threshold level” of democracy must be reached before there are any significant improvements to human rights (De Mesquita, Cherif, Downs, & Smith, 2005).

This analysis breaks down the threshold concept and was done to determine which individual dimension of democracy shows to be more valuable in improving human rights. Even though this improvement by individual characteristics may not be a large one, human rights are such a globally important issue that any establishment of process that improves upon these human rights violations should be implemented.

As mentioned previously, democracy and human rights are both complex issues and when the two are intertwined with each other they become even more intricate. The numerous aspects of democracy and human rights are addressed in the following literature, as well as other potential factors that affect democratic transitions and the implementation of an international standard of human rights.

## **Building Blocks: The Initial Concepts**

The aforementioned concept of a “threshold level” of democracy developed in a 2005 study done by De Mesquita et al. emphasizes the notion that it takes a full-fledged democracy in order for a stable and reliable improvement in human rights to occur within a country. The aim of this research is not to refute this widely accepted theory, but to break down the components of democracy to see if the individual characteristics themselves make a difference to human rights. This removes the “threshold level” concept of democracy and breaks down the aggregated data index that is often used to measure democracy.

While the study by De Mesquita et al. uses a 5-year lag to measure the effects of democracy on human rights, I use variables that measure the change in the democratic characteristics and individual liberties over a 28-year time span from 1981-2009 (2005). They use the Polity IV dataset that I also use, but instead of using the composite and weighted index that measures democracy, I will analyze its four component variables; competitiveness of political participation, the openness of executive recruitment, the competitiveness of executive recruitment, and constraints on the chief executive (Marshall & Jaggers, n.d.).

What De Mesquita et al. also discover is that executive constraints and multi-party competition lead to an increase in the protection of human rights (2005). This is because these particular democratic characteristics promote accountability and stability, which lead to and encourage behavioral change in a repressive government. The variable of executive constraints shows to be the most important dimension of democracy in this analysis and is consistent with the findings of De Mesquita et al. (2005).



What the De Mesquita et al. study provides are the building blocks for the analysis of the effects of separate individual democratic characteristics on human rights. Their study brings up numerous variables that have an interactive relationship between democracy and human rights. Some of these variables include accountability, repression, alliances, international treaties, transition and diffusion of democracy, and also economic factors.

### **International Alliances and Agreements**

Individual liberties have been acknowledged as an important area that a country's government is responsible for protecting. The diffusion of democratic values and norms increases the globalization of respect for individual liberties. International alliances and treaty agreements are argued to be one way this diffusion can be increased.

While countries agree to human rights treaties and alliances contingent upon the protection of these rights, often times the treaties hold little sway and are ineffective (Hafner-Burton & Tsutsui, 2005). The lack of accountability present in international alliances and agreements allows countries to simply agree to the treaties and gain clout in the international human rights regime, but fail to follow through on the implementation of the agreed upon clauses. As Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui discovered, treaties often supply face value to a country and legitimacy in the world of human rights, but these treaties ultimately end up acting as a shield and the number of human rights abuses often increases (2005).

The research will show that this is an area that needs to be addressed, and while human rights treaties are without a doubt important to the improvement of this field, the establishment of democratic characteristics provides the most important factor for making

these treaties effective- accountability. If these treaties lack effectiveness and can potentially lead to further repressive behavior, this needs to be addressed. If there were democratic characteristics present in a country, a failure to comply with an international treaty could lead to a publication of these violations and subsequent actions to make the government accountable for their mistakes. The development of these democratic characteristics will remove this paradox of “empty promises” made by governments and make them responsible for carrying out the clauses of the treaties they have ratified (Hafner-Burton & Tsutsui, 2005).

If the individual characteristics of democracy were present then the government would be held accountable for their commitments and more likely to follow through with the statutes of treaties and alliances. One change that would encourage more countries to agree to treaties would be if they were able to weigh the costs and benefits of agreeing to a treaty (Hafner-Burton, 2005). It may be hard for a country to see the long-term benefits they will garner for paying the short-term cost of a treaty.

Hafner-Burton further emphasized that the costs of ratifying a treaty or joining an alliance must not outweigh the potential benefits that a country would experience, or they won't agree to it (2005). If there is a way to enforce the statutes of a treaty, through hard laws, then it is likely to be more effective than if soft laws enforce the statutes. Hard law holds government more accountable than soft law does, and this outside monitoring of the treaty is often essential to ensuring its statutes are followed.

This accountability of democracies is explained in the sense that they are more likely to keep obligations because constituents can and will hold their representatives accountable for violations. This is because democracies contain effective legal

mechanisms for enforcing the punishment for these violations (Powell & Staton, 2009). It has been shown that since human rights treaties by themselves do not offer any obvious and immediate benefits aside from a potential reputation boost, they are more likely to be effective in countries where there is domestic legal enforcement (Hathaway, 2007).

The independence of the judiciary has been mentioned as an important independent characteristic of democracy. It also would increase the effectiveness of human rights agreements and lead to an improvement in this area. The importance of accountability is further emphasized by Hathaway's 2007 study in the discovery that citizen involvement in non-governmental organizations, international or domestic, makes a country more likely to commit to human rights treaties. Not only can the treaties and alliances themselves hold a government accountable, but also an active citizen base raises awareness and encourages the government to follow through on its agreements.

Hathaway also showed that newer regimes are more likely to commit to human rights treaties than older regimes, which paves the way for the concept of the diffusion democracy (2007). This involvement in and ratification of treaties and alliances can tie directly into theories on democratic diffusion. Countries that are located in areas where there are a greater number of human rights treaties in surrounding countries are more likely to agree to those treaties themselves (Hathaway, 2007).

### *Diffusion of Democracy*

While treaties and alliances play an obvious role in regards to the development of democracy and human rights, the concept of the diffusion of democracy is also an important factor in this relationship. As shown, democracies are less likely to commit human rights abuses in the first place and are more likely to follow through on treaty agreements (Powell & Staton, 2009). Alliances can encourage the diffusion of democracy because the interdependence among countries helps to foster democracy and decrease repressive behaviors (Starr & Lindborg, 2003).

The decrease in repressive behavior is a basic idea of democracy. Factors that encourage less repression could create a better atmosphere for the diffusion of a democratic system. Starr & Lindborg show that democracies are less prone to conflict both internally and externally, so if the diffusion of democracy occurs then there is a lower chance of international wars being started and less chance of these wars leading to instability and repressive behavior (2003). The diffusion of democracy could lead to less repression on an international scale and a subsequent global improvement in human rights.

One issue hindering the diffusion of democracy is the acceptance that the past regimes in a country play a role in the development of new regimes (Shin, 2005). For example, if a county was previously under the rule of a dictator, certain aspects of this system may be hard to overcome when attempting to adopt a more democratic system. This concept is called reinforcement and simply means that the structures and behaviors from a past regime quite often need to be overcome before democracy can be fully established. The analysis is done to determine the extent to which establishing individual

democratic characters can assist in changing past repressive beliefs and habits and leading to an improvement in human rights within a country. Along with reinforcement, the economy and population growth are two factors that affect the diffusion of democracy (Starr & Lindborg, 2003).

When alliances and treaties are tied into the concept of diffusion, Gibler's notion of a "regional peace zone" further explains their interaction with democracy (2006). This "regional peace zone" allows the diffusion of democracy to occur because it creates an area in which alliances between a country and all of its bordering countries exist (Gibler, 2006). This peace zone does two things to aid in the diffusion of democracy: reduces the territorial threat to the alliance members, and this therefore decreases the militarization of a country, which assists in a successful transition to democracy (Gibler, 2006). It becomes evident through analyzing the literature that alliances and treaties play an important role in the diffusion of democracy.

### *Challenges to Transition Theory*

Along with alliances and treaties another thing necessary to encourage the growth of democracy is to disregard the transitional paradigm and acknowledge that the "political grey zone" is where most countries in the world fall (Carothers, 2002). This grey zone is a concept of explaining where most transitional countries fall, and that they are neither moving towards nor away from democracy.

This is an important concept to acknowledge because it encourages more energy to be focused towards how the international community can help encourage the spread of democratic ideals and subsequently the spread of civil liberties. The presence of even a few democratic characteristics could help a country move towards democracy and civil

liberties, and this nullifying of the transitional paradigm is an important factor to consider if transitional countries wish to move out of the political grey zone (Carothers, 2002).

This analysis was done to show which individual democratic characteristics would have the greatest positive influence on human rights. There have been many studies done regarding democracy as a whole, but it is important to look at its components and determine which is most important with regards to reducing the repressive behavior of governments.

### **Cultural Divides and Repressive Behavior**

Repressive behavior goes against everything that the international human rights institutions are trying to protect. In order to reduce repression, the issues hindering the development of a democracy need to be addressed.

One of the major threats to the development of a democracy involves divisions in society that occur at birth, such as race, ethnicity, religion, and native language (Glazer, 2010). Repressive behavior towards minority groups is an issue that is better dealt with by democracy than other types of regimes. This is one of the reasons that the development of individual democratic characteristics is likely to improve the respect for individual liberties. Democracy provides a country with a more effective, non-violent, way in which to deal with cultural issues and divides (Glazer, 2010). Glazer shows that this is completed by the presence of multi-party competition and an independent judiciary because these two characteristics lead to stability, which leads to less repression (2010).

The public perceptions of these human rights violations are also an important aspect to take into consideration (Anderson, Regan, & Ostergard, 2002). The homogeneity of a society plays a role in the development of democracy, but it is in fact the democratic

characteristics that are the very thing that can sort through these issues without the use of repression. The notion of public perceptions and a mass political ideology within a country is shown to play an important role in not only the development of democratic characteristics, but also in the quest for civil liberties. If the citizens of a country are engaged in voluntary associations then there will be an increase in the development of democratic virtues, repression will therefore decrease, and the system will flourish with an active citizen base (Lee, 2008; Powell & Staton, 2009; Carlin, 2011).

An active citizen base is essential to a democracy because one of the best things about this system is that there are ways for these citizens to show their dissatisfaction and this is through both protesting and voting (Carlin, 2011). Carlin explains that citizens should be actively participating and it's always best to remain a little wary of a government because, "...low trust in democratic institutions can benefit democracy by inducing democratic citizens to demand accountability and reform," (2011, p. 11). The accountability of the government is an important way in which the people can hold their government responsible and demand reforms if the government exhibits repressive behavior.

Along with alliances, treaties, diffusion, and transition, another factor that affects repressive behavior and human rights is that of constitutional provisions. A constitution not only acts as a reference for correct political behavior, but both this document as well as a bill of rights serve as "a socializing tool that conditions the expectations of the public" and make them aware of their rights and any repressive behavior against them (Keith, 2002, p. 113). In regards to the case study on Hungary, a study by Visegrády in 1992 reinforced the concept that constitutions protect people against autocracies and can

help to reduce repression and encourage the people to believe in democracy and have a strong desire to work towards it.

### **Essential Elements of Studying Democracy**

The push to break down democracy as a whole comes from literature focused on the different levels that democracy can exist at. In their case study of Argentina, Gibson and Suarez-Cao (2010) show that sub national governments play an important role in the human rights of a country and the repression that occurs. By breaking down the composite democratic index of the Polity IV dataset it allows the analysis to research the data at an individual level (Marshall & Jaggers, n.d.). It will allow us to identify the most important individual characteristics of a democracy and attempts to implement those nationally across all levels of government can then be taken. This national adoption of democracy at all levels could help reduce repressive behavior at a sub-national level.

Another encouraging reason to study the individual democratic characteristics is that there is a distinction between full and restricted democracies (Stephens, 1989). The individual and separated characteristics will help us understand whether establishing these individual characteristics will even have enough sway in regards to improving individual liberties. Whether or not these individual characteristics make a large enough improvement to be worth implementing, before they can be guaranteed to be completely legitimate, is what the analysis hopes to discover.

The most obvious purpose to breaking down the index of democracy and examining the individual characteristics is to simply see if even the most basic presence of democratic norms and values will make an improvement upon the human rights of a given country over a transitional time frame. It is a basic quality of democracy that the



authority of the government is derived from the consent of the people being governed (Ibrahim, 2006). The development and establishment of democratic characteristics will allow a country to accommodate a broad variety of groups, perspectives, and values, and these characteristics will allow a country to unlock the full potential of their citizens through the institutionalization of individual liberties (Ibrahim, 2006).

It is obvious that the factors affecting democracy are wide and varied, and there are many places in which these factors are woven together into the relationship between democracy and human rights. The literature points towards a positive outlook for the theory that even with all the other factors taken into consideration, even the basic establishment of a democratic characteristic has the potential to improve the chances of a full democratic threshold being reached. This essentially improves the respect of individual liberties right from the onset. These democratic characteristics build a foundation, which leads to an optimistic outlook for the promotion of further democratic development and diffusion as well as an improvement in both domestic and international human rights affairs.

### **Gross Domestic Product: Controlling for GDP**

It has been shown in the literature that one of the most important factors that effects the development of democracy and the subsequent respect of individual liberties is the economy. Along with multi-party competition and the independence of the judiciary, a factor that increases stability and decreases repression is the improvement of the national economy (Glazer, 2010). In Lee's case study of South Korea the role of the economy was further elaborated upon by showing that as Gross Domestic Product (GDP) increases in a country, the education and income of the citizens also increases (2008). As education and

income increases within a country this leads to an increase in public awareness and civil activism (Lee, 2008).

An increase in civil participation leads to further stability and accountability of the governmental system and these two factors work to decrease repressive behavior. In the case of democratic development in South American countries, an increase in GDP increased stability and mass public support for democracy (Stephens, 1989). It can be determined then that as the economy improves people will be more likely show greater support for the concepts of democracy and this encourages the development of democratic norms and ideals. If the initial results of the analysis prove significant, the analysis will be repeated to incorporate a control variable for GDP in US dollars. This will allow the discovery of whether or not it is the democratic characteristics themselves that are improving individual liberties, or if it is the development of the economy that is causing the reduction in repressive behavior.

## **Methodology**

### **Independent Variables**

The independent variables in this study are the individual democratic characteristics that measure the levels to which these democratic norms and ideals are established in a country. My units of analysis are all 164 countries in the *Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics* dataset and the four democratic components used are also from this well-respected dataset (Marshall, M. G., & Jaggers, K. n.d.). In a 2002 comparative study of democratic indices the Polity IV Project received positive comments regarding the selection of indicators, measurement levels, validity, intercoder reliability, and the publication of disaggregate data (Munck & Verkuilen).

Within the Polity IV Project there is a composite, weighted index, entitled *democ*. This index was previously mentioned in the literature review and was used in the important study by De Mesquita, Cherif, Downs, and Smith (2005). The main goal of the research is break down this index and use the individual characteristics to measure the impact on human rights. The four independent variables that make up this index are the competitiveness of executive recruitment (XRCOMP), the openness of executive recruitment (XROPEN), the constraint on chief executive (XCONST), and the competitiveness of political participation (PARCOMP) (Marshall, M. G., & Jaggers, K. n.d.).

Data on these variables was collected in both the years 1981 and 2009, and the 1981 measurement of each of the four variables was subtracted from the 2009 measurement of each of the variables in order to create new variables that show the change in these scores over the 28-year analysis time frame. The new variables are coded XRCOMPCHANGE, XROPENCHANGE, XCSONTCHANGE, and PARCOMPCHANGE. These four independent variables now serve to measure the change in democratic characteristics over a 28-year time span. These change variables were then recoded into new ordinal variables. The new Polity IV variables were then put into a new dataset along with the dependent individual liberties and the control variable of GDP.

### **Dependent Variables**

The dependent variables in this study are the human rights characteristics that measure the level of respect for the individual liberties of the citizens within the country of analysis. These variables are taken from the CIRI Human Rights Data Project

(Cingranelli & Richards, n.d.). This dataset contains an additive Physical Integrity Rights Index labeled *physint*. This Physical Integrity Rights Index is also broken down into its component variables in order to better analyze which democratic characteristics make the most significant impact on specific areas of human rights. These four dependent variables are torture (TORT), disappearance (DISAP), extrajudicial killing (KILL), and political imprisonment (POLPRIS) (Cingranelli & Richards, n.d.).

These variables are then subjected to the same transformation as the independent variables and the 1981 data is subtracted from the 2009 data in order to create four new variables that display the change in these individual liberties over the 28-year span of the study. These new variables are then coded TORTCHANGE, DISAPCHANGE, KILLCHANGE, and POLPRISCHANGE. These change variables were then recoded into new ordinal variables. These dependent variables are also added to the new dataset along with the independent democratic characteristics and the control variable of GDP. The goal of this study is to analyze how the change in democratic characteristics changes the respect for individual liberties. This will allow the discovery of whether the establishment or reduction of the individual democratic characteristics improves or hinders the development of human rights.

### **Control Variable**

As mentioned in the literature review, GDP has been shown to play an important role in both the development of democracy and human rights. GDP will therefore be controlled for in order to rule out a potential alternate explanation for the change in both democratic and human rights characteristics.

The control variable was created by using data from the World Bank Group and

took the GDP per capita in U.S. dollars of each country in both 1981 and 2009. In order to create a GDPCHANGE variable the 1981 values were subtracted from the 2009 values and recoded. The values of GDP were measured in the current US dollar value of each year of measurement. The variable of GDP was then recoded into a 3 category ordinal variable for use in crosstabs analysis. This control variable of GDP was then added to the new dataset that includes the democratic characteristics and the individual liberties. GDP will only be used as a control in the analysis if causal significance is found between the individual democratic characteristics and the individual liberties.

## **Data Analysis**

### **Steps of Analysis**

In order to test the hypothesis that individual democratic characteristics have a causal effect on the improvement of individual liberties I analyze each of the four independent variables against the four dependent variables. Frequencies were calculated for the relationships between the independent and dependent variables using Crosstabs. A handful of significant relationships were found. The control variable of a High Change in GDP had too few cases to show significance so the results are not included. A bivariate correlation and a linear multiple regression test were then completed to measure the relationship between the individual democratic characteristics, the change in GDP, and the Physical Integrity Index found in the Polity IV Dataset.<sup>1</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup> Visual representations of significant results are located at the end of the paper in Appendix A. Null findings are included in Appendix B for reference, but not discussed in the paper.

## Results

### *Competitiveness of Political Participation*

The independent variable PARCOMPCHANGE was analyzed against the four dependent variables and the only significant relationship was found with the variable POLPRISCHANGE, which measures the change in numbers of political imprisonments in a country.

*(table 1.1 about here)*

It becomes obvious that the relationship is significant by the measures of association, and the Crosstabs analysis shows that as there is an increase in competitiveness there is a decrease in political imprisonment. Of the cases analyzed, 50.0% showed a decrease in competitiveness of political participation and had an increase in political imprisonment. While 40.0% of the cases that showed an increase in the competitiveness of political participation showed a decrease in political imprisonment.

### *Competitiveness of Executive Recruitment*

The independent variable XRCOMPCHANGE was analyzed against the four dependent variables and significance was found between the variables involving torture, disappearances, and political imprisonment. The initial relationship between the change in competitiveness of executive recruitment and the change in torture showed significance in that as the competitiveness of executive recruitment increased, there was a decrease in torture. As the competitiveness of executive recruitment decreased, 81.8% of cases showed an increase in torture. While as the competitiveness of executive recruitment increased, there were 18.6% of cases that displayed a decrease in torture.

*(table 1.2 about here)*

The relationship between the change in competitiveness of executive recruitment and the change in disappearances was also significant. As the competitiveness of executive recruitment decreased, 27.3% of cases showed an increase in disappearances. While as the competitiveness of executive recruitment increased there were 34.1% of cases that experienced a decrease in disappearances.

*(table 1.3 about here)*

The third significant relationship found with the independent variable of the change in competitiveness of executive recruitment was with change in political imprisonment. As the competitiveness of executive recruitment decreased there were 36.4% of cases that showed an increase in political imprisonment. While as the competitiveness of executive recruitment increased there were 48.8% of cases that showed a decrease in political imprisonment.

*(table 1.4 about here)*

### *Openness of Executive Recruitment*

The change in the levels of openness of executive recruitment did not show a significant relationship for any of the dependent variables that were tested. This leads us to believe that the openness of executive recruitment does not by itself play an important role in the improvement of civil liberties. This may represent an example of a democratic characteristic that requires the establishment and legitimacy of other democratic characteristics in order to make an impact on human rights.

### *Executive Constraints (Decision Rules)*

The only significant relationship found for the independent variable regarding

change in executive constraints was with the dependent variable regarding the change in political imprisonment. As the executive constraints decreased, 50/0% of the cases showed an increase in political imprisonment. While as executive constraints increased there were 41.0% of cases that showed a decrease in political imprisonment.

*(table 1.5 about here)*

### *Linear Regression*

The bivariate correlation showed slight multi-co linearity between the independent variables measuring the change in the constraint of the chief executive and the change in the competitiveness of executive recruitment. This test was run before the variables were recoded into the 3-point ordinal variables.<sup>2</sup> Using the change in GDP, change in competitiveness of political participation, change in openness of executive recruitment, and the change on constraints on the chief executive, a multiple linear regression was done.<sup>3</sup>

The dependent Polity IV Physical Integrity Index measured the effect of these independent variables. The reason that the index for Physical Integrity was used instead of the individual human rights characteristics is because the regression was done to determine the relationship between the independent democratic variables and GDP. The goal of the analysis was to determine the extent to which the individual democratic characteristics and the GDP variable affect human rights overall. In prior analysis the individual characteristics of the Physical Rights Integrity index are used, but the index was kept intact for the regression in order to focus on the independent variables and their

---

<sup>2</sup> In the bivariate correlation the Pearson correlations for the variables of change in executive constraints and change in competitiveness of executive recruitment show correlation above the .808 standard.

<sup>3</sup> The variable measuring the competitiveness of executive recruitment was excluded in the linear regression in order to avoid issues of multi- co linearity.



relationships with human rights as a whole.

*(table 1.6 about here)*

The results of the linear regression show that there is significance between both the GDP per Capita change variable and the Executive Constraints (Decision Rules) variable. By using the adjusted R Square value we can determine that the independent variables used can explain 16% of the variation in the change of Physical Integrity Index variable. The variable of change in executive constraints is shown to hold its significance in this relationship.

## **Conclusion**

The areas of democracy and human rights are obviously related to each other in numerous ways. The purpose of this study was to determine and prove that there was a causal link between the establishment of individual democratic characteristics and the improvement of human rights within a country. The data and analysis did show a number of significant relationships, mainly to the effects the democratic characteristics had on political imprisonment. After the linear regression the variable involving executive restraints (decision rules) was the only variable that held its significance.

The multiple linear regression and the corresponding insignificance of 2/3 of the relationships simply further enhance the concept that democracy is a complex process, as too are human rights. While there is no doubt by political scientists that democracy and human rights are inextricably intertwined, the analysis finds similar results to those results found by De Mesquita, Cherif, Downs, and Smith (2005). The idea that there is no reliable change to individual liberties unless a “threshold level” of democracy has been reached is reinforced by my analysis. The effect of the individual democratic

characteristics was much less significant than the theory proposed, but the variable of executive constraints did maintain its significance after the control variable of GDP was added.

Along with accountability, an active citizen base that believes in democracy is necessary for its development (Ibrahim, 2006). The involvement of a country in alliances, preferential trade agreements, and international human rights treaties, are factors that can help in the transition and diffusion of both democracy and human rights. International law and treaties need to provide more assistance in developing the domestic institutions of a country and assist in the costs of implementing the clauses and agreements that have been made (Hathaway 2007). It is obvious as well that the economic factors in a country affect both the development of democracy and the level of repressive behavior practiced by a governing regime. When GDP comes into play, it appears to have a large role in the development of both democracy and human rights.

While the analysis and theory did not prove as significant as expected, there is no denying that democracy plays a large role in the development of human rights. Even though the only causal relationship between the individual characteristics and an improvement in civil liberties was with executive constraints, establishing these individual characteristics of democracy is an important task for the advancement of the human rights in a country. This issue is of global importance and if even the smallest of changes can be made to improve the rights of individuals in a country then those changes should be made.

## Appendix A

**Table 1.1**

Crosstabs Analysis of the Impact of the Change in Competitiveness of Political Participation and the Change in Political Imprisonment

		Change in Competitiveness of Political Participation		
		Decrease in Competitiveness	No Change in Competitiveness	Increase in Competitiveness
<i>Change in Political Imprisonment</i>	Increase in Political Imprisonment	5 50.0%	4 10.5%	7 10.8%
	No Change in Political Imprisonment	5 50.0%	27 71.1%	32 49.2%
	Decrease in Political Imprisonment	0 .0%	7 18.4%	26 40.0%
	Total	10 100.0%	38 100.0%	65 100.0%

*Source:* Polity IV Data Project, CIRI Human Rights Project

Chi- Square Significance Value and Significance= 19.083, .001

Somers'd Value and Significance= .298, .001

Kendall's tau-b Value and Significance= .291, .001

Gamma Value and Significance= .502, .001

**Table 1.2**

Crosstabs Analysis of the Impact of the Change in Competitiveness of Executive Recruitment on the Change of the Practice of Torture

		Change in Competitiveness of Executive Recruitment		
		Decrease in Competitiveness	No Change in Competitiveness	Increase in Competitiveness
<i>Change in Practice of Torture</i>	Increase in Torture	9 81.8%	36 60.0%	22 51.2%
	No Change in Torture	2 18.2%	22 36.7%	13 30.2%
	Decrease in Torture	0 .0%	2 3.3%	8 18.6%
	Total	11 100.0%	60 100.0%	43 100.0%

*Source:* Polity IV Data Project, CIRI Human Rights Project

Chi- Square Significance Value and Significance= 10.244, .037

Somers'd Value and Significance= .185, .028

Kendall's tau-b Value and Significance= .190, .028

Gamma Value and Significance= .339, .028

**Table 1.3**

Crosstabs Analysis of the Impact of the Change in Competitiveness of Executive Recruitment on the Change of Disappearances

		Change in Competitiveness of Executive Recruitment		
		Decrease in Competitiveness	No Change in Competitiveness	Increase in Competitiveness
<i>Change in Disappearances</i>	Increase in Disappearances	3 27.3%	10 16.7%	3 6.8%
	No Change in Disappearances	6 54.5%	43 71.7%	26 59.1%
	Decrease in Disappearances	2 18.2%	43 71.7%	15 34.1%
	Total	11 100.0%	60 100.0%	44 100.0%

*Source:* Polity IV Data Project, CIRI Human Rights Project

Chi- Square Significance Value and Significance= 10.316, .035

Somers'd Value and Significance= .234, .005

Kendall's tau-b Value and Significance= .248, .005

Gamma Value and Significance= .436, .005

**Table 1.4**

Crosstabs Analysis of the Impact of the Change in Competitiveness of Executive Recruitment on the Change in Political Imprisonment

		Change in Competitiveness of Executive Recruitment		
		Decrease in Competitiveness	No Change in Competitiveness	Increase in Competitiveness
<i>Change in Political Imprisonment</i>	Increase in Political Imprisonment	4 36.4%	10 16.9%	2 4.7%
	No Change in Political Imprisonment	6 54.5%	38 64.4%	20 46.5%
	Decrease in Political Imprisonment	1 9.1%	11 18.6%	21 48.8%
	Total	11 100.0%	59 100.0%	43 100.0%

*Source:* Polity IV Data Project, CIRI Human Rights Project

Chi- Square Significance Value and Significance= 17.768, .001

Somers'd Value and Significance= .355, .000

Kendall's tau-b Value and Significance= .355, .000

Gamma Value and Significance= .586, .000

**Table 1.5**

Crosstabs Analysis of the Impact of the Change in Executive Constraints (Decision Rules) on the Change in Political Imprisonment

		Change in Executive Constraints (Decision Rules)		
		Decrease in Executive Constraints	No Change in Executive Constraints	Increase in Executive Constraints
<i>Change in Political Imprisonment</i>	Increase in Political Imprisonment	5 50.0%	6 14.3%	5 8.2%
	No Change in Political Imprisonment	5 50.0%	28 66.7%	31 50.8%
	Decrease in Political Imprisonment	0 .0%	8 19.0%	25 41.0%
	Total	10 100.0%	42 100.0%	61 100.0%

*Source:* Polity IV Data Project, CIRI Human Rights Project

Chi- Square Significance Value and Significance= 19.095, .001

Somers'd Value and Significance= .328, .000

Kendall's tau-b Value and Significance= .325, .000

Gamma Value and Significance= .549, .000

**Table 1.6**

Linear Regression: Impact of Change Independent Change and Control Variables on Change Dependent Physical Integrity Index (T-Statistics in Parentheses)

	GDP Per Capita (\$US)	Competitiveness of Participation	Openness of Executive Recruitment	Executive Constraints (Decision Rules)
	<i>Standardized coefficient</i>	<i>Standardized coefficient</i>	<i>Standardized coefficient</i>	<i>Standardized coefficient</i>
<i>Physical Rights Integrity Index</i>	.205 (2.029)*	.195 (1.233)	-.113 (-1.024)	.342 (2.096)*

Source: Polity IV Data Project, CIRI Human Rights Project, World Bank Data

Significance: \*p<.05, \*\*p<.01, \*\*\*p<.1

R Square Value: .196

Adjusted R Square Value: .160



## Appendix B

**Table 1.7**

Bivariate Correlations of Independent Change Democratic Characteristics

	Competitiveness of Participation	Competitiveness of Executive Recruitment	Openness of Executive Recruitment	Executive Constraints (Decision Rules)
	<i>Pearson Correlation</i>	<i>Pearson Correlation</i>	<i>Pearson Correlation</i>	<i>Pearson Correlation</i>
<i>Competitiveness of Participation</i>	1	.721*	.305*	.735*
<i>Competitiveness of Executive Recruitment</i>	.721*	1	.672*	.831*
<i>Openness of Executive Recruitment</i>	.305*	.672*	1	.464*
<i>Executive Constraints (Decision Rules)</i>	.735*	.831*	.464*	1

Source: Polity IV Data Project, CIRI Human Rights Project

Significance: \*correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)

**Table 1.8**

Crosstabs Analysis of the Impact of the Change in Competitiveness of Political Participation and the Change in Torture

		competitiveness of political participation		
		decrease in competitiveness of political participation	no change in competitiveness of political participation	increase in competitiveness of political participation
change in torture	increase in practice of torture	8 80.0%	23 59.0%	36 55.4%
	no change in practice of torture	1 10.0%	15 38.5%	21 32.3%
	decrease in practice of torture	1 10.0%	1 2.6%	8 12.3%
Total		10 100.0%	39 100.0%	65 100.0%

*Source:* Polity IV Data Project, CIRI Human Rights Project

Chi- Square Significance Value and Significance= 5.538, .236

Somers'd Value and Significance= .113, .188

Kendall's tau-b Value and Significance= .114, .188

Gamma Value and Significance= .212, .188

**Table 1.9**

Crosstabs Analysis of the Impact of the Change in Competitiveness of Political Participation and the Change in Extrajudicial Killing

		competitiveness of political participation		
		decrease in competitiveness of political participation	no change in competitiveness of political participation	increase in competitiveness of political participation
extrajudicial killing change	increase in number of extrajudicial killings	2 20.0%	14 35.9%	20 31.7%
	no change in the number of extrajudicial killing	7 70.0%	20 51.3%	29 46.0%
	decrease in number of extrajudicial killings	1 10.0%	5 12.8%	14 22.2%
Total		10 100.0%	39 100.0%	63 100.0%

*Source:* Polity IV Data Project, CIRI Human Rights Project

Chi- Square Significance Value and Significance= 3.216, .522

Somers'd Value and Significance= .053, .543

Kendall's tau-b Value and Significance= .051, .543

Gamma Value and Significance= .087, .543

**Table 2.1**

Crosstabs Analysis of the Impact of the Change in Competitiveness of Political Participation and the Change in Disappearances

		competitiveness of political participation		
		decrease in competitiveness of political participation	no change in competitiveness of political participation	increase in competitiveness of political participation
disappearance change	increase in number of disappearances	3 30.0%	4 10.3%	9 13.6%
	no change in number of disappearances	6 60.0%	28 71.8%	41 62.1%
	decrease in number of disappearances	1 10.0%	7 17.9%	16 24.2%
Total		10 100.0%	39 100.0%	66 100.0%

*Source:* Polity IV Data Project, CIRI Human Rights Project

Chi- Square Significance Value and Significance= 3.721, .445

Somers'd Value and Significance= .091, .289

Kendall's tau-b Value and Significance= .094, .289

Gamma Value and Significance= .177, .289

**Table 2.2**

Crosstabs Analysis of the Impact of the Change in Competitiveness of Executive Recruitment on the Change in Extrajudicial Killings

		change in competitiveness of executive recruitment		
		decrease in competitiveness of executive recruitment	no change in competitiveness of executive recruitment	increase in competitiveness of executive recruitment
extrajudicial killing change	increase in number of extrajudicial killings	4 36.4%	20 33.3%	12 29.3%
	no change in the number of extrajudicial killing	4 36.4%	33 55.0%	19 46.3%
	decrease in number of extrajudicial killings	3 27.3%	7 11.7%	10 24.4%
Total		11 100.0%	60 100.0%	41 100.0%

Source: Polity IV Data Project, CIRI Human Rights Project

Chi- Square Significance Value and Significance= 3.825, .430

Somers'd Value and Significance= .073, .450

Kendall's tau-b Value and Significance= .070, .450

Gamma Value and Significance= .116, .450

**Table 2.3**

Crosstabs Analysis of the Impact of the Change in Openness of Executive Recruitment on the Change in Torture

		openness of executive recruitment		
		decrease in openness of executive recruitment	no change in openness of executive recruitment	increase in openness of executive recruitment
change in torture	increase in practice of torture	7 70.0%	52 57.8%	8 57.1%
	no change in practice of torture	3 30.0%	30 33.3%	4 28.6%
	decrease in practice of torture	0 .0%	8 8.9%	2 14.3%
Total		10 100.0%	90 100.0%	14 100.0%

Source: Polity IV Data Project, CIRI Human Rights Project

Chi- Square Significance Value and Significance= 1.705, .790

Somers'd Value and Significance= .084, .432

Kendall's tau-b Value and Significance= .068, .432

Gamma Value and Significance= .158, .432

**Table 2.4**

Crosstabs Analysis of the Impact of the Change in Openness of Executive Recruitment on the Change in Extrajudicial Killings

		openness of executive recruitment		
		decrease in openness of executive recruitment	no change in openness of executive recruitment	increase in openness of executive recruitment
extrajudicial killing change	increase in number of extrajudicial killings	2 20.0%	30 33.7%	4 30.8%
	no change in the number of extrajudicial killing	4 40.0%	45 50.6%	7 53.8%
	decrease in number of extrajudicial killings	4 40.0%	14 15.7%	2 15.4%
Total		10 100.0%	89 100.0%	13 100.0%

Source: Polity IV Data Project, CIRI Human Rights Project

Chi- Square Significance Value and Significance= 3.794, .435

Somers'd Value and Significance= -.117, .342

Kendall's tau-b Value and Significance= -.088, .342

Gamma Value and Significance= -.185, .342

**Table 2.5**

Crosstabs Analysis of the Impact of the Change in Openness of Executive Recruitment on the Change in Disappearances

		openness of executive recruitment		
		decrease in openness of executive recruitment	no change in openness of executive recruitment	increase in openness of executive recruitment
disappearance change	increase in number of disappearances	2 20.0%	12 13.2%	2 14.3%
	no change in number of disappearances	7 70.0%	61 67.0%	7 50.0%
	decrease in number of disappearances	1 10.0%	18 19.8%	5 35.7%
Total		10 100.0%	91 100.0%	14 100.0%

Source: Polity IV Data Project, CIRI Human Rights Project

Chi- Square Significance Value and Significance= 2.977, .562

Somers'd Value and Significance= .141, .216

Kendall's tau-b Value and Significance= .117, .216

Gamma Value and Significance= .261, 0216



**Table 2.6**

Crosstabs Analysis of the Impact of the Change in Openness of Executive Recruitment on the Change in Political Imprisonment

		openness of executive recruitment		
		decrease in openness of executive recruitment	no change in openness of executive recruitment	increase in openness of executive recruitment
Change in Political Imprisonment	increase in number of people imprisoned	3 30.0%	11 12.4%	2 14.3%
	no change in number of people imprisoned	5 50.0%	54 60.7%	5 35.7%
	decrease in number of people imprisoned	2 20.0%	24 27.0%	7 50.0%
Total		10 100.0%	89 100.0%	14 100.0%

*Source:* Polity IV Data Project, CIRI Human Rights Project

Chi- Square Significance Value and Significance= 5.908, .206

Somers'd Value and Significance= .198, .120

Kendall's tau-b Value and Significance= .156, .120

Gamma Value and Significance= .317, .120

**Table 2.7**

Crosstabs Analysis of the Impact of the Change in Executive Constraints (Decision Rules) on the Change in Torture

		change in executive constraints (decision rules)		
		decrease in executive restraints (decision rules)	no change in executive restraints (decision rules)	increase in executive restraints (decision rules)
change in torture	increase in practice of torture	8 80.0%	26 60.5%	33 54.1%
	no change in practice of torture	2 20.0%	15 34.9%	20 32.8%
	decrease in practice of torture	0 .0%	2 4.7%	8 13.1%
Total		10 100.0%	43 100.0%	61 100.0%

Source: Polity IV Data Project, CIRI Human Rights Project

Chi-Square Significance Value and Significance= 4.594, .332

Somers'd Value and Significance= .139, .091

Kendall's tau-b Value and Significance= .142, .091

Gamma Value and Significance= .261, .091

**Table 2.8**

Crosstabs Analysis of the Impact of the Change in Executive Constraints (Decision Rules) on the Change in Extrajudicial Killing

		change in executive constraints (decision rules)		
		decrease in executive restraints (decision rules)	no change in executive restraints (decision rules)	increase in executive restraints (decision rules)
extrajudicial killing change	increase in number of extrajudicial killings	4 40.0%	13 30.2%	19 32.2%
	no change in the number of extrajudicial killing	4 40.0%	25 58.1%	27 45.8%
	decrease in number of extrajudicial killings	2 20.0%	5 11.6%	13 22.0%
Total		10 100.0%	43 100.0%	59 100.0%

*Source:* Polity IV Data Project, CIRI Human Rights Project

Chi- Square Significance Value and Significance= 2.759, .599

Somers'd Value and Significance= .055, .556

Kendall's tau-b Value and Significance= .053, .556

Gamma Value and Significance= .089, .556

## Bibliography

- Anderson, C. J., Regan, P. M., & Ostergard, R. L. (2002). Political repression and public perceptions of human rights. *Political Research Quarterly*, 55(2), 439. doi: 10.2307/3088060
- Carlin, R. E. (2011). Distrusting democrats and political participation in new democracies: Lessons from Chile. *Political Research Quarterly*, 64(3), 668-687. doi: 10.1177/1065912910370692
- Carothers, T. (2002). The end of the transition paradigm. *Journal of Democracy*, 5(21). Retrieved December 8, 2011, from [http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/journal\\_of\\_democracy/v013/13.1carothers.html](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/journal_of_democracy/v013/13.1carothers.html)
- Cingranelli, D. L., & Richards, D. L. (n.d.). *CIRI human rights data project* [Scholarly project]. In *CIRI Human Rights Data Project: Home*. Retrieved December 08, 2011, from <http://ciri.binghamton.edu/>
- Corrales, J. (2001). Strong societies, weak parties: Regime change in Cuba and Venezuela in the 1950s and today [Abstract]. *Latin American Politics and Society*, 43(2), 81-113. Retrieved February 28, 2012, from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3176972>
- De Mesquita, B. B., Cherif, F. M., Downs, G. W., & Smith, A. (2005). Thinking inside the box: A look at democracy and human rights. *International Studies Quarterly*, 49(3), 439-458. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-2478.2005.00372.x
- Gibler, D. M. (2006). Alliances, then democracy: An examination of the relationship between regime type and alliance formation. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 50(1), 129-153. doi: 10.1177/0022002705281360

- Gibson, E. L., & Suarez-Cao, J. (2010). Federalized party systems and subnational party competition: Theory and an empirical application to Argentina. *Comparative Politics*, 43(1), 21-39.
- Glazer, N. (2010). Democracy and deep divides. *Journal of Democracy*, 21(2), 5-19. doi: 10.1353/jod.0.0171
- Hafner-Burton, E. M. (2005). Trading human rights: How preferential trade agreements influence government repression. *International Organization*, 59(03). doi: 10.1017/S0020818305050216
- Hafner-Burton, E. M., & Tsutsui, K. (2005). Human rights in a globalizing world: The paradox of empty promises. *American Journal of Sociology*, 110(5), 1373-1411. doi: 10.1086/428442
- Hathaway, O. A. (2007). Why do countries commit to human rights treaties? *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 51(4), 588-621. doi: 10.1177/0022002707303046
- Hungary. (2007). In *Worldmark Encyclopedia of Nations*. Retrieved February 28, 2012, from <http://www.encyclopedia.com/topic/Hungary.aspx>
- Ibrahim, A. (2006). Universal values and Muslim democracy. *Journal of Democracy*, 17(3), 5-12. doi: 10.1353/jod.2006.0046
- Keith, L. C. (2002). Constitutional provisions for individual human rights (1977-1996): Are they more than mere "window dressing?" *Political Research Quarterly*, 55(1), 111. doi: 10.2307/3088068
- Korea. (2008). In *The Columbia Encyclopedia, 6th Ed.* Retrieved February 28, 2012, from <http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1E1-Korea.html>
- Lee, J. (2008). Path toward democracy in South Korea: Social capital and democracy

- embedded in the citizens. *Asian Survey*, 48(4), 580-602. doi:  
10.1525/as.2008.48.4.580
- Marshall, M. G., & Jaggers, K. (n.d.). *Polity IV project* [Scholarly project]. In *Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics*. Retrieved December 8, 2011, from <http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm>
- Munck, G. L., & Verkuilen, J. (2002). Conceptualizing and measuring democracy: Evaluating alternative indices. *Comparative Political Studies*, 35(1), 5-34. doi:  
10.1177/001041400203500101
- Powell, E. J., & Staton, J. K. (2009). Domestic judicial institutions and human rights treaty violation. *International Studies Quarterly*, 53(1), 149-174. doi:  
10.1111/j.1468-2478.2008.01527.x
- Shin, D. C. (2005). How does democratic regime change affect mass political ideology? a case study of South Korea in comparative perspective [Abstract]. *International Political Science Review/ Revue Internationale De Science Politique*, 26(4), 381-396. doi: 10.1177/0192512105055806
- Starr, H., & Lindborg, C. (2003). Democratic dominoes revisited: The hazards of governmental transitions. *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 47(4), 490-519.
- Stephens, E. H. (1989). Capitalist development and democracy in South America. *Politics & Society*, 17(3), 281-352. doi: 10.1177/003232928901700302
- The World Bank Group. (2012). Data | the world bank. *Data | The World Bank*. Retrieved February 29, 2012, from <http://data.worldbank.org/>
- Venezuela. (2007). In *Worldmark Encyclopedia of Nations*. Retrieved February 28, 2012, from <http://www.encyclopedia.com/topic/Venezuela.aspx>

Visegrády, A. (1992). Transition to democracy in central and eastern Europe:

Experiences of a model country - Hungary [Abstract]. *William & Mary Bill of*

*Rights Journal*, 1(2). Retrieved February 28, 2012, from

<http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmborj/vol1/iss2/6>