

International Humanitarian Law and Civilians in Modern Day Warfare

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ABSTRACT

The present study aims to reflect the effect of International Humanitarian Law on non-state actors. The effect of International Humanitarian Law on non-state actor seems to be minimal, causing a rise in civilian deaths and injury. This study presents an overview of International Humanitarian Law, the purpose and effects of such on state actors, and recent research on International Humanitarian Law and non-state actors. Following will be an analysis of civilian deaths (dependent variable) and various independent variables as they relate to region, type of conflict, and incompatibility.

Key words: International Humanitarian Law, non-state actors, state-actors, civilians, new wars, modern warfare.

INTRODUCTION

This paper is an assessment of the irrelevancy of International Humanitarian Law such as the Geneva Convention in preventing civilian casualty in modern warfare. Throughout this paper the influence of International Humanitarian Law and its effects on both state actors and non-state actors will be reviewed. Following that portion will be an analysis of battle deaths using data from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (2020).

INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND STATE ACTORS

International Humanitarian Law is an ancient practice that is honored in modern warfare. International Humanitarian Law has been practiced since Egypt made agreements with Samaria on the treatment of soldiers (Solis, 2016). Asian countries have multiple Hindu texts that report laws of war regarding the treatment of disabled and surrendering persons, and Roman emperors have laid down restrictions on types of weapon use against enemy combatants (Solis, 2016). International Humanitarian Law has been a practice for a long time, not just since the creation of

international organizations like the United Nations or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The purpose of International Humanitarian Law is to reduce the amount of unnecessary human suffering in times of war (Fenrick, 2005).

According to the International Committee of the Red Cross, Humanitarian Law is described as “a set of rules that seek to limit the effects of armed conflict. It protects people who are not or are no longer participating in hostilities and restricts the means and methods of warfare” (International Committee of the Red Cross, 2020). The treaties that primarily regulate the means of warfare today are the Hague Conventions, the Geneva Conventions, and Additional Protocols I and II. These treaties demonstrate regulations on war on land and sea, the wounded and sick, maritime conflicts, prisoners of war, and civilians. These treaties bind those who ratified them to their guidelines, and failure to adhere to the guidelines in these treaties may be punishable by judicial action in the international court.

Throughout the history of International Humanitarian Law, there have been times in which states have religiously followed the guidelines of such laws and there have been times in which states have abandoned those guidelines altogether. One example is when the United States fought against the standard of the treatment of prisoners of war, as described in the Geneva Conventions, after the attacks on September 11, 2001 (Shumate, 2005). Even though the United States had support in their war time response to Al Qaeda after the attack on the Twin Towers, the United States took their approach one step further in their attempt to detain members of the terrorist organization at Guantanamo Bay. President Bush justified this by stating that because Al Qaeda was using a different style of warfare, there needed to be new rules to govern the response (Shumate, 2005). The fact that a state such as the United States of America would change their approach and go against the standards of the Geneva Convention when those standards no longer

benefited the United States calls for an understanding International Humanitarian Law and its effects on state actors.

An important piece to understanding International Humanitarian Law is *why* states decide to ratify these laws and what influences states to follow the rules set before them. There are many researchers who seek to understand this question, however, in this paper, it is important to understand the arguments for what influences state actors to adhere to International Humanitarian Law before examining how non-state actors are influenced by International Humanitarian Law.

George Wallace is one of many researchers who examines what influences states to follow IHL, and he argues that a state's history of conflict is the most influential of all (Wallace, 2012). Wallace discusses that because the Geneva Conventions are explicit and detailed, they arise more cost to commitment, and these detailed restrictions and costs are most influential (Wallace, 2012). Because events that emotionally vivid or disturbing are proven through psychological research to influence judgement and decision making, it is most likely for state actors to be influenced by previous warfare when it comes to their decisions to sign a treaty that restricts their mobility in warfare (Rosen, 2005). Wallace assessed the decision of states to ratify a treaty and how long it took the states to ratify the treaty by analyzing the history of participation in war of those who ratified the treaties. Wallace found that states who experienced more overall conflict took longer to ratify the treaties, and even more so, that those who were the victors of warfare were less likely to ratify than those who lost in warfare (Wallace, 2012).

James D. Morrow is another researcher that studies the reasons why states may ratify and adhere to International Humanitarian Law. Morrow indicates that when a state signs a treaty, they are agreeing to the standards set in the treaty, and when multiple states sign a treaty, they

are recognizing that, collectively, all will cooperate with the guidelines within the signed treaty and accept their new responsibility to follow those guidelines (Morrow, 2007). Morrow suggests that the most influential factor is adherence to these IHL treaties is reciprocal responses by other signatories (Morrow, 2007). In Morrow's assessment, when signatories of a treaty adhere to the standards of the treaty, it is more likely to encourage and influence other signatories of the same treaty to live up to the standards of the treaty. Morrow found this to be true regardless of the perspective in which International Humanitarian Law was viewed, regarding Liberalism, Realism or Constructivism (Morrow, 2007). Morrow also found that when one state violates the standards of International Humanitarian Law, other states are more likely to violate those standards as well (Morrow, 2007). According to Morrow's data, despite reciprocity, if violating the standards of International Humanitarian Law will end the war faster, then states are more likely to violate International Humanitarian Law (Morrow 2007).

Chayes and Chayes (1993) argue that the binding factor to International Humanitarian Law is the fact of whether the treaty will benefit the state or not. Chayes and Chayes discuss that the very nature of ratifying a treaty is to signify that one supports it and is willing to conform to its standards, but the influencing factor of that conformation is whether the guidelines will benefit the state's interests. Chayes and Chayes use this assessment to recognize that not all contexts are the same and there will be some contexts in which a state may violate the standards of the treaty because those standards do not benefit them at the time, however, the overall benefits are worth more than the costs of remaining bound by the treaty itself (1993). Also mentioned by the researchers is that treaties, and international treaties especially, are typically written with the ability to modify, amend, or reinterpret the clauses when they no longer fit the goals or agenda of the international organization or the members who ratified the treaty. This is

important for signatories on international treaties because it allows them more mobility when their goals and personal standards change (Chayes and Chayes, 1993).

Another theory of why states ratify and adhere to International Humanitarian Law is that states who are inferior in technology, military, and economics are more likely to support International Humanitarian Law in war because it secures a more equal playing field in the means of war (Posner, 2003). Posner discusses the effects of deficiency in weapons, technology and economics in his journal article “A Theory of the Laws of War,” and finds through his analysis that weaker states are more likely to join treaties so that they are not disadvantaged on such a high scale (Posner, 2003). Another topic that Posner discusses is how recently a state has had its sovereignty. Posner suggests that newly sovereign nations are *less* likely to ratify into International Humanitarian Law because it may restrict their ability to maintain their sovereignty should they see another war (Posner, 2003).

These theories discuss the many ways that states are influenced into ratifying and adhering to International Humanitarian Law. Understanding the research that describes the influences on states ratifying these treaties of war is vital to beginning to understand what influences non-state actors into ratifying or foregoing International Humanitarian Law. Because war with non-state actors is relatively new in the scope of the history of war, understanding organized, sovereign states is fundamental to moving forward in the discussion and applying these same and similar questions to new non-state adversaries.

INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW EFFECTS ON NON-STATE ACTORS

Chinkin and Kaldor describe “war” in their book *International Law and New Wars* as “collective use of force by two more actors” (Chickin and Kaldor, 2017, pg 4). Chinkin and

Kaldor expand on their definition of war to say that it is politically based in transactions forced through aggression in order to obtain the outcome one actor desires (Chinkin and Kaldor).

However, the authors specify that war has changed in recent years and that it is not as transactional as it used to be.

One way that Chinkin and Kaldor specify the way that war is changing that is relevant to the theory discussed in this paper is that contemporary war was fought by armed forces, but in new wars, they are not (Chinkin and Kaldor, 2017). In contemporary wars, the fighting forces were distinguishable through their uniforms, so they were easy to designate who was the enemy, versus who as a civilian, or a non-participating individual. In these New Wars, fighting forces could be uniformed forces, paramilitary troops, or civilians. The participants could be acting on behalf of the state, or they could be acting of their own free will. Because of this, wars do not typically end the way they used to (Chinkin and Kaldor, 2017). They often continue because there are participants that are not ruled by the state or by International Humanitarian Law. Without those guidelines, some participants can continue the violence as they see fit.

Mastorodimos discusses the obligations of armed non-state actors in International Humanitarian Law in his book *Armed Non-State Actors in International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law*. According to Mastorodimos, the legitimacy of non-state actors and their level of sovereignty, or ability to be considered a signatory, but the basic outcome of the discussion is that armed non-state actors are *not* bound to International Humanitarian Law the same way that a sovereign state is (Mastorodimos, 2017).

One of the arguably most famous instances of realization that non-state actors are not bound to or protected by International Humanitarian Law is the United States' response to the 2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center. The United States responded by housing

enemy combatants from Al Qaeda and the Taliban at Guantanamo Bay in 2002. The United States was able to do this by claiming that the members of Al Qaeda and the Taliban that they had detained were not able to be classified as Prisoners of War, because they were non-state actors (2002). Therefore, the United States was able to act without having to follow guidelines for treatment of Prisoners of War outlined in the third Geneva Convention (2002). Furthermore, former President Bush, at the time, shifted the outlook to reflect that Al Qaeda members did not qualify for protections under the third Geneva Convention, but the Taliban was, given the Taliban's recognition by the Afghanistan government, despite not holding POW status (2002). The Taliban did not qualify for the POW status because they did not match the requirements of Article 4 (A) (2) of the third Geneva Convention, which specifies that POWs must have uniforms, insignia, and always carry a weapon, which, the Taliban did not do (2002). Nonetheless, President Bush made a statement that the detainees would be treated with many of the amenities that POWs are offered by the Geneva Conventions. However, despite similar treatment, the lack of the POW status allowed the United States to interrogate the detainees for more information than their name, rank, and serial number (2002). This moment in history sets a precedence for treatment of non-state actors, as well as their status among the International Humanitarian Law playing field. It opened the field for questions of who determines a group's status or eligibility for treatment within the Geneva Conventions when the investigators are bound to the treaty, but the recipients of treatment are not.

Regarding civilians during times of war, the fourth Geneva Convention provides protection of civilians who take no part in the hostilities, allowing them the ability to search for protection from non-involved state entities and guaranteeing them humane treatment (International Committee of the Red Cross). A major tactic in modern warfare by groups like ISIS, Al Qaeda, and the Taliban is targeting civilians. By targeting civilians not involved in the

warfare, these groups would be violating humanitarian law, if they were involved in International Humanitarian Law. In *Genva 2.0*, Charli Carpenter addresses this briefly by discussing the lack of standards for these groups, and the lack of ability for state actors to punish or address these actions by non-state actors (Carpenter, 2008). Carpenter also addresses the idea that *if* these groups were bound by International Humanitarian Law, then they may be able to defend their actions by classifying harm to civilians as “collateral damage” by stating they had no purpose or goal to harm uninvolved civilians. At that point, history of offense and actions would make or break punishment if these groups were held accountable by IHL (2008).

In his article *The ‘New War’ Challenge to IHL*, Nicolas Lamp discusses the ways that International Humanitarian Law is challenged by these “new wars.” One of the first things Lamp brings up is simply the writing of the Geneva Conventions. Lamp points out that the verbiage of the Geneva Conventions implies conventional warfare, with terms like “unnecessary suffering” (Lamp, 2011). Terms like these are reflective of conventional warfare, or “old wars,” because it implies that harm to civilians and harm in general are not part of the purpose of war, which, as seen by the rape and unwanted impregnating of women, child soldiers, and human bombers, seems to be a theme of these “new wars” (Lamp, 2011). One of the purposes of IHL is to balance the disproportionate power of military forces and civilian persons, thus there are guidelines as to not harming civilians because the military forces have exponential power imbalance. Lamp considers the difference between “new wars” and “old wars” in this sense, regarding the fact that most “new wars” are compiled of civilian or paramilitary groups, and therefore, the power of the military is also the power of the civilians, so there is essentially no imbalance, causing IHL to not influence non-state actors in war (Lamp, 2011).

Shruti Bedi contemplates the future of International Humanitarian Law when they discuss the purpose of IHL itself. Bedi points out that International Humanitarian Law has the purpose of

limiting the harm done to people in war, and questions why there is not any restrictions or action to take against non-state actors that ignore humanitarianism (Bedi, 2014). Bedi recognizes that there is no mistaking that terrorist groups like Al Qaeda, the Taliban, and ISIS violate humanitarianism with their violent actions, recruitment of children, and treatment of people. However, Bedi questions whether there is a possibility of some International Humanitarian guideline that non-state actors could be a part of as well (Bedi, 2014). Bedi's question poses a difficult place for International Humanitarian Law, though. This is because the recognition of groups such as ISIS or the Taliban in Humanitarian Law recognizes them as sovereign groups that could have influence over international matters. And, if their actions are considered terrorism, and terrorism is recognized as blatant anti-humanitarianism, then are these groups able to be guided by any International Humanitarian Law? Do they deserve to be treated within the bound of such law if they themselves do not and cannot bind themselves? Bedi's questions lead to the analysis portion of this paper on the damage that these groups have on civilians that are direct violations of International Humanitarian Law, proving that they are not and cannot be bound by these guidelines that state actors follow.

THE AFTERMATH OF NON-STATE ACTORS WITHOUT INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW

Throughout this paper, there has been coverage on what International Humanitarian Law's purpose is, and how the implementation of it has evolved with the changes in war. The importance of IHL is to limit the unnecessary suffering of people in times of war. However, it was built for conventional war. The enchantment of IHL is different for many states, as was

demonstrated by many researchers mentioned. To Wallace, a nation's history of war was the influencing factor (2012). Morrow researched the effects of reciprocity in adherence to the standards of IHL and found that reciprocity was influential upon other states to follow IHL as well (2007). According to Chayes and Chayes, the cost-benefit analysis of following IHL was one of the most influential factors (1993). And for Posner, it was a state's inferiority in military capability and a desire for an even playing field (2003). When looking at the effects of International Humanitarian Law on non-state actors, and the applicability of IHL on non-state actors, it is difficult to assess because non-state actors fight a different kind of war than International Humanitarian Law was built for. These "new wars" are built from purposeful violence and don't allow for a distinguishable difference between civilians and fighters. It was seen after the attacks on 9/11 that even the United States seems to think that IHL applies differently to this new kind of warfare with non-state actors. Lamp and Bedi question whether International Humanitarian Law can be applicable to non-state actors at all, and if so, what that would look like (2011, 2014). Lamp even specifies that International Humanitarian Law is not enticing or built for these non-state actors (2011). This is all great research, but it does not address what will happen to civilians if there is no change. Without any temptation to limit the harm done by these "new wars," more civilians will be harmed or die as an effect of non-state actors not being bound to International Humanitarian Law.

DATA REVIEW

The Uppsala Conflict Data Program has extensive data on battle deaths from 1989 to 2019 (Pettersson and Öberg, 2020). Using Pettersson's codebook, it was easiest to utilize their variable `bd_best` as the independent variable (2020). According to the codebook, `bd_best` is described as "the UCDP best estimate for battle related deaths in the dyad in a given year" (Pettersson, 2020). Their best estimate for battle related deaths is determined by an analysis of

the sources used to maintain the data and determined by the most reliable sources utilized (Pettersson, 2020). In this study, this is the dependent variable because it most closely relates to the thesis of this analysis in that it considers the death toll of battles across the globe. Though it does not specify whether these battle deaths are civilian or combatant, it *does* indicate the deadliness of these wars.

The first independent variable tested with the `bd_best` is the type of conflict. Type of conflict is coded as `type_of_conflict`. `type_of_conflict` is classified into four groups. 1 = extrasystemic, meaning a state going against a non-state actor outside of the states' territory. 2 = interstate, meaning conflict between two or more states. 3 = intrastate, meaning side A is the government and side B is a rebel group within side A's government. 4 = internationalized intrastate, meaning side A is the government, side B is a rebel group, and there is foreign troop involvement (Pettersson, 2020). When looking at data from these tests, regarding `type_of_conflict`, the focus will be on internationalized intrastate conflict because International Humanitarian Law as it pertains to this thesis is interested in internationalized intrastate conflict.

When running a crosstabulation of `bd_best` and `type_of_conflict`, `bd_best` was binned to create four categories of deaths, which created `binned_bd_deaths`. The categories are as follows: low deaths, medium low deaths, medium high deaths and high deaths. In this binning, "low" indicates 53.0 or less battle related deaths. "Medium low" indicates 53.1 to 168.0 battle related deaths. "Medium high" indicates 168.1 to 703.0 battle related deaths. "High" indicates 703.1 or more battle related deaths. Using `binned_bd_best` as the dependent variable and `types_of_conflict` as the independent variable, SPSS produces Table A.

When comparing the results within the crosstabulation, it indicates that 49.8% of internationalized intrastate warfare results in high rates of battle deaths. In comparison to

intrastate conflict, which only has 19% of battles resulting in high deaths, and interstate conflict, which results in 26.5% of battles having high deaths, internationalized intrastate warfare is by far the deadliest warfare according to the data recorded in this last year. What this means is that warfare between a government and rebel groups within the government's territory that has foreign involvement is the deadliest of styles of warfare seen today.

Even when running a cross tabulation for `bd_deaths` and `type_of_conflict`, with the type of conflict controlled for years that were battle deaths have been recorded, the results indicate that international intrastate conflict results in high battle related deaths the most often. Years was coded into three sections, with years separated into three decades, 1989-1999 (1), 2000-2009 (2) and 2010-2019 (3). The following table (Table B) indicates that in the most recent decade, (2010-2019), battle deaths were most frequent in the high death range within international intrastate conflict at 47.4%. This pattern can be seen over the prior two decades as well. Review Table B for visuals.

An important question to ask is *what* these groups are fighting about. Looking at the data from UCDP, it is possible to answer that question. Under the codebook for this dataset, incompatibility is defined as the “main conflict issue” (Pettersson, 2020). Next, data was compared to understand which type of conflict most frequently resulted in high battle deaths given the purpose of the conflict. When creating a cross tabulation for `bd_deaths` and `type_of_conflict`, while controlling for the incompatibility, results show Table C.

What this data shows is that when controlling for incompatibility, high battle related deaths occur most often in internationalized intrastate conflict for both government incompatibility. For territory incompatibility, high battle related deaths occur most often in interstate conflicts. This means that when two states have conflict over territory, it is more likely

to cause higher rates of battle related deaths than any other type of conflict. It also means that a state having government conflict with rebel groups that results in foreign involvement has most often has high rates of battle related deaths.

After running a frequency test on variable region, which according to the codebook, designates the region of incompatibility, it was displayed that Africa and Aisia have the most instances of incompatibility of any kind (see Table D). Out of curiosity, a crosstabulation was ran between binned_bd_best and type_of_conflict controlling for region. The results are presented in Table E.

What Table E indicates is that even though incompatibility occurs most often in African and Asian regions, incompatibility in the Middle East resulting in internationalized intrastate warfare is by far the deadliest. With 81.3% of internationalized intrastate warfare resulting in high deaths, it is can be reasonably estimated that conflict in the Middle East is more deadly than other conflict.

DISCUSSION

Unfortunately, the data provided does not indicate if the battle related deaths have been civilian or combatant deaths. However, the data and tests *do* indicate that conflicts between a government and a rebel group with international involvement result in high death rates. Though international intrastate conflict is second in frequency to intrastate conflict, it has proven to be more deadly, even in the most recent decade. Considering international intrastate conflict is intrastate conflict that has reached an international level of awareness with international involvement, it is alarming that these conflicts are more deadly than others when there are International Humanitarian Laws to mitigate the cost of war. In addition, with most modern war occurring in the Middle East with non-state combatants, it is alarming that even though more

incompatibility occurs in Asian and African regions, the conflict in the Middle East results in higher battle death rates despite their lower numbers of conflict.

CONCLUSION

Given the data sets provided and the historical and documentational context of modern-day warfare, battle related deaths, and International Humanitarian Law, there is evidence to reasonably conclude that International Humanitarian Law has not impacted war in with non-state actors in the Middle East. The data and evidence provided indicate there is research to do yet in order to conclude more direct effects on civilian deaths. Unfortunately, there is not much data on what level of involvement in the conflict the deceased had prior to death. This information would exponentially help in understanding the effects of provisions in IHL meant to protect civilians.

International Humanitarian Law aims to limit the amount of unnecessary harm done to people in times of war. Given the results of these data, it is evident that International Humanitarian Law is not succeeded in this mission regarding modern day warfare. For future success in humanitarian goals, research should be done going forward to find a better alternative to current International Humanitarian Law.

Tables

Table A:**Binned Battle Related Deaths per Type of Conflict**

			type_of_conflict		
			interstate	intra state	internationaliz ed intra state
bd_best (Binned)	low	Count	13	294	18
		% within type_of_conflict	38.2%	28.9%	8.2%
	medium low	Count	10	273	33
		% within type_of_conflict	29.4%	26.8%	15.1%
	medium high	Count	2	258	59
		% within type_of_conflict	5.9%	25.3%	26.9%
	high	Count	9	193	109
		% within type_of_conflict	26.5%	19.0%	49.8%
Total	Count		34	1018	219
	% within type_of_conflict		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Table B:**Binned Battle Related Deaths per Type of Conflict (by year)**

				type_of_conflict			Total
				interstat e	intra state	internationali zed intra state	
1	bd_best (Binned)	low	Count	5	123	3	131
			% within type_of_conflict	33.3%	28.8%	7.1%	27.1%
		medium low	Count	4	108	2	114

			% within type_of_conflict	26.7%	25.3%	4.8%	23.6%
		medium high	Count	0	88	12	100
			% within type_of_conflict	0.0%	20.6%	28.6%	20.7%
		high	Count	6	108	25	139
			% within type_of_conflict	40.0%	25.3%	59.5%	28.7%
	Total		Count	15	427	42	484
			% within type_of_conflict	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
2	bd_best (Binned)	low	Count	4	75	4	83
			% within type_of_conflict	50.0%	25.3%	9.1%	23.8%
		medium low	Count	0	75	4	79
			% within type_of_conflict	0.0%	25.3%	9.1%	22.6%
		medium high	Count	1	95	15	111
			% within type_of_conflict	12.5%	32.0%	34.1%	31.8%
		high	Count	3	52	21	76
			% within type_of_conflict	37.5%	17.5%	47.7%	21.8%
	Total		Count	8	297	44	349
			% within type_of_conflict	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
3	bd_best (Binned)	low	Count	4	96	11	111
			% within type_of_conflict	36.4%	32.7%	8.3%	25.3%
		medium low	Count	6	90	27	123
			% within type_of_conflict	54.5%	30.6%	20.3%	28.1%
		medium high	Count	1	75	32	108
			% within type_of_conflict	9.1%	25.5%	24.1%	24.7%
		high	Count	0	33	63	96
			% within type_of_conflict	0.0%	11.2%	47.4%	21.9%

Total			Count	11	294	133	438	
			% within type_of_conflict	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	
Total	bd_best (Binned)	low	Count	13	294	18	325	
			% within type_of_conflict	38.2%	28.9%	8.2%	25.6%	
		medium low	Count	10	273	33	316	
			% within type_of_conflict	29.4%	26.8%	15.1%	24.9%	
		medium high	Count	2	258	59	319	
			% within type_of_conflict	5.9%	25.3%	26.9%	25.1%	
	high	Count	9	193	109	311		
		% within type_of_conflict	26.5%	19.0%	49.8%	24.5%		
	Total			Count	34	1018	219	1271
				% within type_of_conflict	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Table C:

Binned Battle Related Deaths per Type of Conflict (Incompatibility)

incompatibility			type_of_conflict			Total	
			interstate	intra state	internationalized intra state		
1	bd_best (Binned)	low	Count	13	207	12	232
			% within type_of_conflict	44.8%	37.2%	19.7%	35.9%
		medium low	Count	8	157	11	176
			% within type_of_conflict	27.6%	28.2%	18.0%	27.2%
		medium high	Count	2	116	14	132
			% within type_of_conflict	6.9%	20.9%	23.0%	20.4%
	high	Count	6	76	24	106	

			% within type_of_conflict	20.7%	13.7%	39.3%	16.4%
	Total		Count	29	556	61	646
			% within type_of_conflict	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
2	bd_best (Binned)	low	Count	0	86	6	92
			% within type_of_conflict	0.0%	18.7%	3.8%	14.8%
		medium low	Count	2	115	22	139
			% within type_of_conflict	40.0%	25.0%	13.9%	22.3%
		medium high	Count	0	142	45	187
			% within type_of_conflict	0.0%	30.9%	28.5%	30.0%
		high	Count	3	117	85	205
			% within type_of_conflict	60.0%	25.4%	53.8%	32.9%
	Total		Count	5	460	158	623
			% within type_of_conflict	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
3	bd_best (Binned)	low	Count		1		1
			% within type_of_conflict		50.0%		50.0%
		medium low	Count		1		1
			% within type_of_conflict		50.0%		50.0%
	Total		Count		2		2
			% within type_of_conflict		100.0%		100.0%
Total	bd_best (Binned)	low	Count	13	294	18	325
			% within type_of_conflict	38.2%	28.9%	8.2%	25.6%
		medium low	Count	10	273	33	316
			% within type_of_conflict	29.4%	26.8%	15.1%	24.9%
			Count	2	258	59	319

	medium high	% within type_of_conflict	5.9%	25.3%	26.9%	25.1%
	high	Count	9	193	109	311
		% within type_of_conflict	26.5%	19.0%	49.8%	24.5%
Total		Count	34	1018	219	1271
		% within type_of_conflict	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Table D:

region

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	2	.2	.2	.2
1	88	6.9	6.9	7.0
2	183	14.3	14.3	21.3
3	471	36.7	36.7	58.0
4	453	35.3	35.3	93.3
5	86	6.7	6.7	100.0
Total	1283	100.0	100.0	

Table E:

Binned Battle Related Deaths per Type of Conflict (Region)

region	bd_best (Binned)	high	type_of_conflict			Total
			interstate	intra state	internationalized intra state	
		Count	2			2
		% within type_of_conflict	100.0%			100.0%
Total		Count	2			2

			% within type_of_conflict	100.0%			100.0 %
1	bd_best (Binned)	low	Count		14	8	22
			% within type_of_conflict		23.0%	29.6%	25.0%
	medium low	Count		16	3	19	
		% within type_of_conflict		26.2%	11.1%	21.6%	
	medium high	Count		16	6	22	
		% within type_of_conflict		26.2%	22.2%	25.0%	
	high	Count		15	10	25	
		% within type_of_conflict		24.6%	37.0%	28.4%	
	Total	Count		61	27	88	
		% within type_of_conflict		100.0%	100.0%	100.0 %	
2	bd_best (Binned)	low	Count	0	41	0	41
			% within type_of_conflict	0.0%	28.9%	0.0%	23.0%
	medium low	Count	2	39	1	42	
		% within type_of_conflict	50.0%	27.5%	3.1%	23.6%	
	medium high	Count	0	36	5	41	
		% within type_of_conflict	0.0%	25.4%	15.6%	23.0%	
	high	Count	2	26	26	54	
		% within type_of_conflict	50.0%	18.3%	81.3%	30.3%	
	Total	Count	4	142	32	178	
		% within type_of_conflict	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0 %	
3	bd_best (Binned)	low	Count	11	124	0	135
			% within type_of_conflict	57.9%	29.7%	0.0%	28.8%
		Count	6	124	2	132	

		medium low	% within type_of_conflict	31.6%	29.7%	6.1%	28.1%	
		medium high	Count	1	106	6	113	
			% within type_of_conflict	5.3%	25.4%	18.2%	24.1%	
		high	Count	1	63	25	89	
			% within type_of_conflict	5.3%	15.1%	75.8%	19.0%	
	Total		Count	19	417	33	469	
			% within type_of_conflict	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0 %	
4	bd_best (Binned)	low	Count	2	103	8	113	
			% within type_of_conflict	28.6%	31.0%	7.3%	25.2%	
		medium low	Count	1	75	21	97	
			% within type_of_conflict	14.3%	22.6%	19.3%	21.7%	
		medium high	Count	1	84	34	119	
			% within type_of_conflict	14.3%	25.3%	31.2%	26.6%	
		high	Count	3	70	46	119	
			% within type_of_conflict	42.9%	21.1%	42.2%	26.6%	
		Total		Count	7	332	109	448
				% within type_of_conflict	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0 %
5	bd_best (Binned)	low	Count	0	12	2	14	
			% within type_of_conflict	0.0%	18.2%	11.1%	16.3%	
		medium low	Count	1	19	6	26	
			% within type_of_conflict	50.0%	28.8%	33.3%	30.2%	
		medium high	Count	0	16	8	24	
			% within type_of_conflict	0.0%	24.2%	44.4%	27.9%	
		high	Count	1	19	2	22	
			% within type_of_conflict	50.0%	28.8%	11.1%	25.6%	

	Total		Count	2	66	18	86
			% within type_of_conflict	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Total	bd_best (Binned)	low	Count	13	294	18	325
			% within type_of_conflict	38.2%	28.9%	8.2%	25.6%
		medium low	Count	10	273	33	316
			% within type_of_conflict	29.4%	26.8%	15.1%	24.9%
		medium high	Count	2	258	59	319
			% within type_of_conflict	5.9%	25.3%	26.9%	25.1%
		high	Count	9	193	109	311
			% within type_of_conflict	26.5%	19.0%	49.8%	24.5%
	Total		Count	34	1018	219	1271
			% within type_of_conflict	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

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