

Does Anyone Trust the Government Anymore?

Or Does it Depend on Who You Ask and When You Ask Them?

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Abstract

Political scientists have been curious about trust and its impact on government for years. They have learned that governments who have earned the trust of their citizens are more effective in serving the people and are generally able to accomplish more. However, do levels of trust in government depend upon a person's party affiliation and the party in power? Does partisan trust also vary depending on gender, race, education, or income level? I analyze data from the American National Election Survey (ANES) over time and conclude levels of trust in government rise and fall as power in government shifts back and forth between the two major parties. I also find interesting variations to trust levels when I look at the different demographics of the respondents. My research shows levels of partisan trust move up and down depending on which party controls the government. Further, there is not a significant level of change in trust for a 14 year period. This suggests the attention focused on the increasing polarization of society and how it affects our view of government may be overstated.

Introduction

The 2016 presidential election ended in a surprising upset win for President Trump. His win upended the political arena. It shocked the political pundits and the country. The campaign season was several long months filled with accusations, denials, blunt and offensive statements, incorrect statements, and finger pointing. Candidate Clinton offended a large number of people when she labeled Trump supporters a “basket of deplorables.” Many more citizens were angered and outraged when a tape was released showing Candidate Trump making crude and vulgar statements about women leading to serious questions about his fitness to be president. Democrat party headquarters' computers were hacked. Wikileaks kept publishing leaked or stolen information. In addition, there were investigations into Candidate Clinton's e-mail server with the FBI Director, James Comey, making statements at two critical junctures during the campaign on Candidate Clinton's guilt or absolution.

Then, amidst this upheaval, accusations were leveled at the Trump campaign asserting collusion with Russians had taken place to help President Trump steal and win the Presidency. The FBI director had appeared to place his thumb on the scales for Candidate Clinton absolving

her of the e-mail server improprieties the summer before the election, then tipped the scales the other way for Candidate Trump by re-opening the server investigation into Candidate Clinton just days before the election. After the election, President Trump fired James Comey, the FBI director, who accused President Trump of obstructing justice. Director Comey leaked pages of accusatory notes he had written about Trump to the media.

Citizens were already angry with the FBI director, who they felt had tipped the scales first toward Candidate Clinton and then, again, just before the election against Candidate Clinton. President Trump tweeted an accusation that the FBI had wiretapped Trump Tower to spy on his campaign. The FBI appeared to be heavily entwined with the events of the 2016 election cycle, and their reputation had taken somewhat of a beating.

I wondered, specifically, if and how the FBI would ever be able to re-gain the trust of citizens after these events. This question led me to research trust in the government agency of the FBI. My research led me from trust in the FBI to trust in government agencies and ultimately to trust in government and the leaders and parties that control the government.

Literature Review

Lack of trust in government officials and institutions is not a new phenomenon. Lack of trust has been plaguing government and its agencies for some time. Scholars have studied issues of public trust in government and trust in the specific agencies of government. A relatively new area of study in trust in government looks at party control of government and resulting levels of partisan trust. Extensive research has been done demonstrating the lack of public trust in government. Scandals and corruption contribute to lack of trust in government agencies (Bowler 2004, Clark 1997, Freeh 2005, Keele 2005, Theoharis 2016), two well-known investigations of the two major party candidates of the 2016 presidential election have people in the United States

declaring their mistrust in the specific agency of the FBI and the agents who lead that agency (Richey 2018). The investigation into Secretary Clinton's personal use of an e-mail server and the investigation into President Trump's campaign for collusion with Russian agents have drawn criticism from both parties and raises issues of party control and partisanship in government (diGenova 2018, Richey 2018).

Trust in government agencies is essential for institutions to implement and carry out the policies they are tasked with (Aitalieva 2018, Blind 2006, Bowler and Karp 2004, Warren 1999). The lack of trust has been examined for government seeking to rebuild public confidence and support in agencies. This research can be helpful, specifically, in determining what causes and affects trust in government and how it may be increased.

Trust in Government

Scholars have examined political trust and mistrust concluding trust is important for government to operate efficiently and accomplish the objectives they are tasked with (Aitalieva 2018, Blind 2006, Warren 1999). Objectives of government include protecting its citizens, maintaining growth of the economy, delivering services, and resolving basic social issues (Aitalieva 2018, Blind 2006, Chanley, Rudolph, and Rahn 2000). Researchers also assert increased public participation in elections and public policy are important outcomes of higher trust in government and support for government programs (Chanley, Rudolph, and Rahn 2000, Levi and Stoker 2000, Keele 2005). Citizens' lack of trust in government has been established through a variety of surveys. Chanley, Rudolph, and Rahn (2000) developed a quarterly time series to measure levels of trust in the United States national government and conducted a multivariate time series examination of public trust in government. They believe their quarterly measure of trust gives a more complete picture of changes in trust in government than can be

seen with the American National Election Study at two year intervals (Chanley, Rudolph, and Rahn 2000). Chanley, et al. (2000) determined that the decreasing level of public trust in government leads directly to loss of support for governmental programs and institutions and directly affects outcomes of elections. Chanley, et al. (2000) examined levels of trust in the 1980s and 1990s and observed great variations, both rising and falling. Hetherington (1998) demonstrated that negative evaluations of a president and congress are a consequence of decreasing levels of trust, thereby causing a political climate in which it is difficult for government to succeed. The General Social Survey (GSS) conducted by the National Opinion Research Center at the University of Chicago uses a five-item ordinal response scale as does the International Social Survey Program (ISSP) (Aitalieva 2018). The World Values Survey (WVS) utilizes a four-item response ranking to survey questions to determine the level of trust in government (Aitalieva 2018). The United Nations cites a myriad of surveys from several governmental and nongovernmental organizations that measure levels of trust to demonstrate the crisis of public trust in government around the globe with statistics showing trust in government does not reach levels above 50% anywhere (Blind 2006). Blind (2006) attributes the decrease in trust to economics, security issues, crime, political scandals, rampant corruption and the high focus of the media on some of these issues. Levi and Stoker (2000) reviewed survey-based research using the American National Election Studies (ANES) and determined political and government trust are important for continued public participation in politics. They determined the trust citizens have in government influences whether they favor policy or institutional reforms and whether they will comply with those laws (Levi and Stoker 2000), in effect, giving government its legitimacy.

Scholars researching trust in government acknowledge corruption is often a major factor contributing to the degradation of the public trust in governments (Aitalieva 2018, Blind 2006, Chanley, Rudolph, and Rahn 2000, Houston, Aitalieva, Morelock, and Shults 2016, Levi and Stoker 2000, Warren 1999). These scientists do not specifically link corruption necessarily to partisanship with targeted research.

Current Pew Research (2017) details that overall public trust in government is near historic lows and that frustration remains the dominant feeling toward government. Gershtenson, Ladewig, and Plane (2006) assert that trust in government affects which candidates citizens vote for. They further point out that a decline in trust in the national government is the only constant in recent years (Gershtenson, Ladewin, & Plane 2006).

Trust in Agencies

Morgeson and Petrescu (2011) researched the determinants of satisfaction and trust for six US federal government agencies (the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), Medicare, Medicaid, the National Parks Service (NPS), the Social Security Administration (SSA), and focused on what causes the satisfaction and trust. Satisfaction with the way these agencies performed their tasks led to public trust. They implemented a multi-year, multi-agency, cross-sectional sample of survey responses from Americans – data from the American Customer Satisfaction Index (ASCI) – and structural equation modeling statistical techniques and identified benchmarking partners that could be used for future studies. Their aim was to help government agencies determine if they need to improve performance and also help them compare their agency with other government agencies in the trust and satisfaction arena, enabling agencies to deliver better quality services to citizens and increase citizens trust. The research of the satisfaction determinants was specifically to target if that was a main determinant of trust in the agency.

They identified that benchmarking partners based on similarities in satisfaction determinants would be useful in dealing with different goals and services across agencies and may lead to ways to measure satisfaction of the chosen solution for the trust issue agencies experience. Robinson, et al. (2012) claim that public trust has been trending downward in recent decades. Acknowledging several scholars and their research on public trust and distrust and the sources of that trust and distrust, they focused on trust in specific government agencies. Building on the previous research, they delved specifically into popular trust in the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). They performed an agency-specific analysis that highlighted the origins of individual-level trust. They included the variables of political ideology and party identification in their analysis. They recommend more study be done before transferring the results of their study to other agencies. They concluded evaluations of DHS are driven by political attitudes and some personal demographics. Apart from these works, there has not been a lot of specific research into trust and specific agencies and how satisfaction with an agency impacts that trust after Morgeson and Petrescu (2011) and Robinson, et al. (2013).

Observing the decline in trust toward government, Houston with Aitalieva, Morelock, and Shults examined trust in agencies and civil servants (2016). They claim governments have been implementing bureaucratic reforms within their agencies since the 1980s with regaining trust as the objective. Analyzing data from the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP), which conducts national surveys, they discovered trust in civil servants is associated with government performance and, also, that public trust is lower in countries that have more corruption.

Hetherington (1998) attributes loss of trust in political leaders as the cause of loss of trust in government. He uses NES data, the congressional thermometer and questions about perceptions of government effectiveness and utilizes two cross-sectional data sets from 1988 and 1996 to demonstrate people have increased trust when they perceive government agencies are accomplishing what they are meant to do. Hetherington (1998) asserts that trust provides leaders more latitude in governing and provides much needed support for government agencies regardless of performance.

Bendix and Quirk (2016) question whether legislators distort their deliberations over surveillance issues to pursue ideological agendas and/or to pander to public fears leading to laws that have simplified the process allowing the FBI to mishandle surveillance policy in collecting private data of citizens.

Keele (2003) undertakes an examination of trust in government for a dissertation thesis. Conversely from other scholars, he contends that the many empirical studies over several years produced two competing explanations for distrust. That is trust was a function of government performance or public cynicism toward government. He believes that the previous trust studies do not firmly decide between these two questions. His analysis concluded that the cynicism of citizens does determine to some extent whether they will trust or distrust government.

Partisan Lense to Agency and Leadership Trust

More trust is generally given to presidential appointees who demonstrate qualifications for government positions. However, trust is partially due to partisanship, and trust in nominees/appointees may be a reflection of that partisanship (Hollibaugh 2016). Keele's (2003) research links trust more closely to political leaders as opposed to institutions. More recent

research by Keele (2005) reveals a connection in partisan trust to party control of the Senate, the House of Representatives, and the Presidency.

Gershtenson, Ladewig, and Plane (2006) used data from the Center for Survey Research and Analysis at the University of Connecticut to determine that some of the population are aware of the political environment and current events and change their views of government when changes occur in the political arena.

There are important reasons to study trust in relation to partisan cynicism and leadership trust issues (Keele 2003, Hetherington 1998). Meaningful research has been conducted by many political scientists in the area of government and trust and its relevance. Keele (2003) solidly linked levels of trust in government to partisanship with his research. Partisanship plays a key role in understanding levels of citizen trust in government. Our current political environment seems to have devolved into a chaotic arena. Further, the last 15 years have been some of the most contentious in our politics and this justifies revisiting and looking at the demographics beyond partisanship which may be impacting this.

Methods and Analysis

I performed crosstabulations using data from the cumulative American National Election Studies (ANES). The ANES is an academically driven survey that questions voters nationally in the United States before and after each presidential election. The same questions have been asked in each election cycle and are a continuation of studies going back to 1948. Keele's research shows that trust correlates closely to a respondent's trust in the person or party in control of the government. I wanted to determine if the data supported those results for the years

after Keele's research ended. I used the ANES Trust Index Variable, which is a binned variable of three questions about a respondent's level of trust in the government. The questions binned in the Trust Index are: 1. How much of the time do you think you can trust the government in Washington to do what is right? Response options were: a) Just about always, b) Most of the time, and c) Only some of the time. 2. Would you say government is pretty much run by a few big interests looking out for themselves or that it is run for the benefit of all the people? Response options were: a) By a few big interests, and b) For the benefit of all the people. 3. Do you think that people in the government waste a lot of money we pay in taxes, waste some of it, or don't waste very much of it? Responses were: a) Waste a lot of money, b) Waste some of it, or c) Don't waste very much of it.

Variables for the year of study cross tabulated with a respondent's party and their level of trust would ascertain the amount of trust Democrats and Republicans had and whether that changed when the parties in control of the government changed in election years. Did Republicans trust the government more when their party was in power? Did Republicans trust the government less when their party was out of power? I run crosstabulations for Republicans, Democrats and Independents to check these results. Keele linked trust to having components identifying more closely with people or the party who held similar beliefs and believing that those entities would put in place policies that would be more beneficial to the respondent. At the same time, a respondent would view the opposite party as not having the same beliefs or world view and would see that entity as more likely to put in place policies that would not be beneficial to the respondent and might possibly even be harmful.

It is important to know who the president being referred to is and which political party they were with for each election year of the study. In this study, I looked at the Republican party

under George W. Bush in 2002, 2004, and 2008. Democrat Barack Obama was elected in 2008. The 2012 and 2016 results are a reflection on the two terms of his presidency, while the results for 2008 reflect on George W. Bush's last term. The minimal levels of trust increase each election year for respondents of all parties indicating trust in government has decreased. The levels of minimal trust mirror the levels of high trust. As high trust levels decrease, minimal trust levels increase. Overall, levels of trust have been in a steady decline over the time period from 2002 to 2008 and in a highly significant decline from 2008 to 2016. Those levels shift between the individuals on the basis of party identification, gender, level of education, and ethnicity-race.

My dependent variable is the level of trust which I am measuring. Independent variables used in the crosstabulations and figures are the years of the study, party identification, gender, ethnicity, and education level.

In addition to the crosstabulations tables, I put the data I analyzed into stacked bar charts. Stacked bar charts illustrate the data in an easily readable format. The stacked bar charts provide a clear, somewhat simplified visual to compare the totals within the variables and see the changes from election year to election year for levels of trust for each independent variable being measured.

(Table 1 about here)

The table shows high trust levels for all three partisan categories beginning in 2002. This high level of trust may possibly be attributed to 9/11 and the mood of the country with people putting trust in the government at that time, though I have no way to concretely measure that at this time. It is merely a plausible explanation. Levels of minimal Republican trust increase dramatically for the Republicans by 30 points when the Democrats take control of the presidency

from 2008 to 2016. Minimal trust levels initially decrease for Democrat respondents when their party gains the presidency after the Bush presidency. Democrat mistrust was at a high level after President Bush's first term. Democrat minimal mistrust initially decreases after President Obama's first term yet slightly rises again after his second term. If the null hypothesis is correct that, in the population from which the sample was drawn, there is no relationship between party affiliation and trust in government levels, then random sampling error will produce the observed data .0 times. The null hypothesis must be rejected for each of the party results because it tells us how many times the chi-square score would happen randomly. That number is zero, so the null hypothesis does not apply here. Compared to how well we can predict levels of trust in the government by not knowing party affiliation, we can improve our prediction by 3.2% by knowing a respondent's political party affiliation is Democrat and by 14.8% if we know the respondent's party id is Republican. It is a bit of an anomaly that Democrat minimal mistrust initially decreases after President Obama's first term yet slightly rises again after his second term. This small anomaly does not change the data results as the statistics hold fast in which partisanship strongly proves to be a factor affecting levels of trust. Factors influencing society at that time need to be considered further in determining what may have caused this slight variance between 2012 and 2016. The relationship between levels of trust and party identification is strongest for Republicans. In fact, comparative trust level changes are the most dramatic for Republicans. The comparative change is especially stronger during Democrat President Barack Obama's two terms. Levels of Republican mistrust increase by 30 points under Barack Obama's presidency from 2008 to 2016. Analyzing the data for levels of trust and comparing the groups within the variables conclusively establishes partisanship does have an effect on an individual's trust in government.

(Figure 1 about here)

The stacked bars in the chart reflect the same information as in the previous crosstabulation. The chart shows percentage labels for each individual political party and the totals for minimal trust for each stack. It is easy to see in this chart that total levels of minimal trust increased with each election cycle and easy to see just how much the total responses increased for each individual party. Levels of minimal trust increase the most for Republicans at about 30% in response to Democrat Barack Obama's two terms as president in 2012 and 2016. Note that Democrat levels of minimal trust decreased after Democrat President Obama's first term but then increased slightly by four percent after his second term. The comparative change for Republicans is especially stronger during the Obama years. For that same period of time, the Republican levels of mistrust increased by 30 points.

(Table 2 about here)

(Table 3 about here)

I performed these crosstabulations to determine if controlling for gender has an effect on levels of partisan trust. Male and female levels of trust for Democrats and Republicans are fairly similar with each change of power in the election cycle. Males and females identifying politically as Independents differ from each in trust levels more significantly with males having higher levels of minimal trust than females. Judging from the chi-square tests at all values of the control, we can see that it is extremely unlikely that the observed patterns were produced by random sampling error. The chi-square statistics invite us to reject the null hypothesis. Therefore, we can easily reject the null hypothesis for this crosstabulation. To determine how strong the relationship is between trust and party affiliation for each gender, we look at the directional measures provided by the Lambda scores. Compared to how well we can predict trust

levels by not knowing the genders, we can improve our prediction by 5.7 percent for Republicans by knowing the respondent gender is male. Trust levels for males and females track together fairly closely. Overall, the data does not support gender as a large factor in change of levels of trust.

(Figure 2 about here)

The stacked bar chart clearly shows relatively equal increases in minimal levels of trust after each election cycle. Note the larger differences between males and females in the Independent political affiliation. The stacked bar chart gives a visual of fairly equal increases of minimal trust among both genders. The differences in levels of trust between the genders are minimal and gender does not factor in as having a real effect in men's and women's changing levels of trust in the government inside of the partisanship variable.

(Table 4 about here)

I chose to highlight levels of High Trust in Government in this crosstabulation. The decrease in the high level of trust mirrors the increases I saw in the levels of minimal trust. The most significant decrease in levels of high trust occurred in the White ethnicity category. High trust levels dropped after Bush's first term and continued to steadily decrease throughout Obama's two terms for the White ethnicity. Note that White Republicans had higher levels of trust in the government during the Bush years and it decreased markedly after Bush's second term and eroded even further during Obama's presidencies. Black ethnicity for Republicans had even higher levels of trust than the White ethnicity for Republicans during Bush's presidencies. That high trust dropped markedly after Bush's second term and decreased even more after Obama's first term, then increased after Obama's second term. Hispanic Republicans had high

trust levels that were similar to the high trust levels shown by the White ethnicity Republicans and their high trust levels did decrease but not as much through the Bush and Obama presidencies. We must reject the null hypothesis as the P-scores are all .000 and are within the domain of the null hypothesis for all three ethnicities. The possibility of the results for levels of trust and ethnicity are at .000. The magnitude of the Pearson chi-square further indicates these results happening by chance are increasingly implausible. Compared to how well we can predict trust levels by not knowing ethnicity, we can improve our prediction by 3.6 percent by knowing the Hispanic ethnicity and 2.5 percent by knowing the White ethnicity.

(Figure 3 about here)

I chose to highlight the results for High Trust in Government in this stacked bar chart, as I did in the crosstabulation, for this variable to show that this stacked bar chart and the high levels of trust mirror the results we have seen of increasing minimal trust. White ethnicity of high trust levels are the highest in 2002 and begin to decrease slightly after George Bush's first term and further after his second term. Black ethnicity trust levels are highest of all three ethnicities after Bush's first term. It decreases dramatically after Bush's second term and decreases a bit more after Obama's first term, then rises after Obama's second term. Black ethnicity Independents have the highest percentage of high trust after Obama's second term. The Hispanic ethnicity high trust levels remain the most stable over the period of time studied.

(Table 5 about here)

Those with Some College but No Degree had the greatest increase of minimal trust over the time period studied at an increase of 54.8 percent. Those with a College or Advanced Degree increased their minimal trust levels over the time period by 51.1 percent. Minimal trust levels were reduced for those with a Grade School or less education level from a high of 46.9% after

Bush's second term down to 37.3% after Obama's second term. Once again, we must reject the null hypothesis and accept that if the null hypothesis were correct that, in the population from which the sample was drawn, there is no relationship between education levels and levels of trust, then random sampling error would produce the observed data .000 of the time. Compared to how well we can predict levels of trust by now knowing respondents' levels of education, we can improve our prediction by 3.8 percent for those with a Grade School education, 3.0 percent for those with a High School education, 2.9 percent for those with Some College education, and 2.8 percent for those with a College degree.

(Figure 4 about here)

Conclusion

My research clearly links citizen trust in government to shared political beliefs and party identification. Levels of trust increase and decrease in government for those who identify with each party based on who wins elections and which party they identify with. Trust levels shift up and down depending on who is elected and takes control of the government for the time period studied. It makes sense that individuals will have a certain amount of trust for the officials that a president appoints to government agencies when the individual shares values and a belief system of a common partisan identity with the president of their political party.

While overall trust levels for partisans decreased for the whole period studied, those trust levels decreased significantly for the time period between 2008 and 2016. Democrat minimal trust decreased after Democrat President Obama's first term and then slightly increased to its highest level at 52.6% after his second term. In comparison, Republican levels of minimal trust increased significantly more by 30 percentage points over the Barack Obama presidency between 2008 to 2016 to a high of 79.6%.

Further, my data analysis indicates race and education level inside of partisanship have an effect on the changing levels of trust in the government. Those with the least levels of education were, in general, more trusting of government. This data is interesting and would be a good trust area to research and analyze further to identify the specific reasons for this. Gender did not prove to be a factor in nor impact the changing levels of trust. Levels of trust for gender increased, as did trust overall, throughout the time period studied, relatively equally for both genders.

I found important differences when I performed a crosstabulation for ethnicity and levels of trust. Looking at the data here, we will compare for the High levels of trust variable. The Hispanic ethnicity showed the least variation of trust between the changes of the presidency between the Democrats and the Republicans and had a relatively stable level of trust throughout the time period studied. Trust levels for Black ethnicity were up during the first Bush presidency, dropping after Bush's second term. Black ethnicity trust decreased a slight bit more before increasing after Obama's second term. Levels of trust for White ethnicity decreased drastically from a high during 2002 plummeting to a low at the end of 2016 after Obama's second term.

Levels of trust increased, decreased and shifted when I controlled for the variables of partisanship, ethnicity, and education level. Knowing these variables and which party is in power can help you predict how certain individuals will feel about particular issues or even how they may vote. There was a significant drop in all trust levels from 2008 to 2016. The research indicates some of the variation in shifting levels of trust seen after each election cycle are a part of the regular cycling of trust levels related to partisanship and political identification, including

ethnicity and education and are not merely a response to a perceived rift and polarization of society. The variables of Race, Ethnicity, and Education Level offer further explanations for the shifting trust inside the variable of partisanship.

I want to extrapolate the data after the 2020 election to analyze the resulting changes in levels of trust for the Trump presidency. A comparative analysis will be revealing as I build on this study to observe the differences in levels of trust after the Trump presidency for party identification, ethnicity, and education level. While gender did not turn out to be a factor in my research data in this study, that should be reviewed again to verify it still remains an inconsequential variable,

While I cannot say the evidence conclusively shows trust in the FBI will rise now that President Trump has appointed the new director, Christopher Wray, it is a logical inference based on the data. Further research to determine if this inference stands should be undertaken. A study should be designed to explore the data to a greater extent for the specific agency of the FBI in ascertaining solutions to the deficit of trust in government and its agencies amidst current issues. In the meantime, we can look at current events and the Justice Department's special counsel investigation.

My research results prove especially interesting and timely since a redacted version of the controversial Mueller Report was released to the public by the Justice Department in April, 2019. Robert Mueller led the special counsel investigation tasked with investigating allegations of collusion and obstruction of justice against President Trump. The charge that President Trump colluded with Russia to interfere in and affect the outcome of the 2016 presidential race as well as the allegations of committing obstruction of justice in the ensuing investigation contributed to

an already heated political environment. Republicans were generally frustrated that a special counsel investigation had been launched stymieing the President's ability to turn the nation's attention to his agenda; while many Democrats felt the investigation was necessary and were hoping to get news that the President would be charged with crimes and impeached.

It is against this tumultuous and chaotic backdrop that I can apply my research findings and offer that we may not be as polarized or hopelessly far apart as our current events sometimes may seem. While partisans might disagree on the effectiveness or fitness of the president, partisans of both parties have found something about the report released by the Justice Department they agree upon. The Morning Consult poll for Politico found that 46% of Americans think the Department of Justice's investigation into Russia's influence on the 2016 presidential election was handled fairly (Morning 2019). In addition, according to a Washington Post/ABC Poll a large number of the population, at 51%, said the Mueller Report was fair and evenhanded. Looking inside that number for partisanship, we find that 53% of the Democrat respondents and 56% of the Republican respondents agreed the report was fair (Dhrumil 2019). The FBI and the Justice Department have been embroiled in near constant controversy since the last presidential election. This response to the Mueller Report is a bright light for government and its agencies in gaining the trust of the American people.

Appendix

Table 1: Crosstabulation of Election Year and Trust in Government by Political Party

| | | | 2002 | 2004 | 2008 | 2012 | 2016 |
|--------------|---------------------|---------------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| Democrats | Trust in Government | Minimal Trust | 108 | 139 | 539 | 1338 | 1025 |
| | | | 17.2% | 27.6% | 51.0% | 48.9% | 52.6% |
| | Some Trust | | 141 | 137 | 106 | 362 | 418 |
| | | | 22.5% | 27.2% | 10.0% | 13.2% | 21.5% |
| | More Trust | | 153 | 120 | 243 | 638 | 184 |
| | | | 24.4% | 23.9% | 23.0% | 23.3% | 9.5% |
| | High Trust | | 226 | 107 | 168 | 396 | 320 |
| | | | 36.0% | 21.3% | 15.9% | 14.5% | 16.4% |
| | Total | | | 628 | 503 | 1056 | 2734 |
| | | | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% |
| Independents | Trust in Government | Minimal Trust | 25 | 36 | 113 | 539 | 403 |
| | | | 28.4% | 36.7% | 47.7% | 64.8% | 65.3% |
| | Some Trust | | 17 | 12 | 23 | 93 | 78 |
| | | | 19.3% | 12.2% | 9.7% | 11.2% | 12.6% |
| | More Trust | | 17 | 23 | 50 | 114 | 54 |
| | | | 19.3% | 23.5% | 21.1% | 13.7% | 8.8% |
| | High Trust | | 29 | 27 | 51 | 86 | 82 |
| | | | 33.0% | 27.6% | 21.5% | 10.3% | 13.3% |
| | Total | | | 88 | 98 | 237 | 832 |
| | | | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% |
| Republicans | Trust in Government | Minimal Trust | 75 | 59 | 404 | 1546 | 1326 |
| | | | 13.4% | 13.4% | 50.8% | 66.7% | 79.6% |
| | Some Trust | | 73 | 86 | 90 | 241 | 178 |
| | | | 13.1% | 19.5% | 11.3% | 10.4% | 10.7% |
| | More Trust | | 124 | 98 | 173 | 357 | 84 |
| | | | 22.2% | 22.2% | 21.7% | 15.4% | 5.0% |
| | High Trust | | 286 | 198 | 129 | 175 | 77 |
| | | | 51.3% | 44.9% | 16.2% | 7.5% | 4.6% |
| | Total | | | 558 | 441 | 796 | 2319 |
| | | | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% |

Dem. Chi-Square = 580.953 Sig = .000

Ind. Chi-Square = 120.680 Sig. = .000

Dem. Lambda = .032 T score = 6.476 Sig=.000

Ind. Lambda = .005 T score = .544 Sig. = .000

Rep. Chi-Square = 1667.452 Sig. = .000

Rep. Lambda = .148 T score = 14.327 Sig = .000

Figure 1: Stacked Bar Chart for Minimal Trust in Government by Political Party




Table 2: Crosstabulation of Election Year and Trust in Government by Political Party and Male Gender

| | | | | 2002 | 2004 | 2008 | 2012 | 2016 |
|------------|--------------|------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| Male | Democrats | Minimal | Count | 33 | 59 | 215 | 612 | 437 |
| | | Trust | % | 12.3% | 25.9% | 50.4% | 49.7% | 51.4% |
| | | Some | Count | 57 | 63 | 52 | 153 | 194 |
| | | Trust | % | 21.3% | 27.6% | 12.2% | 12.4% | 22.8% |
| | | More | Count | 80 | 62 | 87 | 279 | 81 |
| | | Trust | % | 29.9% | 27.2% | 20.4% | 22.6% | 9.5% |
| | Independents | High Trust | Count | 98 | 44 | 73 | 188 | 138 |
| | | | % | 36.6% | 19.3% | 17.1% | 15.3% | 16.2% |
| | | Minimal | Count | 13 | 23 | 60 | 272 | 211 |
| | | Trust | % | 34.2% | 44.2% | 49.6% | 68.5% | 67.8% |
| | | Some | Count | 3 | 6 | 13 | 41 | 40 |
| | | Trust | % | 7.9% | 11.5% | 10.7% | 10.3% | 12.9% |
| | Republicans | More | Count | 9 | 10 | 27 | 58 | 26 |
| | | Trust | % | 23.7% | 19.2% | 22.3% | 14.6% | 8.4% |
| | | High Trust | Count | 13 | 13 | 21 | 26 | 34 |
| | | | % | 34.2% | 25.0% | 17.4% | 6.5% | 10.9% |
| | | Minimal | Count | 38 | 32 | 212 | 809 | 678 |
| | | Trust | % | 15.0% | 13.7% | 54.1% | 67.6% | 79.4% |
| | | Some | Count | 40 | 51 | 52 | 146 | 82 |
| | | Trust | % | 15.7% | 21.9% | 13.3% | 12.2% | 9.6% |
| | | More | Count | 63 | 51 | 79 | 153 | 52 |
| Trust | | % | 24.8% | 21.9% | 20.2% | 12.8% | 6.1% | |
| High Trust | | Count | 113 | 99 | 49 | 89 | 42 | |
| | | % | 44.5% | 42.5% | 12.5% | 7.4% | 4.9% | |

Dem. Chi-Square = 282.724 Sig = .000
 Dem. Lambda = .032 T score = 4.506 Sig=.000

Ind. Chi-Square = 69.356 Sig. = .000
 Ind. Lambda = .009 T score = 1.003 Sig. = .000

Rep. Chi-Square = 751.507 Sig. = .000
 Rep. Lambda = .057 T score = 6.272 Sig = .000

Table 3: Crosstabulation of Election Year and Trust in Government by Political Party and Female Gender

| | | | | 2002 | 2004 | 2008 | 2012 | 2016 |
|--------|--------------|------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| Female | Democrats | Minimal | Count | 75 | 80 | 324 | 725 | 580 |
| | | Trust | % | 20.8% | 29.1% | 51.6% | 48.3% | 54.2% |
| | | Some | Count | 84 | 74 | 54 | 210 | 217 |
| | | Trust | % | 23.3% | 26.9% | 8.6% | 14.0% | 20.3% |
| | | More | Count | 73 | 58 | 155 | 359 | 97 |
| | | Trust | % | 20.3% | 21.1% | 24.7% | 23.9% | 9.1% |
| | Independents | Minimal | Count | 11 | 13 | 53 | 266 | 190 |
| | | Trust | % | 22.0% | 27.7% | 45.3% | 61.4% | 63.8% |
| | | Some | Count | 15 | 7 | 10 | 51 | 37 |
| | | Trust | % | 30.0% | 14.9% | 8.5% | 11.8% | 12.4% |
| | | More | Count | 8 | 13 | 24 | 56 | 26 |
| | | Trust | % | 16.0% | 27.7% | 20.5% | 12.9% | 8.7% |
| | Republicans | Minimal | Count | 37 | 27 | 191 | 737 | 638 |
| | | Trust | % | 12.2% | 13.0% | 47.4% | 65.6% | 79.9% |
| | | Some | Count | 33 | 35 | 38 | 96 | 96 |
| | | Trust | % | 10.9% | 16.8% | 9.4% | 8.5% | 12.0% |
| | | More | Count | 61 | 47 | 94 | 204 | 28 |
| | | Trust | % | 20.1% | 22.6% | 23.3% | 18.2% | 3.5% |
| | | High Trust | Count | 173 | 99 | 80 | 86 | 36 |
| | | | % | 56.9% | 47.6% | 19.9% | 7.7% | 4.5% |

Dem. Chi-Square = 323.508 Sig = .000
 Dem. Lambda = .014 T score = 2.392 Sig=.000

Ind. Chi-Square = 74.077 Sig. = .000
 Ind. Lambda = .006 T score = .817 Sig. = .000

Rep. Chi-Square = 933.036 Sig. = .000
 Rep. Lambda = .101 T score = 9.777 Sig = .000

Figure 2: Stacked Bar Chart for Minimal Government Trust by Party Identification and Gender




Table 4: Crosstabulation of High Government Trust by Race-Ethnicity

| | | | 2002 | 2004 | 2008 | 2012 | 2016 |
|-----------------------|------------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| White Ethnicity | Minimal Trust | Count | 156 | 153 | 793 | 2613 | 2074 |
| | | % | 15.5% | 20.6% | 51.7% | 62.5% | 70.9% |
| | Some Trust | Count | 172 | 162 | 167 | 506 | 441 |
| | | % | 17.0% | 21.8% | 10.9% | 12.1% | 15.1% |
| | More Trust | Count | 231 | 175 | 326 | 732 | 189 |
| | | % | 22.9% | 23.6% | 21.3% | 17.5% | 6.5% |
| High Trust | Count | 450 | 253 | 247 | 331 | 223 | |
| | % | 44.6% | 34.1% | 16.1% | 7.9% | 7.6% | |
| Black Ethnicity | Minimal Trust | Count | 23 | 43 | 112 | 319 | 228 |
| | | % | 18.5% | 27.0% | 46.5% | 45.2% | 49.4% |
| | Some Trust | Count | 25 | 45 | 30 | 79 | 76 |
| | | % | 20.2% | 28.3% | 12.4% | 11.2% | 16.5% |
| | More Trust | Count | 35 | 35 | 61 | 168 | 60 |
| | | % | 28.2% | 22.0% | 25.3% | 23.8% | 13.0% |
| High Trust | Count | 41 | 36 | 38 | 140 | 98 | |
| | % | 33.1% | 22.6% | 15.8% | 19.8% | 21.2% | |
| Hispanic Ethnicity | Minimal Trust | Count | 17 | 24 | 86 | 286 | 247 |
| | | % | 19.1% | 25.5% | 39.8% | 43.7% | 49.1% |
| | Some Trust | Count | 23 | 15 | 16 | 67 | 92 |
| | | % | 25.8% | 16.0% | 7.4% | 10.2% | 18.3% |
| | More Trust | Count | 14 | 20 | 63 | 156 | 48 |
| | | % | 15.7% | 21.3% | 29.2% | 23.9% | 9.5% |
| High Trust | Count | 35 | 35 | 51 | 145 | 116 | |
| | % | 39.3% | 37.2% | 23.6% | 22.2% | 23.1% | |

White
Ethnicity: Chi-Square = 469.411 Sig = .000
Lambda = .025 T score = 3.182 Sig= .001

Black
Ethnicity: Chi-Square = 84.613 Sig = .000
Lambda = .010 T score = 2.267 Sig=.023

Hispanic
Ethnicity: Chi-Square = 80.057 Sig = .000
Lambda = .036 T score = 3.000 Sig=.003

Figure 3: Stacked Bar Chart for High Government Trust by Race-Ethnicity




Table 5: Crosstabulation of Minimal Government Trust by Education Level


| | | | 2002 | 2004 | 2008 | 2012 | 2016 |
|--------------------------------------|---------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| Grade School or less (0-8 grades) | Minimal Trust | Count | 10 | 11 | 23 | 51 | 19 |
| | | % | 21.3% | 24.4% | 46.9% | 40.8% | 37.3% |
| | Some Trust | Count | 6 | 12 | 5 | 11 | 14 |
| | | % | 12.8% | 26.7% | 10.2% | 8.8% | 27.5% |
| | More Trust | Count | 12 | 8 | 9 | 32 | 8 |
| | | % | 25.5% | 17.8% | 18.4% | 25.6% | 15.7% |
| | High Trust | Count | 19 | 14 | 12 | 31 | 10 |
| | % | 40.4% | 31.1% | 24.5% | 24.8% | 19.6% | |
| High School (12 grades or fewer) | Minimal Trust | Count | 105 | 110 | 421 | 1374 | 979 |
| | | % | 18.4% | 25.5% | 49.4% | 61.5% | 62.9% |
| | Some Trust | Count | 90 | 85 | 111 | 219 | 228 |
| | | % | 15.8% | 19.7% | 13.0% | 9.8% | 14.7% |
| | More Trust | Count | 129 | 98 | 194 | 380 | 139 |
| | | % | 22.6% | 22.7% | 22.7% | 17.0% | 8.9% |
| | High Trust | Count | 247 | 138 | 127 | 260 | 210 |
| | % | 43.3% | 32.0% | 14.9% | 11.6% | 13.5% | |
| Some college but no degree | Minimal Trust | Count | 58 | 69 | 344 | 1057 | 922 |
| | | % | 15.8% | 22.4% | 56.0% | 60.2% | 70.6% |
| | Some Trust | Count | 74 | 72 | 52 | 199 | 182 |
| | | % | 20.2% | 23.4% | 8.5% | 11.3% | 13.9% |
| | More Trust | Count | 79 | 65 | 133 | 322 | 89 |
| | | % | 21.6% | 21.1% | 21.7% | 18.3% | 6.8% |
| | High Trust | Count | 155 | 102 | 85 | 179 | 113 |
| | % | 42.3% | 33.1% | 13.8% | 10.2% | 8.7% | |
| College or advanced degree | Minimal Trust | Count | 40 | 49 | 275 | 910 | 834 |
| | | % | 12.5% | 17.8% | 46.8% | 52.9% | 63.6% |
| | Some Trust | Count | 65 | 68 | 54 | 268 | 249 |
| | | % | 20.3% | 24.6% | 9.2% | 15.6% | 19.0% |
| | More Trust | Count | 81 | 75 | 132 | 363 | 85 |
| | | % | 25.3% | 27.2% | 22.4% | 21.1% | 6.5% |
| | High Trust | Count | 134 | 84 | 127 | 180 | 143 |
| | % | 41.9% | 30.4% | 21.6% | 10.5% | 10.9% | |

Grade School: Chi-Square = 27.663 Sig = .006
Lambda = .038 T score = 1.695 Sig=.090
High School: Chi-Square = 719.619 Sig. = .000
Lambda = .030 T score = 5.547 Sig. = .000

Some College: Chi-Square = 695.909 Sig. = .000
Lambda = .029 T score = 6.668 Sig = .000

College Chi-Square = 614.306 Sig = .000
Degree: Lambda = .028 T score = 7.410 Sig=.000

Figure 4: Stacked Bar Chart for Minimal Government Trust by Education Level



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