

# **European Citizens Attitudes Towards the European Union and Integration, and the question of Sovereignty**

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## Abstract

*Since the referendum in 2016 that stated the United Kingdom was to leave the EU, many were wondering what caused them to leave. Many point to the theory that integration into the European Union was the cause, however we will look into other factors such as attitudes by analyzing the works of theorists, researchers, professors, and others to answer the question if the EUs encroachment on sovereignty, rise of nationalism, and the attitudes towards the EU are the possible factors to leaving the EU. I analyze political identities, occupation, and overall feelings on the EU and EU policies to see where the dissatisfaction is most prevalent.*

## Introduction

As the United Kingdom moves into its final stages of leaving the European Union, their departure raises questions surrounding sovereignty amongst the EUs member states, such as what aspect of their states freedoms they must give up to become a member of the Union, what benefit do they get from the EU even if they join, or is it really worth staying in the EU, and what will be the rise of Nationalism lead more countries to break?

The European Union is a political and economic union, according to the EUs official website, “the predecessor of the EU was created in the aftermath of the Second World War. The first steps were to foster economic cooperation... the result was the European Economic Community (EEC), created in 1958, and initially increasing economic cooperation between six countries: Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands.” (europa.eu). Later, the European Economic Community had been replaced by the European Union in 1993 after the signing of the Maastricht treaty. ” According to the EU website, its purpose was to “prepare for European Monetary Union and introduce elements of a political union” (europa.eu). In Dominique Moisi’s 1999 article “Dreaming of Europe”, she mentions how the countries within Europe “must rethink its notions of sovereignty, space, and perhaps, more importantly, of identity” (Moisi 1999). The article also includes a poll on what Europeans think the EU role

must be, with a majority looking towards international relations and currency being the most agreed upon. Thinking like this had given rise to the question that the EU must expand even more than it did with the Maastricht and Amsterdam treaties, which would lead to a potential Constitution.

## The EU Constitution

In 2004, the EU put forth a “constitution for Europe”, which would expand the powers of the EU further. Nicoladis (2004), states that the supporters of the constitution “... argue that the constitution will give the EU a more effective government, better adapted to its greater size and ambitions, and make it a more democratic polity.” This was huge. By having a formal constitution, the EU would no longer be just a union for economic cooperation, but a Union similar to the United States. Nicoladis describes two camps that emerged over the constitution debate, the “supernationalists, mostly smaller member states and European parliamentarians, wanted to protect the commission (the traditional advocate of weaker parties), strengthen democratic control by the European Parliament, extend majority voting, and generally expand EU powers.” (Nicoladis 2004). The other camp are the “intergovernmentalists”, who “often subscribe to a form of sovereignty, holding that nations, which are bound by a common language, culture, history, and often ethnicity, are the only credible foundations of politics. Being part of a nation is a precondition, they argue, for the basic compromise of representative democracy: agreeing to be in the minority one day with the expectation of being the majority in another. Intergovernmentalists defend national sovereignty not as a reactionary reflex but as the ultimate guarantee of democracy” (Nicoladis 2004). Finally, Nicoladis brings up an important notion, that the EU is not the same as a super-nation, and we “must depart from mainstream

constitutional thinking, and to do that requires three conceptual shifts: seeking the mutual recognition of all of the members' identities rather than a common identity; promoting a community of projects, not a community of identity; and sharing governance horizontally, among states, rather than only vertically, between states and the union”.

Peter van Elsuwege (2004) of Ghent University examines the legal approach of the constitution, its aspects, and its effects, and examines the law and sovereignty. Elsuwege (98) states that “The far-reaching provisions of the [Maastricht Treaty], particularly in the monetary field, raised new discussions on the division of competences and the interpretation of sovereignty. Proceeding from its primary task to ensure the proper application of the constitution, the French Constitutional Council maintained that changes to the European Treaties could be accepted as long as they do not undermine essential conditions for the exercise of national sovereignty. It subsequently concluded that the Maastricht Treaty provisions concerning the establishment of an Economic Monetary Policy on the one hand, and a common visa policy on the other, did indeed affect these essential conditions” (Elsugewe 2004). This means that the treaty did indeed conflict with the French constitution, and as a result the French had to amend their constitution, which would allow them to participate in the EU. On the other hand, Elsuwege says that the German and Danish supreme courts ruled it did not affect sovereignty. “Firstly, the member States remain the Masters of the Treaties because each new delegation of competences is subject to unanimous approval and ratification under the national constitutional procedures by the Member States (Art.48 EU). Secondly, *Kompetenz-Kompetenz*- The power to decide on the limits to EU Authority- remains to the member states” (Elsugewe 98-99). France was not the only Member to have issues with integration into the EU.

Avram and Radu's (2008) article on "Competence, participation and political loyalty in the Process of Romania's integration in EU" discusses Romania's inclusion in the EU, and the effects it has had. "European integration was defined as 'the process through which EU member states agree to transfer progressively a series of competences depending on the national sovereignty from national to supranational level accepting to exercise it in common'" (Avram and Radu 9). Integration, then, means that the new member states must give up some of its power to become fully integrated into the union. Similar to France, in order to be a part of the Union, their Constitution needed to be changed. Avram and Radu state that "treaties could be ratified only after the constitution revisal. Revising member states' Constitutions was equivalent to modifying the essential conditions of exercising national sovereignty" (Avram and Radu 2002). For the question of national sovereignty, this would show that it is falling by the wayside, giving way to a new "'Shared Sovereignty.' Shared sovereignty does not involve the total loss of some functions of internal sovereignty, but enlarges the external and interdependent capacities of national sovereignty in the direction of strengthening the capacity to regulate economic and political matters... in a more coherent, efficient and cheaper manner" (Avram and Radu 10). One could argue that this means the end for national sovereignty in the EU. The constitution, however, failed to be ratified by some members, leading it to be scrapped, but it did not end the expansion of the EU.

This is one possible way that leads to dissatisfaction of the citizens from within the Union. However, they benefit greatly from the small constitutional changes that they tend not to be overly dissatisfied by it. In short, by giving up some of the aspects of their sovereignty to work together with the union is more beneficial than trying it on their own.

## More Theories on Encroachment

The EU has grown to 27 members, the most recent member is Croatia in 2013 (europa.eu) and leaving on January 31st was the UK. Now, instead of just economic cooperation, the EU has many areas of emphasis. “What began as a purely economic Union has evolved into an organization spanning policy areas, from climate, environmental and health to external relations and security, justice and migration” (europa.eu) thanks to the Treaty of Lisbon, signed in 2007 and enforced in 2009, which was the final step the EU took to where it is now. On the EU site, its main changes are “more power to the European Parliament, change of voting procedures in the Council... a new high representative for Foreign Affairs, a new EU diplomatic service” (europa.eu) and it also defined the powers that belong to the EU, and what belongs to the states.

The sovereignty question then again came to question. James Heartfield wrote an article “Demobilizing the nation: the decline of sovereignty in Western Europe” which includes data from research on the question of sovereignty. Heartfield states that “states still interact according to the pursuit of national interests” (Heartfield 2009 pg.723), and that “policy innovation at the European level is framed in terms of avoiding nationally based ambitions” (Heartfield 723). By doing this the EU can limit the amount of pro- member policies that could possibly hinder another state's chance at a fair policy. Another point that Heartfield brings up about sovereignty is how the EU and NGOs (non-governmental organizations) have close relations, and how “NGOs have proved a useful interlocutor between the Commission and the Public” (Heartfield 725). He concludes that this relationship harms the relations with its member states.

Dissatisfaction can arise from this too, however not too many people are fully aware of the

actions taken during integration. So, this is possibly one of the lesser causes of dissatisfaction from the workers.

More recently, Tomasz Grezegorz Grosse wrote in his article “Sovereignty in the European Union: A Critical Appraisal”, that the TTIP (Transatlantic Trade and investment partnership), a trade agreement with the “aim of which is to establish a free trade area that comprises the US and EU” (Grosse 2016 pg.106) has “Become a symbol of constraints, resulting from economic globalization, on the sovereignty of European states and nations... Intervention by the European Commission (EC) in this regard was understood by the politicians who represented the Polish government as undue interference by an institution that has an insufficient democratic mandate yet joined the internal political rivalry between the government and the opposition, thus violating the sovereign rights of national democracy” (Grosse 106-107). Since the European Union put itself in between the two sides of a nation's constitutional debate, it thereby violated Poland's national sovereignty to decide its own constitution. Grosse concludes that the “These assumptions lead to EU Member States and not the (non-existent) European state or federation being the subject of sovereignty” and that sovereignty is “subject to three phenomena. First, it is restricted by EU law and policies... second sovereignty is reinforced, particularly in the case of the largest states... The third phenomenon is the asymmetry of power in the EU among member states” (Grosse 122). The biggest conclusion that Grosse comes to is that “smaller, economically and politically weaker states trade their national sovereignty for economic benefits or a greater sense of stability and security” (Grosse 123).

## Nationalism and Citizens' Thoughts on the EU

The thought of losing sovereignty can have some negative effects inside a member state, however. In some countries recently, has seen a rise in Right-wing parties, mainly due to the dissatisfaction with the immigration policies of the EU and a disagreement on who should be setting policy. In the case of the Czech Republic, where earlier in May an article in Politico, titled “Czech Republic at heart of fight for Europe”, discusses that the Czechs are the least satisfied with the EU. “A recent Eurobarometer survey found that only one in three Czechs believes their country’s EU membership is a good thing.” (Morkowitz and Bauerova), while oddly having 58% of their respondents think that Czechia has benefitted by membership.

Andrew Glencross of Aston University in Birmingham, UK, published the article “The Impact of the Article 50 talks on the EU: Risk aversion and the prospects for further EU disintegration” which analyzes why there was no domino effect from Brexit. The Article concludes that there was no domino effect because “the Negotiations showcased to the general public the inherent difficulties of accepting trade-offs that come from leaving the EU.” (Glencross 191). Since most country’s witnessed the long, 4-year process of leaving the EU, it is highly unlikely another country will break. Glencross mentions that “the great risk now is that ‘exit skepticism’ (DeVries 2018a, 78) becomes a strategy of desperation, not self-confidence, with populist parties embracing it as the last option to avert national decline.” (Glencross 191), meaning that when countries choose to leave or have the thought of leaving, the EU will respond with skepticism as a sign of “desperation”. Glencross concludes that the EU must create reasons for other countries to stay, and that “Relying on Brexit as an antidote to anti-EU sentiment will not prove sufficient” (191).



The European Union is made up of 27 members, of all different backgrounds. One way to survey the citizens of the EU is to have them fill out a survey, the Eurobarometer. Isabelle Guinaudeau and Tinnette Schnatterer wrote an article on the Eurobarometer, “Measuring Public Support for European Integration across Time and Countries: The ‘European Mood’ Indicator”. The article analyzes the attitudes on the EU based on the Eurobarometer data from 1973 to 2014. Their study finds that support for the EU fluctuates depending on events going on in the world and in the Union. While analyzing the mood of the EU, they state that “There was a subsequent upward trend from 2007 in France, Germany, Portugal, the Netherlands, Finland, and Austria, following the successful negotiation of the Lisbon Treaty. In the context of the economic crisis beginning in 2008, the ‘European Mood’ then plummeted everywhere” (Guinaudeau and Schnatterer 2019, pg.1191). Surprisingly, on one of their graphs analyzing the UKs mood, it has remained fairly constant for 1973 to 2014, 2 years before their break. They conclude that “The level of support in each domestic constituency is likely to shape member states’ EU policy and their position in negotiations, as well as the outcomes of EU elections and referendums” (1194), leading to the idea that dissatisfaction is one of the main contributors to disintegration.

# Method and Analysis

While looking at the reasons why the UK chose to leave, a number of questions arose, such as what countries and groups of people are more dissatisfied and who would possibly leave next? A few hypotheses that will be tested are:

- The Soviet Union was in a sense a supranational government, so would countries that are former satellite states trust the EU? Warsaw Pact Satellite states include Czechia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Romania, East Germany and Bulgaria
- There has always been an argument on white collar individuals and blue-collar workers. I hypothesize that they will be polarized
- Political wings are always divisive over policies and actions to be taken within a country, but in this case, the Union. Do those who ID as right-wing view EU proposals as unfavorable?

In order to get a good idea on how the citizens of the EU feel, I use the 2018 Eurobarometer. While the data is from 2018, it is still recent enough to give us a good idea on how people see the EU, especially since it is after the UK's 2016 referendum to leave the EU. It includes variables such as trust in the EU, nationality, political ideology, occupation, age, etc., from all (at the time) 28 member states. It also enables me to look deeper into the different demographics inside a country. By doing this, I can analyze the divisions within a country.

## Hypothesis 1:

*The Soviet Union was in a sense a supranational government, so would countries that are former satellite states trust the EU?*

For my first hypothesis, I look at former Soviet satellite states, specifically Warsaw Pact states, and if they trust the EU. There are 9 former Warsaw Pact States; Czechia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Romania, East Germany, and Bulgaria. The idea came to me while reading about Romania's integration into the EU, "Competence, Participation, and Political Loyalty in the Process of Romania's Integration in the EU" by Avram and Radu. I wanted to see why they trust a supranational government after being subjected to Soviet Rule. For the study, I analyze the variable "trust in EU" which measures if the respondents trust the EU. Another variable I use is "Globalization Threatens Identity", which measures respondents' feelings of globalization and whether it hurts the individual country's identity. The first step, however, was recoding the country variable to give me just the Warsaw pact countries. Once that was finished, I was able to determine the results for the countries of Czechia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Romania, East Germany, and Bulgaria.

I first tested the Trust in EU variable in Warsaw Pact countries By looking at the table, we see that the Czech Republic has the highest percentage of respondents who do not trust the EU, followed by the East Germans, followed by the Hungarians. (Table 1.1). However, there is a fair number of countries with an even split, and even some who trust the EU more, surprisingly former Soviet Union states Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. By analyzing this section of data, I would assume that if dissatisfaction was the sole cause of EU disintegration, the next exit from former Soviet nations would be the Czech Republic or Hungary. Lambda is used to tell us if the independent variable predicts the dependent variable if lambda is 1. This test produces a lambda

of .091, which tells us that there is a fairly strong relationship between the two variables.

However, the Chi-square tells us that we should reject the null hypothesis because it has a value of .000.

One thing that is always brought up is identity. One thing that former Satellite states fell victim to was losing their identity and being referred to as the “USSR”, even though only 3, Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia, were officially a part of it. While being Warsaw Pact members, however they were heavily under the influence of the Soviet Union. This brought up my next test within this hypothesis, testing the Former Soviet States and “Globalization threatens Identity”. (Table 1.2). As expected, most tended to agree rather than disagree. Both tend to disagree and tend to agree were very close in their percentages, that it is really a toss-up. Interesting enough, in table 1.3 on if Globalization is an opportunity most nations consider Globalization to be an opportunity. Even though the trust in the EU is scarce and the fear of losing their national identity by means of globalization, most of the former Soviet satellite States view globalization as an opportunity.

## Hypothesis 2:

*There has always been an argument on white collar individuals and blue-collar workers. I hypothesize that they will be polarized.*

For my second hypothesis, I analyzed one of the classic arguments, White Collar beliefs versus those in the working class, or blue collar. For this, I needed to gather the respondents occupation, and how they feel about the EU by looking at a few questions, such as “Is the EU going in the right direction?”, “EU Positive image?”, “EU waste of money”, “Satisfied with EU democracy”, and finally to see if there is a difference in understanding how the EU works, I

included the response to the question “Understanding how the EU works” which is an ordinal variable that measures how much the respondents understand the EU. I wanted to test the feelings on the EU in one of the most classic tests, the White Collar versus blue collar. First, I wanted to see who had more of an understanding of the EU. (Table 2.1) According to this table, most people tend to at least agree that they understand how the EU works, with only those described as “House Persons” having the highest percent of those who tend to disagree. Managers have the highest percent of people who understand how the EU works, with students, self-employed and other white collars being the next highest. By this we can conclude that each person in their occupation at least in some aspect understands what the EU is about.

Next , I tested trust in the EU and occupation. (Table 2.2) that those who are in the working class are less likely to trust the EU since they are more likely to be affected by some of the laws, especially fishing, environment, and others. The results I got were not quite what I expected. It showed that Managers were more likely to trust the EU, while the other White collar and those who are self-employed were more polarized on the issue. Manual workers, “house Persons”, and those that were unemployed were more likely to distrust the EU.

Those that are considered white collar surprised me that they were more likely to distrust the EU, all except for managers. Students were also more likely to trust the EU, while those in the working class did not trust the EU.

### Hypothesis 3:

*Political wings are always divisive over policies and actions to be taken within a country, but in this case, the Union. Do those who ID as right-wing view EU proposals as unfavorable?*

Finally, my third hypothesis analyzes attitudes on nationalism. Nationalism is a big deal right now. The UK left the EU in part because of nationalism, and more and more EU countries are seeing a rise in Nationalism. While not measured by the Eurobarometer, we can analyze if those that identify as Right-wing tend to be against EU proposals. By gathering the variables for political identity, feelings toward EU proposals, and within the country to see which ones view EU policies as unfavorable. My third hypothesis consists of looking at the Left-Right placement of individuals and the differences in their feelings on the current and potential EU policies. Some of the policies that will be focused on include a common currency, common trade policy, common defense policy, and common foreign policy. Most nationalists tend to think that there should be a “country first” policy, where the country comes up with their own policies and the EU serves as a trade bloc. Most nationalism comes out of the right.

Table 3.1 focuses on the relationship between the thoughts on a common currency and left-right placement. A common currency in Europe would be beneficial to all since there would be no need for an exchange rate. I would not be surprised if there was more that favor it across the political spectrum than not. The results, as I suspected, were not polarized based on their placement on the spectrum. Over 60% of each placement stated that they are for this, with the right having the highest number of those voting against coming from the right, which was sort of expected.

Table 3.2 focuses on the relationship between the thoughts on a common foreign policy and left-right placement. A Common foreign policy would mean that every country would have to abide by a singular policy, either towards countries in the Middle East, or Russia. Countries

closer to the external borders may not feel it should abide by those policies. However, we are not looking at that, we are looking at the attitudes towards it by left-right placement. Again, a common foreign policy would mean a shift more towards what Brussels thinks, rather than the country believes. The results were not what was to be expected. I had assumed that those who leaned right would not favor this by a large margin, however they were more for this than they were for a common currency. Also, those who leaned to the left were a little more favorable. There was also a large increase in respondents who did not know or refused to answer.

Table 3.3 focuses on the relationship between the thoughts on a common defense policy and left-right placement. A common defense policy would go hand in hand with a common foreign policy, especially those who border nations with high volatility. The results were increasingly surprising, with nearly 74% of each ideology giving it 74%. The reason for this, compared to just a foreign policy, might be due to the increased aggression by Russia, and those who might tend to be nationalists would be willing to work together to preserve their nations.

Table 3.4 focuses on the relationship between the thoughts on a common trade policy and left-right placement. Common trade is economically beneficial, especially on the international level. If one nation is usually unable to secure a trade deal with another country, they would benefit by being an EU member and not have to worry about deals with outside nations. That is possibly why many of those on the Right tend to have a higher rate of "For". However, a common trade policy gives a rise to the second highest number of those who do not know.

The Chi-square and lambda tests for all of these tests resulted in a .000. The chi-square tells us that we should reject the null hypothesis. This shows that there really is no significance in those identifying as right or left wing when it comes to polices. The Lambda tells us that in the tests there is no association between the variables.

**Table 1.1: Trust in EU within Former Warsaw Pact Countries**

		Warsaw Pact Countries										
		Czech Republic	Estonia	Hungary	Latvia	Lithuania	Poland	Slovakia	Romania	E-Germany	Bulgaria	Total
TRUST IN EUROPEAN UNION	Tend to trust	287	485	402	464	607	417	415	541	180	525	4323
		30.5%	61.4%	41.6%	54.8%	71.7%	47.2%	46.2%	56.5%	37.8%	62.2%	51.1%
	Tend not to trust	655	305	565	383	239	467	484	416	296	319	4129
		69.5%	38.6%	58.4%	45.2%	28.3%	52.8%	53.8%	43.5%	62.2%	37.8%	48.9%
Total		942	790	967	847	846	884	899	957	476	844	8452
		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Chi-Square: .000

Lambda: .091

**Table 1.2: Response to "Globalisation Threatens Identity" within Warsaw Pact Countries**

		Estonia	Hungary	Latvia	Lithuania	Poland	Slovakia	Romania	E-Germany	Bulgaria	Total
GLOBALISATION THREATENS IDENTITY	Totally agree	220	224	230	153	160	144	203	91	154	1807
		25.3%	23.7%	27.0%	18.6%	18.2%	17.2%	22.8%	19.0%	19.8%	21.8%
	Tend to agree	374	342	350	353	335	374	344	133	246	3216
		42.9%	36.2%	41.1%	42.8%	38.2%	44.7%	38.7%	27.7%	31.7%	38.8%
	Tend to disagree	197	290	202	247	311	267	266	168	256	2468
		22.6%	30.7%	23.7%	30.0%	35.5%	31.9%	29.9%	35.0%	32.9%	29.8%
Total	Totally disagree	80	88	69	71	71	52	77	88	121	796
		9.2%	9.3%	8.1%	8.6%	8.1%	6.2%	8.7%	18.3%	15.6%	9.6%
		871	944	851	824	877	837	890	480	777	8287
		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Chi-square: .000

Lambda: .011

**Table 1.3: Responses to "Globalisation Is Opportunity" by Warsaw Pact Countries**

		Warsaw Pact Countries										
		Czech Republic	Estonia	Hungary	Latvia	Lithuania	Poland	Slovakia	Romania	E-Germany	Bulgaria	Total
GLOBALISATION IS OPPORTUNITY	Totally agree	65	112	165	199	167	151	101	157	127	167	1411
		7.3%	15.3%	17.7%	23.5%	21.8%	17.7%	12.1%	17.8%	27.0%	21.3%	17.7%
	Tend to agree	340	328	460	401	434	414	359	400	201	345	3682
		38.4%	44.8%	49.4%	47.3%	56.6%	48.5%	42.9%	45.4%	42.7%	44.1%	46.1%
	Tend to disagree	332	214	209	169	135	223	262	241	106	181	2072
		37.5%	29.2%	22.4%	20.0%	17.6%	26.1%	31.3%	27.4%	22.5%	23.1%	25.9%
Total	Totally disagree	148	78	97	78	31	65	114	83	37	90	821
		16.7%	10.7%	10.4%	9.2%	4.0%	7.6%	13.6%	9.4%	7.9%	11.5%	10.3%
		885	732	931	847	767	853	836	881	471	783	7986
		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Chi-square: .000

Lambda: .018



**Table 2.1: EU Image by Occupation**

		RESPONDENT OCCUPATION								Total
		Self-employed	Managers	Other white collars	Manual workers	House persons	Unemployed	Retired	Students	
EU IMAGE - POSITIVE/NEGATIVE	Very positive	132 7.0%	253 8.5%	208 6.1%	290 5.1%	67 5.2%	54 3.8%	369 4.1%	180 11.1%	1553 5.7%
	Fairly positive	721 38.2%	1343 45.3%	1268 37.1%	1818 31.9%	386 30.1%	369 26.2%	2940 33.0%	732 45.0%	9577 35.2%
	Neutral	675 35.8%	989 33.4%	1391 40.7%	2537 44.5%	596 46.5%	624 44.3%	3638 40.8%	588 36.1%	11038 40.6%
	Fairly negative	280 14.8%	307 10.4%	450 13.2%	813 14.2%	179 14.0%	251 17.8%	1483 16.6%	102 6.3%	3865 14.2%
	Very negative	79 4.2%	73 2.5%	103 3.0%	249 4.4%	54 4.2%	109 7.7%	480 5.4%	26 1.6%	1173 4.3%
Total	1887 100.0%	2965 100.0%	3420 100.0%	5707 100.0%	1282 100.0%	1407 100.0%	8910 100.0%	1628 100.0%	27206 100.0%	

Chi-square:

Lambda: .016

**Table 2.2: Trust in EU by Occupation**

		RESPONDENT OCCUPATION SCALE (C14)								Total
		Self-employed	Managers	Other white collars	Manual workers	House persons	Unemployed	Retired	Students	
TRUST IN EUROPEAN UNION	Tend to trust	834 47.0%	1598 58.2%	1518 48.5%	2215 42.3%	476 41.4%	443 34.7%	3548 44.6%	941 63.0%	11573 46.7%
	Tend not to trust	942 53.0%	1148 41.8%	1614 51.5%	3020 57.7%	674 58.6%	834 65.3%	4400 55.4%	553 37.0%	13185 53.3%
Total		1776 100.0%	2746 100.0%	3132 100.0%	5235 100.0%	1150 100.0%	1277 100.0%	7948 100.0%	1494 100.0%	24758 100.0%

Chi-square: .000

Lambda: .030

**Table 2.3: Understanding the EU by Occupation**

		RESPONDENT OCCUPATION								Total
		Self-employed	Managers	Other white collars	Manual workers	House persons	Unemployed	Retired	Students	
UNDERSTAND HOW EU WORKS	Totally agree	338 18.1%	612 20.9%	462 13.7%	725 12.9%	118 9.4%	150 10.9%	1021 11.6%	239 15.0%	3665 13.7%
	Tend to agree	1021 54.6%	1772 60.4%	1962 58.0%	2780 49.3%	502 39.9%	612 44.6%	4064 46.3%	904 56.7%	13617 50.8%
	Tend to disagree	420 22.5%	482 16.4%	789 23.3%	1672 29.6%	454 36.1%	427 31.1%	2628 30.0%	361 22.7%	7233 27.0%
	Totally disagree	91 4.9%	67 2.3%	167 4.9%	463 8.2%	185 14.7%	184 13.4%	1061 12.1%	89 5.6%	2307 8.6%
Total	1870 100.0%	2933 100.0%	3380 100.0%	5640 100.0%	1259 100.0%	1373 100.0%	8774 100.0%	1593 100.0%	26822 100.0%	

Chi-square: .000

Lambda: .000

**Table 3.1: Thoughts on Single Currency by Left-Right Placement**

		LEFT-RIGHT PLACEMENT			Total
		Left	Centre	Right	
EU PROPOSALS: SINGLE CURRENCY	For	4454 69.2%	6291 70.5%	3605 63.5%	14350 68.2%
	Against	1983 30.8%	2628 29.5%	2075 36.5%	6686 31.8%
Total		6437 100.0%	8919 100.0%	5680 100.0%	21036 100.0%

Chi-square: .000

Lambda: .000

**Table 3.2: Thoughts on Common Foreign Policy by Left-Right Placement**

		LEFT-RIGHT PLACEMENT			Total
		Left	Centre	Right	
EU PROPOSALS: COMMON FOREIGN POLICY	For	4473 71.9%	6260 72.5%	3771 68.0%	14504 71.1%
	Against	1746 28.1%	2378 27.5%	1778 32.0%	5902 28.9%
Total		6219 100.0%	8638 100.0%	5549 100.0%	20406 100.0%

Chi-square: .000

Lambda: .000

**Table 3.3: Thoughts on Common Defense Policy by Left-Right Placement**

		LEFT-RIGHT PLACEMENT			Total
		Left	Centre	Right	
EU PROPOSALS: COMMON DEFENCE POLICY	For	5017 79.2%	7110 80.7%	4408 77.6%	16535 79.4%
	Against	1315 20.8%	1705 19.3%	1272 22.4%	4292 20.6%
Total		6332 100.0%	8815 100.0%	5680 100.0%	20827 100.0%

Chi-square: .000

Lambda: .000

**Table 3.4 Thoughts on Common Trade Policy by Left-Right Placement**

		LEFT-RIGHT PLACEMENT			Total
		Left	Centre	Right	
EU PROPOSALS: COMMON TRADE POLICY	For	4969 79.5%	6941 79.9%	4284 76.9%	16194 79.0%
	Against	1282 20.5%	1741 20.1%	1285 23.1%	4308 21.0%
Total		6251 100.0%	8682 100.0%	5569 100.0%	20502 100.0%

Chi-square: .000

Lambda: .000

## Conclusion

Encroachment is a rather big debate. While most scholars and writers do admit that the EU takes away some rights of the member states, most seem to agree that the benefit from membership outweighs the minor changes to the constitutions that are required to participate. My data shows that most people from the current 27 members generally favor the EU, with a few outliers here and there. The move towards more integration into the EU proves to be too beneficial than the idea of breaking away and trying to get a decent trade deal with the EU, among other issues. Other theories on “Czexit”, “Grexit”, and “Itexit”, terms for the possible exits of Czechia, Greece, and Italy respectively, at the time of Britain leaving the Union was a big debate. However, the process that the UK took to break from the EU will possibly discourage any more breaks. The data from my research also shows that EU support and policy support in countries is rather high, regardless of party identification, however the amount of people who participated in the survey can only give a general idea of the feelings towards the EU, since there are only a few who participate. Still, the likelihood of another break is very unlikely anytime soon.

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